

JPRS-NEA-94-047
26 August 1994



**FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE**

JPRS Report

Near East & South Asia

This report contains information which is or may be copyrighted in a number of countries. Therefore, copying and/or further dissemination of the report is expressly prohibited without obtaining the permission of the copyright owner(s).

Near East & South Asia

JPRS-NEA-94-047

CONTENTS

26 August 1994

NEAR EAST

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Influence of NPT on Region Examined	1
Interview With Hans Blix Presented [Cairo AL-AHRAM 27 Jul]	1
Arab Perspective on Nuclear Policy [Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-DUWALI 29 Jul]	3
North African Immigration Statistics Reported [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE 10 Aug]	5

ALGERIA

Attack on French Nationals; Zitouni Group [Algiers EL WATAN 4 Aug]	9
Islamists Detained Throughout France Named [LE FIGARO 7 Aug]	9
Islamists Questioned in Paris, Marseille [Paris LE MONDE 13 Aug]	10
Kebir 'Violates' Ban; Islamist Press Banned [LE MATIN 10 Aug]	11
Background Information on Rabah Kebir [Paris LE MONDE 13 Aug]	11
Haddam, Zaoui Contrasted: FIS Tactical Maneuver [EL WATAN 3 Aug]	12
FIS Financial Support Discussed [Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR 11-17 Aug]	13
Background on Leadership of GIA [London AL-MAJALLAH 20 Aug]	14
Dialogue: Nahnah Offers To Serve as Mediator [EL WATAN 28 Jul]	16
Commando Operation Reported; Chebouti's Whereabouts [VSD 10 Aug]	16
Evolution of Armed Groups To Present Structure [Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR 11-17 Aug]	18
Folembay: Some Detainees Named; Background [Paris LIBERATION 7 Aug]	21
Folembay: Omar Saker Responds to Charges [EL WATAN 8 Aug]	22
Folembay: Student Held for Possession of Weapons [LE MATIN 10 Aug]	22
Imam Larbi Kechat Held in Folembay [Paris LE MONDE 15 Aug]	23
Arms Smuggling Networks Detailed [Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI 12 Aug]	23
Differences Among Armed Groups Discussed [Paris LIBERATION 8 Aug]	27
Explanation of Laws for Detaining Islamists [Paris LIBERATION 8 Aug]	29
Escalation of Islamist Violence Examined [Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI 29 Jul]	29
Kabylia Said Under Increased 'Terrorist' Attacks [EL WATAN 1 Aug]	32
Struggle To Resist Terrorism in Chlef Described [EL WATAN 25 Jul]	33
Increased Violence, Sabotage in Tizi Ouzou Detailed [EL WATAN 23 Jul]	35
EL HAQ Editor on Risk of Civil War [Paris LIBERATION 2 Aug]	36
Journalist Questioned; Organizations Protest [Paris LE MONDE 15 Aug]	36
Scientists Return Home To Participate in Forum [EL WATAN 8 Aug]	37

EGYPT

Survey of Independent Press Presented [London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT 27 May]	38
---	----

ISRAEL

Strength of Religious Zionism Expected To Grow [AL HAMISHMAR 22 Jul]	42
--	----

TUNISIA

Efforts To Eradicate Environmental Pollution	44
Environmental Minister Discusses Programs [REALITES 30 Jun]	44
Industrial Pollution Sources Identified [REALITES 30 Jun]	46

SOUTH ASIA

INDIA

Papers Assess Outcome of O'Leary Visit	48
'New Thrust' to Relations [THE HINDU 21 Jul]	48
Greater Firmness Needed [THE TIMES OF INDIA 15 Jul]	49
Further Details on PRC Foreign Minister's Visit	50
Qian 18 Jul Press Conference [THE HINDU 19 Jul]	50
Missile Scheme Discussed [THE HINDU 19 Jul]	50
Analyst's Assessment [THE HINDU 20 Jul]	51
Further Reportage on Relations With PRC	52
Border Trade Resumed [THE TIMES OF INDIA 20 Jul]	52
Economic Ties Stressed [THE TIMES OF INDIA 23 Jul]	52
Pakistan, India Expel Diplomats for Spying [THE TIMES OF INDIA 13 Jul]	53
Spokesman Reports No Progress in Talks With Pakistan [THE TIMES OF INDIA 23 Jul]	55
Militant Incursions Said Beginning in Ram Nagar [PUNJAB KESARI 3 Aug]	55
Congress-I Said Worried About Effects of Scandal [JANSATTA 2 Aug]	57

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Influence of NPT on Region Examined

Interview With Hans Blix Presented

94LD0075Z Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 27 Jul 94 p 5

[Interview with Hans Blix by Mustafa 'Abdallah in Vienna; date not given: "The Agency Is Not an Enforcing Body; It has No Army to Force Countries to Cooperate"—first two paragraphs are AL-AHRAM introduction]

[Text] With mounting questions in political, scientific, and nuclear circles about the Nuclear Nonproliferation Agreement [NPT] and the extent to which the North Korean position might influence the likelihood of its being weakened, AL-AHRAM interviewed Dr. Hans Blix, Director of the International Atomic Energy Agency, in his office at the third UN headquarters in the Austrian capital, Vienna. The interview dealt with the Agency's position relative to North Korea as compared to its positions on Iraq and Israel, and its attention to developing countries as relates to their activities and budgets. The issue of guarantees in the Middle East also came up, and means for establishing peace at a time when one country in the region maintains a nuclear arsenal.

AL-AHRAM started the dialogue with the nuclear problem in North Korea. [passage omitted]

[AL-AHRAM] Do you think the Agency's treatment of North Korea—one of the countries that signed the NPT—will encourage more countries to sign the treaty?

[Blix] I don't think any other countries intend to leave the treaty because of North Korea's position. Generally speaking, it is not reasonable for a country that has joined the treaty to insist on refusing or resisting the nuclear inspection of its nuclear facilities over the years. It is one of the provisions of the treaty, and you can, if you like, call such behavior a weakening of the treaty. At present we see no end to this issue yet. I am convinced that one of the chief aims of the dialogue America is conducting with North Korea and other countries is to convince these countries to respect the NPT fully.

[AL-AHRAM] Many observers believe that the Agency's position on North Korea and Iraq is entirely different from its position on other countries that have the same nuclear activities—such as Israel, for example. What do you have to say about this, as director of the Agency?

[Blix] I believe there is a complete misunderstanding of the situation. The Agency's mission is to conduct inspections of the nuclear sector in the countries that have actually joined the NPT. This is what we are doing in Korea, Iraq, Egypt, Sweden, Switzerland, and other countries. It is not the Agency's right to conduct such investigations in India or Israel, because they did not sign the treaty.

[AL-AHRAM] This leads me to my next question, which is: May one conclude that the countries that signed the treaty have hurt themselves, while the other countries have exempted themselves from your inspection? Do you think that is fair?

[Blix] Again, this is a misunderstanding. The countries that accepted the Agency's monitoring enjoy a special distinction, that the Agency's tests tell the world that a country is not bringing in nuclear raw materials for its use in manufacturing weapons. These countries have joined the treaty, of their own free will, on this condition. What these countries seek is to obtain the Agency's certificate that they are using their atomic installations for peaceful purposes; this is the distinction. There is a big difference between the way Pakistan is dealt with, and India, and Israel, and a country like Egypt on the other hand.

[AL-AHRAM] What is the difference?

[Blix] The difference is that Israel cannot buy nuclear power plants from the world market. And Israel is subject to many restrictions relating to the import of nuclear materials. Egypt has none of these problems.

The NPT stipulates that its member states enjoy the distinction of the ability to exchange expertise and obtain technical assistance in the field of the atom. This is the case with Egypt but not with Israel or India; they have genuine problems bringing in technology from abroad.

North Korea has been compared to Israel. North Korea, which is a developing country, has bought and built the greatest number of atomic reactors in the world. They generate 40 percent of their electricity from nuclear power, and they would not have been able to do that had they not been signatories to the treaty. Egypt, too, can do the same; Israel, India, and Pakistan, no. You think that joining the NPT brings nothing but the pressure of inspections. That's a mistake; there are also benefits, the Agency's certificate that the country is using the atom for peaceful purposes, and no country can obtain nuclear raw materials unless they have this certificate.

I understand the feelings of a person in the Middle East region who wants Israel to join the NPT. It would be a wonderful thing, for the Middle East to be free of nuclear weapons.

[AL-AHRAM] Why doesn't Israel sign the treaty?

[Blix] You'll have to ask them—I'm not a representative of the Israeli Government.

[AL-AHRAM] But Israel is a member of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

[Blix] Yes, Israel, India, and Pakistan are members of the Agency, but that does not mean they are committed to signing the treaty.

[AL-AHRAM] Is the Agency planning to expand its activity in the field of combating nuclear weapons to include—for example—a nuclear test ban treaty, or one to monitor the production of enriched plutonium and uranium, or an agreement to reduce the military nuclear stockpile?

[Blix] No. We are merely a technical agency. It is not our job to negotiate agreements. That is the job of governments. In Geneva they are now discussing an agreement on nuclear testing. As soon as such an agreement is reached, nuclear inspections will have to be conducted to guarantee the implementation of that agreement. At that point, the Agency would be entrusted with some or all of these inspections. Similarly, there is talk of what is called a "cut-off" agreement, dealing with preventing countries from producing enriched plutonium or uranium for military purposes. This agreement would require intensive inspections. These are the Agency's job. We take part in negotiations only in a technical capacity—we are called in to decide what tests are necessary to guarantee the implementation of the agreement and what technical assistance the Agency might offer.

[AL-AHRAM] Let us both imagine that the Middle East actually became free of nuclear weapons. What, in your view, would be the best legal methods to be employed in that case? What are the practical ways for reaching that goal?

[Blix] The General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency asked the director general to prepare a draft agreement to make the Middle East a nuclear weapons free zone. There were a number of consultations with the governments of countries in the region—Egypt, Israel, Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates [UAE]—on possible methods for reaching that goal.

What is for sure is that in that case the inspections would be stricter than those we are conducting in the name of the NPT. It is also likely that there would be mutual bilateral inspections among the countries of the region. I personally do not believe that it would be possible to achieve a nuclear weapons free zone in the Middle East with the establishment of peace in the region. But there is no way out of establishing agreements for nuclear disarmament and weapons of mass destruction, such as biological and chemical weapons, when writing the texts of peace treaties between the countries of the region. It is certain that nuclear weapons free zones require intensive inspections, and that is our field of expertise. A number of ideas for methods of achieving this region have been submitted to the General Conference and the Agency's Board of Governors. The peoples of the region have a long history of distrust. There is nothing better than relying on neutral tests to restore trust. We have long experience at this, and we are ready to offer all aid to all parties in the region.

[AL-AHRAM] After the Chernobyl disaster, many countries, among them Egypt, changed their views on generating electricity and energy from nuclear reactors. How can you erase these fears?

[Blix] Egypt has nuclear power generating units, and I think they are still there, even if they are not working at full capacity. I believe the effects of the Chernobyl disaster are the major factor in Egypt's alarm and hesitation in this regard. In any case, developing countries, Egypt among them, will be needing more energy—specifically, more electricity. There are a limited number of ways of generating electricity, and actually the only major alternatives are burning fuels like coal, gas, or oil—or nuclear energy. Egypt tried exploiting the Nile through the Aswan dams. If you look at wind energy or solar energy you see that they satisfy small rates of electrical needs, and so in my view, Egypt's real choice lies between fuels or nuclear energy. I am confident that a country like Egypt will go back to thinking about nuclear energy. It is the most efficient and economical option and does not cause the environmental pollution problems that fuel stations do. Atomic energy stations cause no waste like that that comes from fuel burning stations. This alternative may at the present time seem expensive, and public opinion might harbor some fears, especially after the Chernobyl disaster. But I am confident Egypt will reconsider this.

[AL-AHRAM] To what extent is the Agency concerned with cooperation among developing countries as regards their activities and budget?

[Blix] We have a huge program for offering technical aid to developing countries, with a volume of \$70 million per year, and not only in the field of nuclear energy. That is only a small part of the program. The major part offers the use of atomic technology in medicine, agriculture, and industry. In Egypt, for example, we have given a great deal of aid in the field of nuclear medicine. Along with that there is research in what is called insect sterilization, through which the fruit flies, which are spreading in the Mediterranean countries, are sterilized. This would protect Egypt's fruit production—apples especially—from this destructive insect. Nuclear technology is also used to locate groundwater, by using isotopes. We have done that in the UAE and in Sudan. So the most important thing on our minds is helping developing countries to progress through the use of atomic technology, not only to generate electricity and energy but also in medicine and agriculture.

[AL-AHRAM] What is the situation with guarantees in the Middle East, and what is the Agency's position? How can there be peace in the Middle East when one of the countries possesses nuclear weapons?

[Blix] I think that in the long term, when there is peace in the Middle East, no country will need nuclear weapons. This is what is meant by making the region a nuclear weapons free zone. I hope the peace process leads not only to achieving peace but to a nuclear weapons free

zone as well. I hope that confidence will prevail among you if any one of you has nuclear weapons. As I have said, that should be stipulated in any peace accord.

Arab Perspective on Nuclear Policy

94LD0075Y Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-DUWALI in Arabic
29 Jul 94 p 6

[Article by Murad Ibrahim al-Disuqi of the Center for Political and Strategic Studies: "Towards a Just Global System of Nuclear Nonproliferation"]

[Text] The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty [NPT] has remained the main pillar of the nuclear nonproliferation system for more than 25 years. While this treaty has been successful in achieving some of the goals it was created to achieve—such as restricting the membership of the nuclear club to a limited number of countries, and preventing certain countries from obtaining certain technologies—the fact no one can deny is that the member states possess enough bombs and nuclear and hydrogen warheads, in light of this treaty, to destroy the earth several times over. If we were to convert the nuclear warheads in these countries' arsenals to their equivalent in high-explosive TNT, we would find that the share of every man, woman, and child on the face of the earth of these explosives in the world's nuclear arsenals would be 750 kg each. This is not counting the many types of conventional bombs in conventional weapons stockpiles.

When the NPT was signed in 1968, and when its implementation began in 1972, it was truly a precedent, unequalled in terms of agreements between global powers themselves on bases governing their activities in the nuclear field. Each one of the treaty's thirteen sections and each one of its 11 articles reflect to some extent the then intense and violent conflict between the superpowers, with no side able to achieve a specific future advantage at the expense of the other by exploiting the treaty's sections and articles. Even so, the treaty is full of gaps and chinks, and the shadow of nuclear weapons proliferation is spreading fast, threatening life on the face of the earth. Israel, for example, succeeded in becoming a nuclear power, with more nuclear warheads than France—or as many, at the very least—thanks to the intense inadequacy in the NPT's provisions, which does not deal with the issue of countries which are not signatories.

While arms limitation and arms control topics have become pillars of the foreign policy of numerous countries, the aim of achieving a universal NPT requires that there be essential changes to its sections and articles to get all countries, with no exceptions, to respect it. This is now that regional and international circumstances are now different from those circumstances in which the NPT was signed.

Conference to Renew and Review the NPT

The basic inadequacy of the NPT lies in its provisions, drawn up to deal with the situation that existed prior to

1968; and most sections of this treaty, its contents and application, were aimed at reaching the minimum accord between the former Soviet Union, in its capacity as the leader of the Eastern Bloc, and the United States, as the leader of the Western Bloc, and so the treaty may be described as being one to deal with a certain condition, and in spite of the fact that this treaty has enjoyed the consent of most of the countries of the world, 162 countries signed this treaty (Israel not among them) and it has remained virtually the basic pillar of the nuclear nonproliferation system.

While this large number of countries reflects a global feeling of the gravity of nuclear armament issues, the many existing aspects of inadequacy in the treaty's provisions show that universality at the implementational and executive level actually does not exist. The proof is that the international community has no means of finding out the positive points facing the countries that are not signatories to the treaty; nor do they have the practical means for showing Israel's actual nuclear weapons stockpiles. Nor has the treaty any provisions dealing with the warheads' delivery systems for their targets; nor does it address problems stemming from the use of modern technology in the production of advanced types of tactical nuclear bombs, nuclear mines, or neutron bombs.

The importance of the conference to renew and review the NPT, which will be held in New York in April-May 1995, is that it is an opportunity for non-nuclear countries, or countries which possess no nuclear weapons, and no intention of obtaining any, to seek to amend the treaty's regulations to increase its effectiveness, and so that the treaty may become a truly global treaty, respected by all parties, without exception. This despite the fact that amending the treaty's provisions is considered difficult—or even impossible—because that amendment requires laborious and exhausting consultations and negotiations for a long period of time. Plus, there are few motives for it on the part of the global powers active in this field, but the position of the countries hurt by nuclear weapons proliferation, and against which these forces might be used—chiefly the Arab countries confronting Israel, must seek to take advantage of the opportunity of this conference to reach a settlement through which a new framework may be established, one in keeping with new global developments, and the adoption of safeguards to guarantee the security and stability for all sides. It would provide them with guarantees for their defense from dangers stemming from nuclear weapons proliferation. We note that Israel has what may be called a "supreme monopoly" in the field of strategic conflict; it has the capability to launch a nuclear weapons strike via ballistic missiles and to prevent a response using anti-missile missiles. This is due to the inability—and impracticality—of the unilateral declarations made in the late 1970s by countries possessing nuclear weapons, with the flaw that the countries that exported them were not bound. The need for the effort to amend the NPT is growing, especially given

Security Council Resolution 255 considers "aggression with nuclear arms or the threat to use them to be something the Council does not approve" subject to the probability of its practical implementation through certain political curbs, such as the right to "veto" or considerations of civility.

Because Israel did not sign the NPT, it has been able to develop a huge nuclear arsenal, and has two nuclear reactors, of which one is an experimental reactor in Nahal Soreq, and the other the primary one in Dimona. While Israel has accepted the application of security safeguards on the Nahal Soreq reactor, it has refused to apply the same safeguards on the more important and dangerous Dimona reactor, as well as the rest of its nuclear installations. These include the one in the reactor itself, the nuclear fuel plant, the reprocessing plant, the uranium enrichment installation, and those located outside: the uranium 402 purification plant, or uranium UF6 conversion plant, and the heavy water plant in Rehovot.

Israel revealed its intentions regarding the nuclear non-proliferation system when it bombed the Iraqi nuclear reactor at Osiraq in June 1981, even though Iraq had in fact ratified the NPT, and the reactor and fuels or its operation were actually subject to international safeguards. So the claim that Israel will not use its nuclear weapons at what it sees as the proper time and in the proper way is something that cannot be verified. It is enough that Israel has in fact previously announced a state of high alert among its nuclear forces and assembled the warheads stockpiled in the Negev Desert during the October 1973 war. This is what the Soviet Union was responding to at the time by announcing a similar alert, and the United States immediately followed, when Nixon announced a state of high alert for America's nuclear forces in Europe.

This shows us the need for all sides harmed by nuclear weapons proliferation to support the international campaign for nuclear disarmament, which is aimed at taking advantage of the renewal and review conference next year in order to reconsider the countries' position on nuclear weapons proliferation, and to provide the world with a just system for stopping the spread of these weapons.

Available Alternatives to the NPT

With the rapid retreat of the idea of "the new world order," there will be an increase in countries' responsibilities in safeguarding their strategic security on their own—practically—especially in confronting the incessant and ongoing increase in nuclear weapons and the mounting efforts of new parties to obtain them. This is the thing that may yield a global arms race of a new kind. As long as the countries that possess nuclear weapons do not take the initiative to cooperate with the international community—given that they are part of it—to put an end to nuclear weapons proliferation, without distinction, with one standard applied to all parties, with no

exceptions, it becomes likely that what we might call nuclear anarchy will prevail in the world. This is a thing whose early signs appeared in the case of the dismantling of Ukraine's nuclear arms, and before that when Chernobyl exploded, and which could happen again at Israel's reactor at Dimona in the Negev Desert. Almost all reports are unanimous in stating that Dimona's hypothetical life is over, and the costs of cleaning it are exorbitant, with no chance of burying its nuclear waste.

One cause for optimism is the fact that the international climate regarding disarmament is progressing well, and disarmament subjects have become pillars of many countries' foreign policies. This would provide a fine opportunity, to a large extent, before the international nuclear nonproliferation campaign and the efforts of nongovernmental organizations to put forth their view and reach a formula capable of saving the world from this terrible danger. In view of the total conviction that disarmament is inevitable, development in present global circumstances arouses an important doubt: if the conflict between the two warring camps is at an end, why are the "deterrent" arms still around, and in such quantities? The objective answer to this question confirms that there is an imbalance in the view of the nuclear countries of their security, and they will disclose absolute sum pursued by these parties at the expense of the other countries. [sentence as published] And yet the quest to restore balance must not cease, nor should there be any room for despair. We are speaking of the common fate of humanity in confronting nuclear proliferation, especially as there is still a margin to maneuver for getting positive results.

If we speak of that margin for the global nuclear nonproliferation movement, we will see that it contains—in addition to an effective and constructive dialogue between its members and the nuclear countries—many issues in which progress can be made to obtain the success we need. There is the request to amend Security Council Resolution 255 and to get effective guarantees from the nuclear countries with the amendment of the unilateral declarations made in the late 1970s and to call upon the nuclear countries to eliminate nuclear weapons in a specific time period. This movement can also support regional initiatives to establish nuclear free zones, chiefly President Husni Mubarak's initiative to establish a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East.

But the establishment of these zones should not be at the expense of making Israel join the NPT, in terms of the amending of the treaty as it deploys its justice and efficacy to treat nuclear proliferation problems—this is the basic goal that this campaign must strive to meet.

Given the need of the Arab masses, and the masses of the Third World, for the information surrounding aspects of the nuclear proliferation issue, education will play an important role in mobilizing these masses for the good of the campaign. Thus it will be able to move on several

fronts, certainly including movement inside Israel. It is also essential to address the "original factor" in Israel's possession of nuclear weapons: the fact that (mainly) France and the United States provided funds, expertise, and facilities over a long-time period so that Israel would have a nuclear deterrent. Coordination and accord among the Arab countries will play a primary role in this dialogue yielding the desired results. It is essential that the international campaign for nuclear nonproliferation be ready to produce suitable alternatives to implement its basic goal, so that its efforts will not be frustrated by the difficulties of amending the NPT. Here we will find that there are numerous alternatives, such as the acceptance of the expansion of the partial nuclear test ban as a preparatory step towards amending the NPT, or going to the International Court of Justice to study the issue of nuclear proliferation. In any case, it is incumbent upon the global nuclear nonproliferation movement and non-governmental organizations to be determined that there be no NPT renewal for longer than a one-time five-year renewal, during which time there would be a fresh discussion of all the issues and topics that relate to nuclear proliferation, preparatory to amending the NPT in such a way as to achieve the fairness necessary to safeguard the security of all parties.

North African Immigration Statistics Reported

94AF0254A Paris *JEUNE AFRIQUE* in French
10 Aug 94 pp 14-21

[Article by Samir Gharbi: "The True Figures of African Immigration in France"—first paragraph is *JEUNE AFRIQUE* introduction]

[Text] Do you know that:

- one foreigner out of two comes from Africa;
- one refugee out of five comes from Africa;
- one naturalized citizen out of three comes from the Maghreb;
- one African out of four is unemployed;
- two foreign students out of three are African;
- two mixed marriages out of five are with someone from the Maghreb;
- one foreign newborn out of two is African.

A few months before the French presidential election, the debate on immigration is being revived. Politicians from the right or extreme right resume their old speeches on immigrants, blaming them for all—or almost all—the ills that plague French society: unemployment, crime, drugs, the Social Security deficit, etc. The figures are inflated on purpose: if we are to believe Jean Mottin, a State Council member, there are 9.64 million immigrants in France,¹ i.e., 16.7 percent of the total population and twice as many as indicated by the last official census results published on 9 June by the INSEE

[National Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies]: 4.2 million immigrants in 1990,² i.e., close to 4.6 million in 1994 if one takes the net annual increase into account.

But let us follow Jean Mottin's reasoning to the letter. Among the alleged 9.64 million, there would be 4.2 million workers, and therefore that many jobs less for the French.... According to him, the calculation is simple: there are, he claims, 6.1 million unemployed in France (that, too, is double the official figure). To give them jobs, all it takes is getting rid of the immigrants. QED.

We should recall here that France needs the immigrants as much as they need her. This fact has become quite clear since the end of World War II. "Recourse to foreign labor was a constant of French economy from 1945 to 1974," the High Integration Council (HCI) wrote in the report it handed over to prime minister Edouard Balladur on 9 December 1992.³ It went on to recall that, in 1945, the French Government estimated at 1.5 million the needs for foreign workers, "in order to meet France's reconstruction and production objectives during the 1945-1950 five-year plan." Since then, and until the first oil crisis, the National Immigration Office (ONI) has kept importing labor, especially from North and West Africa.

President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing put a brake on immigration in 1974, but he did not entirely close the borders. The French economy still needed a cheap labor force that could be made to toil at pleasure, so that immigrants, albeit in much reduced numbers, continued to settle in France, sometimes legally, often illegally: 150,000 regularized their position in 1982 when the Socialists came to power, and thousands more did the same later on. Even under interior minister Charles Pasqua, legal immigrants are still allowed in at the rate of 100,000 per year on the average (all origins taken together).

If illegal immigrants—which include fewer and fewer Africans—keep coming and find jobs, it means that there is a demand somewhere. In fact, the competitiveness, even the survival of several French companies depend on unreported labor, cheap labor. The HCI thus acknowledged that "even in a context of extended unemployment," labor shortages will persist for the next five to 10 years....

The objective of this memorandum is to publish as accurate an estimate as is possible of the number of Africans—from both north and south of the Sahara—who legally reside in France, based on the most recent official documents.⁴ The specific problem of illegal immigrants, while always current, was overlooked on purpose. It will form the subject of a forthcoming *JEUNE AFRIQUE* survey.

1. How Many Foreigners Are There?

The total population of metropolitan France on 1 January 1994 was estimated at close to 58 million.⁵ It consisted of two groups: the French, 54 million (about 52 million by birth and 2 million by acquisition), and the foreigners, 4 million. According to Philippe Bernard of the daily LE MONDE, "nearly one French citizen out of five has at least one immigrant parent or grandparent. That makes over 10 million people who, today, owe their presence in this country to immigration."⁶

2. How Many Immigrants Are There?

All those who confuse foreigners and immigrants are mistaken.⁷ Immigrants straddle the two groups: that of the French and that of the foreigners. In fact, there are two immigrant categories: those who retained their original citizenship and therefore remain foreigners, and those who have acquired French citizenship and have therefore become French citizens—legally full-fledged French citizens.

The children of immigrants—said to form the "second generation"—are, for their part, foreigners born in France. They are not immigrants since they did not come from another country and since they may chose French citizenship when they are 16 and until they are 21, without too many formalities, although their parents are under no obligation to do the same. If we extrapolate the trends derived from the 1990 census, the number of immigrants, excluding the children born in France, may be estimated at about 4.6 million in 1994 (compared with 1 million in 1962), 1.5 million of whom have acquired French citizenship while 3.1 million retained their original citizenship.

According to the calculations of Michele Tribalat, researcher at the National Institute for Demographic Studies (INED), the population issued from immigration—all family members when the head of the family is an immigrant—amounted to 6.1 million in 1990.⁸ The figures in this field are very complex and difficult to handle. At any rate, we ought to know one thing: "repatriated citizens from Algeria" (the "harkis" [North African troops who sided with France]) are not included among the immigrants, nor among the foreigners—they are counted as French citizens. Their numbers vary, depending on the sources, between 400,000 and 800,000, not including their descendants.

These are the general data that enable us to have a better idea of the African population of metropolitan France, at least as far as it is included in statistics.

3. One Foreigner Out of Two Is African

According to the 1990 census, out of a total of 56.6 million inhabitants, 3.6 million stated that they possessed a foreign citizenship. Africans—from north and south of the Sahara—were the most numerous: 1,630,000, including 424,000 born in France.

Africa is now the leading geographic region of origin of foreigners: 45 percent are African, 41 percent European, 12 percent Asiatic, and 2 percent American.

Main Countries of Origin in 1990
(rounded numbers of nationals in decreasing order)

Algeria	614,000
Morocco	573,000
Tunisia	206,000
Senegal	44,000
Mali	38,000
Zaire	23,000
Cameroon	18,000
Ivory Coast	17,000
Mauritius	13,000
Congo	13,000
Madagascar	9,000
Togo	6,000
Guinea	6,000

As a whole, French-speaking Black Africa (177,000) "weighs" less than Tunisia (260,000).

The breakdown by age is similar for Maghreb and Black Africa: 10 percent of nationals are under 14; 15 percent are aged 15 to 24; 72 percent, 25 to 64; and 3 percent are over 64.

4. One New Immigrant Out of Two Comes From Africa

Africa is the leading continent of origin of the immigrants who are allowed into France each year: 50,500 in 1992, or 56 percent of all non-EU [European Union] immigrants (90,724) compared with 48,900 (or 50 percent) in 1991. Africans are twice as numerous as Asiatics, and six times as numerous as Americans.

Breakdown of New African Immigrants by Reason of Admittance in 1992

Family Reunion	37,000
Work	9,500
Political asylum	1,800
Permanent guests	2,200
1992 total	50,500

a. Family Reunion

Families are reunited either around an African parent (21,800 cases) or around a French parent (15,200 cases).

Breakdown by country of origin: Morocco comes first with 15,400 individuals (42 percent of the African total), followed by Algeria (9,700), Tunisia (3,500), French-speaking Black Africa (5,000), and the rest of Africa.

b. Work Permit

The number of new African workers (salaried employees, merchants, craftsmen) authorized to work in France amounted to 9,500 in 1992, i.e., 48 percent of the non-EU total.

That is an increase of 64 percent compared with 1991 (5,800), due to the one-time regularization of the position of asylum seekers whose applications were turned down.

Breakdown by country of origin: Algeria (1,600), Morocco (700), Tunisia (200), French-speaking Black Africa (2,100), rest of Africa (4,900).

c. Political Asylum

The status of political refugees was granted to 1,800 Africans in 1992 (compared with 2,300 in 1991), i.e., 17 percent of the total. This compared with 7,500 Asiatics (70 percent of the total).

Breakdown by country of origin: Zaire (622), Mauritania (331), Angola (179), Tunisia (55), Morocco (26), Algeria (14), other French-speaking Black African countries (174), rest of Africa (419).

d. Permanent Guests

Holders of "temporary" residence permits, these 2,200 Africans nevertheless belong to the permanent-immigrants category (98 percent are reported to be unemployed).

African "guests" accounted for 45 percent of the (non-EU) total. They came mostly from Algeria (900), Morocco (900), and Tunisia (200).

5. "Temporary" Immigrants

Every year, French authorities admit a restricted number of "temporary" immigrants, for various reasons: job qualifications (engineers, technicians, etc.), political situation (asylum seekers), university studies and training periods. In 1992, 19,200 were admitted, i.e., 37 percent of the non-EU total. This figure was much lower than in 1991 (27,700). Actually, entry has become far more difficult for students (entries decreased by 16 percent in 1992, compared with 1991) and asylum seekers (43-percent decrease).

Breakdown of African Temporary Immigrants Per Reason of Admittance in 1992

High job qualification	700
Training periods	200
Studies	8,900
Asylum seekers	9,400
1992 total	19,200

a. High Job Qualification

Executives, engineers, technicians, teachers, and other "brains" are allowed to work in France temporarily (nine-month renewable work permit). The 700 Africans admitted in 1992 accounted for 18 percent of the non-EU total. They came mostly from Morocco (300), Algeria (150), and Tunisia (100).

b. Training Periods

One-third of non-EU trainees (administrative, professional, or corporate training) came from Africa: one-half from the Maghreb and one-half from the rest of Africa.

c. Asylum Seekers

With 9,400 asylum seekers in 1992, Africa came second after Asia (13,000). Its share of the total decreased (40 percent in 1990, 33 percent in 1992). But 43 African countries out of 53 "supply" asylum seekers.

Main Countries of Origin of Asylum Seekers in 1992

Zaire	3,100
Mali	1,100
Guinea	800
Mauritania	600
Algeria	600*
Angola	300
Tunisia	200
Mauritius	65
Morocco	50

* This figure was in marked increase in 1994.

Africans experienced the highest rejection rate: 85 percent of applications were denied, compared with only 15 percent for Southeast Asia nationals (Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam).

6. Those Who Choose To Go Back

The results of the program of aid to immigrant workers volunteering to go back home show that about 20,000 took advantage of it from 1984 to 1992, i.e., two-thirds of the total. Note that the program became obsolete in 1989 (164 returns in 1992, compared with 14,000 in 1985).

Main Countries of Destination of African Immigrants Who Chose To Go Back Home for Good From 1984 to 1992

Algeria	12,600
Morocco	4,000
Tunisia	1,700

7. Those Who Become French

Over one-half of naturalized immigrants are Africans, and over one-third are from the Maghreb. A total of 32,000 Africans acquired French citizenship in 1992, i.e., 54 percent of the total (59,000, not including naturalizations without formalities: 52,000). That proportion was 32 percent in 1988, and 10 percent in 1975.

The proportion of natives of the Maghreb doubled in five years: from 21 percent in 1988 to 42 percent in 1992. Ahead of all latin countries, Morocco has been the leading country of origin of "new French citizens by acquisition" since 1990, followed by Algeria, Portugal, Tunisia, and Vietnam.

Main Countries of Origin of Africans Who Chose Naturalization in 1992

Morocco	12,300
Algeria	7,400
Tunisia	5,000
French-speaking Black Africa	4,900*
Rest of Africa	2,400

* Seventeen countries; no breakdown by country is available.

When the last census was completed in 1990, the cumulative number of French citizens of African origin amounted to 300,000, i.e., 17 percent of all naturalized French citizens (1.8 million in 1990). Former African citizens were twice as numerous as former Asiatic citizens.

To have an idea of the size of the African community in France, we should add the number of African foreigners and the number of African-French citizens. This amounted to 2 million, i.e., 3.5 percent of the 1990 population of metropolitan France.

8. Those Who Are Unemployed

One African worker out of four is unemployed. Of 1,633,000 Africans, 673,000 were active: 492,000 were working, and 181,000 were unemployed (1990). The unemployment rate among Africans was the highest of all: 27 percent. It was 26 percent for Asiatics, 17 percent for East Europeans, and 10.6 percent for France as a whole.

African-born French citizens were no better off than African foreigners when it comes to finding a job. Their unemployment rate was 23 percent.

9. Those Who Are in School

Two-thirds of foreign students are African. Over one-half of them are from the Maghreb. A total of 652,000 African students were registered in public and private primary and secondary schools in 1991-1992. They accounted for 62.6 percent of the non-French school population. The number of students from the Maghreb

was 562,000, nearly three times as many as (non-French) European students.

Main Countries of Origin of African Students in 1991-1992

Morocco	260,000
Algeria	225,000
Tunisia	77,000
Rest of Africa	90,000

10. Those Who Marry a Frenchman or a Frenchwoman

Four mixed marriages out of 10 are with someone from the Maghreb: 13,000 in 1991 out of a total of 33,000. Mixed marriages with natives of the Maghreb accounted for nearly 5 percent of all marriages celebrated in France in 1991 (280,000).

In the breakdown according to the spouse's citizenship, Moroccans followed by Algerians come first and second, with the Portuguese (who ranked first until 1987) in the third place.

In five years, the number of girls from the Maghreb who married a French citizen increased faster than the number of boys doing the same: +113 percent for Algerian girls, +220 percent for Moroccan girls, and +88 percent for Tunisian girls.

Breakdown by country: 6,000 mixed marriages with a Moroccan spouse, 5,500 with an Algerian spouse, and 1,500 with a Tunisian spouse.

11. Those Who Have the Greater Number of Children

Over one-half of foreign children born in France in 1991 had at least one African parent: 43,000 children, i.e., exactly 53 percent of the total of foreign children, or 6 percent of all births in France.

Breakdown of births by country: Morocco (14,000), Algeria (13,000), Tunisia (6,000), rest of Africa (10,000).

The fertility of African women is two to three times greater than that of French women. It is 4.8 children per woman from Sahelian Africa, 3.7 per Tunisian woman, 3.5 per Moroccan woman, 3.2 per Algerian woman, and 1.7 per French woman.

Footnotes

1. "Unemployment and Immigration," Jean Mottin, State Council member, in LE FIGARO dated 13 April 1994.
2. "Foreigners in France," series "Outlines and Characters" published by the INSEE, 160 pages, 78 French francs [Fr].
3. "Foreigners and Employment. Illegal Employment of Foreigners," Statistical report, High Council on Integration, Paris, December 1992.

4. "Immigration and Foreign Presence in France," Andre Lebon, Ministry of Social Affairs, Health, and Cities, Directorate of Population and Migrations, Paris, November 1993, 140 pages.
5. Not including the DOM-TOM [Overseas Departments and Territories] population and French citizens residing abroad, who were estimated to number 1.6 million in 1993.
6. "France From Elsewhere," Philippe Bernard in LE MONDE dated 8 March 1994.
7. We shall use here the word "immigrant" rather than "emigrant" because the reasoning deals with the host country, not the countries of origin.
8. "Immigrants and Populations Linked to Their Settlement in France, 1990," Michele Tribalat, POPULATION magazine, No. 6-1993, INED [National Demographic Studies Institute], Fr130.

ALGERIA

Attack on French Nationals; Zitouni Group

94AF0257D Algiers EL WATAN in French
4 Aug 94 p 3

[Article by Ghania Oukazi: "Five Frenchmen Assassinated"]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] It happened around 07:30. Four terrorists in a Nissan car opened fire on the guard station and forced their way into the yard of the school and buildings housing French embassy and consulate personnel. The Nissan was left near one of the buildings, sources close to security forces reported. The plan was for a car bombing. In fact, the vehicle was loaded with explosives. The criminals who were on board left it immediately and rushed into another vehicle that was waiting for them outside the complex. According to the French defense minister, Francois Leotard, the bomb placed inside the Nissan was defused just in time. He indicated that the terrorists were placing a car-bomb in front of the building that houses part of the staff of the French consulate in Algiers. The gendarmes, he said, were killed during an exchange of fire with the armed group. Bullets hit and killed the two civil servants as they were leaving the building. The slaughter occurred a few meters from the gendarmerie unit located at the entrance of the Ain-Allah development.

French families residing in the development were evacuated, presumably to the French Embassy in a first stage, and then to Paris.

The attack itself is strangely similar to the attack aimed one month ago at the El-Kosseiria restaurant located inside the Ben-Aknoun attraction park, where two foreigners and one Algerian executive were killed. There are many indications as to the identity of the author of the Ain-Allah crime. According to a source close to security

forces, it is most probably Zitouni, leader of the "Katibat El Moute" group, or death squad, belonging to the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) and acting under orders from Gousmi, also known as Abou-Abdellah Ahmed.

Defying moral standards, the "Zitouni" group specializes in the assassination of foreigners. It usually operates in Birkhadem, Saoula, Tixeriane, and other communities in the area. It is responsible for the assassination of the two French priests that took place at the beginning of the year and that of the Russian diplomat found dead in his car near Saoula, to mention only these two.

Immediately after the attack, helicopters and police cars were deployed throughout the region in an intensive search operation.

The French authorities reacted as soon as they learned the macabre news. In fact, according to the AFP, France, through its minister of foreign affairs, Alain Juppe, denounced this new act of barbarity and advised its nationals to go back to France if their presence here is not indispensable. According to the AFP, in a communique, which arrived in Algeria yesterday at the beginning of the afternoon at the same time as defense minister Francois Leotard, the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated: "Paris takes this opportunity to ask the Algerian authorities to take additional protective measures."

As is known, since September 1993, when terrorist groups issued their call for death to foreigners, 15 Frenchmen, including those who died yesterday, have been assassinated. This brings to 56 the number of foreigners killed to date.

Islamists Detained Throughout France Named

94AF0246B Paris LE FIGARO in French 7 Aug 94 p 5

[Article by Francoise Lemoine: "New Sweep Nets 16 Islamists"]

[Text] The Armed Islamic Group (GIA) yesterday claimed credit for Wednesday's assassination of five Frenchmen in Algiers. Forty-eight hours after the terrorist attack, France reacted: Nine FIS [Islamic Salvation Front] activists and/or sympathizers living in the Paris region or the provinces were "picked up" at the crack of dawn. At Folembray barracks (in Aisne, 25 km from Soissons), they joined seven Islamist militants (six men and one woman) arrested on Tuesday night, including Djaffar el-Houari, president of the Algerian Fraternity in France (FAF). The seven had already been put under "assigned residence" in the aftermath of a 9 November 1993 police operation targeting Islamist circles believed to be close to the FIS. Interior Minister Charles Pasqua said yesterday evening that the "16 Islamist fundamentalists under assigned residence" have "all been issued expulsion orders." He also indicated that the 16 notorious activists would not be expelled to Algeria, where their lives would be in danger, but France would try to find a country willing to receive them.

Authorities swung into action at 0600 yesterday morning, when police from General Investigations (RG, the investigative branch of police security) and the Directorate of Territorial Surveillance (DST) pounced on the nine Islamists. In Lyons, they roused Imam Abdeslam Ouili; in Bron, Mourad Chergui; in Paris, Mustapha Boukrid and Rachid Dilmi; in Montreuil-sous-Bois, Abdelkader Mechmour; in Sartrouville, Sofiane Naami; in Marseille, Mohamed Benkhalel and Mohamed Flifla; and finally in Lievin (Pas-de-Calais), Ahmed Zitouni. Police quietly took them to the decommissioned barracks at Folembray. Eleven "assigned residence orders" had already been signed, to be executed yesterday. But one of the subjects was absent, and the juridical status of another was still "being studied."

'Overriding Necessity'

According to the Interior Ministry, action was taken because the militants in question belonged to, or took a position in favor of, terrorist support networks. "Six of them were the subject of ministerial expulsion orders issued on an emergency basis on grounds of overriding necessity to protect state security and public safety, in accordance with procedures set out in Article 26-2 of the ordinance of 2 November 1945," it was explained. "But considering the risks that would be incurred by the parties in question should they return to their homeland, France, acting pursuant to international law and Article 28 of the same ordinance, has assigned them to residence at Folembray."

In plainer language, these militants and/or sympathizers will be able to come and go within the precincts of the barracks, which the army mostly abandoned last year, receive visitors, and use the telephone. But if they want to leave their residential premises, they must obtain a prefectural safe-conduct. From a window of the building—which its new occupants call a "concentration camp"—FAF president Djaffar el-Houari said: "the FIS will come to power no matter how much support Charles Pasqua and the West give to the military junta in Algeria. We do not need lessons in democracy from Mr. Pasqua. Algerians have chosen an Islamic society."

Hamid Ali Ammar, 29, an Algerian student, married and the father of three children, says he does not understand why he is there. Picked up on 9 November, he was put in assigned residence at Mauriac (Cantal). Speaking through the metal grating that surrounds the Gaston-Billotte barracks, he claims not to know what is happening in Algeria and refuses to condemn the terrorist attacks. At the same time, he denounces "France's position and its support for the Algerian Government."

Folembray mayor Bernard Hiverlet (of the left) makes no effort to hide his anger: "I was not informed about this. This presence is irksome to everyone. The barracks was supposed to be turned into a retirement home, not a prison for foreigners in France." The official intends to cut short his vacation and return to his commune,

although authorities have promised him the current arrangements were only temporary. During the afternoon, several villagers exchanged harsh words with the Islamists, but calm was quickly restored.

General Councilman Hugues Martin, RPR [Rally for the Republic party], is also shocked: "I do not challenge Charles Pasqua's decision, but to give us such a 'present' without advance notice seems to me ungracious, to say the least." Hugues Martin also noted that departmental administrative authorities had told him last week they had waived any exercise of the Interior Ministry's right to preempt military land to create a residence center.

Footnote

1. Assigned residence is an administrative measure taken by the prefect or the Interior Ministry. It may be invoked against a foreigner who is the subject of an expulsion or deportation order, or one who does not have the 10-year residence card.

Islamists Questioned in Paris, Marseille

94AF0256A Paris LE MONDE in French 13 Aug 94 p 3

[Unattributed article: "The Algerian Crisis and the French Government's Reactions: Four Islamists Sympathizers Arrested in Paris and Marseille"]

[Text] Two Islamist sympathizers were taken in for questioning in Paris, on Monday, 8 August, and Tuesday, 9 August, following letters rogatory issued by the Parisian judge in charge of the fight against terrorism, Jean-Louis Bruguiere. This, it is said, comes after the arrest, on 9 May near Metz, of an Algerian in possession of a large stock of weapons and explosives bound for Algeria via Spain. This 34-year-old man, Hakim Boutrif, was investigated by Mr. Bruguiere for criminal conspiracy, carrying first- and fourth-class banned weapons, carrying banned explosives, and breaches of customs regulations, in connection with a terrorist undertaking.

On Friday 12 August, Mohamed Belarbi, 30, manager of a Parisian bookstore, and his employee, Lahcene Baroudi, 27, appeared before Examining Judge Roger Le Loire, acting on behalf of Judge Bruguiere who is on holiday. Lahcene Baroudi was taken in Monday by policemen of the sixth division of the Criminal Investigation Department Central Directorate (DCPJ).

Mohamed Belarbi reported to the police on his own on Tuesday morning, as he knew that he was wanted. During searches at his company's office, investigators are said to have found a lot of literature from the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) and the Algerian Brotherhood in France (FAF), an association viewed as the FIS "relay" on French territory and whose president, Djaffar El Houari, is one of the 22 individuals still in forced residence at the Folembray (Aisne) barracks.

3,371 Identity Checks in Paris

In downtown Marseille, two young Islamist militants of French citizenship were taken in for questioning on Thursday 11 August, as part of the identity checks carried out by the police in several provincial towns. A police source indicated that the two men, aged 20 or so, were distributing the magazine EL DJIHAD, one of the five publications banned by the Ministry [of Interior] (LE MONDE, 11 August) because of their "violently anti-West and anti-French tone."

In spite of criticism from some political parties and various antiracism associations (LE MONDE, 12 August), identity checks continue at the request of the Ministry of Interior. In Paris, during the night of Thursday to Friday, 3,371 individuals were thus checked. Eleven of them were handed over to the Criminal Investigation Department. These arrests were said not to be motivated by the Islamist activities of the individuals concerned. AFP

Kebir 'Violates' Ban; Islamist Press Banned

94AF0266A Algiers LE MATIN in French
10 Aug 94 p 2

[Article by Redouane Zizi, based on AFP report: "FIS (Islamic Salvation Front) Relay in France; More Held for Questioning; Islamist Publications Banned"—first paragraph is LE MATIN introduction]

[Excerpts] Washington states that it shares France's concern; the German authorities are about to punish Rabah Kebir for violating the ban on political activity; France continues its antifundamentalist campaign. [passage omitted]

For the time being, France is boosting its security and surveillance measures. Charles Pasqua stated that France "will certainly not fail to heed the threats of the Islamic Salvation Army."

Just as it did by arresting an Algerian student assumed to belong to the FIS [Islamic Salvation Front], France intends to neutralize the entire network that supports Algerian armed groups from abroad. Arrested in Paris while in possession of weapons (over 100 cartridges, two submachine-gun clips, and two silencers), Abderrahmane Chenine is in prison in Rouen. A search of his domicile and another rented apartment near Rouen, made it possible to recover tracts from the FIS executive commission, cartridges, one silencer, one submachine-gun ejector, and instructions on how to handle arms. In addition, five Islamist publications were just banned by order of interior minister Charles Pasqua.

Meanwhile, Rabah Kebir ("Head of the FIS executive branch abroad") may have to pay a fine of 5,000 German marks (\$3,000) and may also be punished otherwise for violating the ban on political activity. A decision will be made by the Ministry of Interior of the German Federal State of Rheinland as soon as it receives information on

Kebir's statements from the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Bonn. Kebir apparently regrets his recent statements to the media, since his close associates told the AFP that he no longer wishes to talk to the press, "because that irritates the German authorities." The latter have granted him the status of political refugee, but that still remains suspended. The federal government's delegate to refugee recognition appealed the decision. Forced to refrain from any political activity, Kebir risks being deported out of Germany.

In France, the Maghreb community is concerned about the negative impact that police identity checks could have. They are afraid that people may confuse Muslim immigrants and fundamentalist circles. The SOS-Racism association considers that "the Algerian situation, French-Algerian relations, and the current terrorist threats require measures and a dispassionate analysis in order to safeguard democratic principles and values." On the other hand, Mr. Jean-Francois Deniau, vice president of the Foreign Affairs Commission at the National Assembly estimates that: "France must keep its distance from both the Algerian Government and the FIS." As far as France's "diplomatic isolation" is concerned, he pointed out that this policy of keeping its distance from both sides would make possible an agreement on terrorism with France's Western partners, "who believe that the Algerian Government has us too much in hand."

Banned Islamist Publications

AL ANSAR (published in Warsaw), EL DJIHAD, EL RIBET, EL FATH EL MOUBINE, and FRONT ISLAMIQUE DU SALUT-ARMEE ISLAMIQUE DU SALUT: these magazines were banned by order of the French Ministry of Interior, because they are "of a nature to endanger law and order, because of their violently anti-West and anti-French tone, and because of the call to terrorism that they contain."

Background Information on Rabah Kebir

94AF0256B Paris LE MONDE in French 13 Aug 94 p 4

[Article by Lucas Delattre: "The Algerian Crisis and Its Repercussions: Germany Calls Rabah Kebir To Order"]

[Text] Who is Rabah Kebir? For two years now, from his German refuge, this secretive man has had some influence on events in Algeria: the positions he has taken on behalf of the FIS [Islamic Salvation Front] have never been contradicted. At 37, he is the unchallenged president of the "FIS executive authority abroad" since the defection of Anouar Haddam and Ahmad El Zaoui (LE MONDE, 4 August) who openly disagreed with him.

"His role is essentially political," people in Germany believe. Since the Bonn authorities do not view him as a dangerous individual that could threaten the security of the Federal Republic, watching him is not a priority for them: "All available evidence indicates that he did not

plan bombings nor helped others do so, and he does not control operational teams," an official source estimated.

Approached by Washington and even by Paris (Charles Pasqua sent a representative to him in April), Rabah Kebir has become an essential part of the political and diplomatic situation resulting from the Algerian conflict. But, as people in Bonn pointed out, if Germany took him in, it does not mean that it intends to act as a mediator.

Bad Company

France, which turned the "Kebir case" into a test of French-German diplomatic cooperation in this year of joint presidency of the European Council, is trying to persuade Germany to adopt a less conciliatory attitude toward the Islamist leader. But the latter, who now lives with his family in Bruehl, between Bonn and Cologne, could not have wished for a more peaceful haven. No longer subject to any regular police check, he enjoys rather considerable freedom of movement, although officially ordered by the German authorities not to leave his region of asylum. He often travels abroad, especially in France, and it is unclear what identity papers he uses to cross the border (he has several times denied possessing an Iranian passport).

Sympathizers of the Algerian Islamist cause are numerous in Germany. They can be found around Aachen or Stuttgart, which are home to relatively large Maghreb communities—large on a German scale: 13,000 Algerians have applied for asylum and live in Germany, and another 6,500 Algerians have lived there for several years. They include Oussama (24) and Selmane (27), the sons of Abassi Madani—the historical FIS leader, now detained in Blida. They live with their mother in Bad-Muenstereifel, not far from Euskirchen. Rabah Kebir has ordered them to keep quiet. But it is mostly in Turkish, or even Egyptian Islamist circles that the FIS finds considerable support, especially financial.

Supposed to be a moderate, Rabah Kebir maintains the image of a man with clean hands. In Paris, however, people consider that he did not denounce strongly enough the Algiers bombing of 3 August (LE MONDE, 6 August). He also maintains contacts with individuals who are more directly tuned to events than he is, in particular with Djamel Lounici, a young Algerian intellectual who lived for a long time near Aachen and, official sources believe, conveys arms from Germany.

His name was mentioned whenever arms coming from Germany were seized (in particularly in March, at Persan-Beaumont, in Val-d'Oise). Obviously no more watched by the German police than Rabah Kebir, Djamel Lounici has vanished. Taken in for questioning during a routine check in November 1993, he was immediately released. True, the trunk of his car contained only harmless walkie-talkies.

Rabah Kebir repeatedly disobeyed the order signified to him on 8 March 1994 to refrain from making public

statements—"verbally or in writing," the text written by the Cologne administration at the request of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs specified—and he will probably have to pay a fine of 5,000 German marks (17,000 francs). He has just promised to be very discreet from now on. But what does he risk? Certainly not deportation to Algeria since he is under a death sentence there for his alleged role in the Algiers airport bombing that killed 9 and wounded 123 on 26 August 1992.

The refugee status that he was granted on 15 February 1994 might be reconsidered following an appeal procedure started by the federal delegate to refugees. In that case, he would have to go to a third country that would accept to receive him. But it is not at all likely that the Aachen administrative court in charge of the case will agree with the arguments put forward by the delegate to refugees.

Haddam, Zaoui Contrasted: FIS Tactical Maneuver

94AF0255A Algiers EL WATAN in French 3 Aug 94 p 2

[Article by M. Abderrahmane: "Dissidence in the Banned FIS (Islamic Salvation Front): Haddam and Zaoui Join the GIA (Armed Islamic Group)"—first paragraph is EL WATAN introduction]

[Text] The news of Annouar Haddam's and Ahmed Zaoui's defection from the FIS [Islamic Salvation Front] executive branch abroad to join the GIA [Armed Islamic Group] is troubling. That is because the two men followed two very different paths.

There are more differences than similarities between Haddam and Zaoui. The former is a "djaz'arist" who came to the banned FIS very late, whereas the latter is more of a "salafist," very close to Ali Benhadj. One owed its "consecration" only to the Batna congress that enabled Hachani, and therefore the Algerianist trend, to take over the banned-FIS leadership, whereas the other was a very influential member of the FIS first Majlis Echourra [advisory council]. Among all these details, there is one that might be considered as something that they have in common: both were educated abroad. The former in the United States, with an Algerian scholarship; the latter in Saudi Arabia, with a scholarship from the Rabita Islamiya, the headquarters of the Islamist Internationale.

Haddam is well-known to the media, especially because of his sensational statements (among other things, he claimed responsibility, from Rome, for Boucebsi's assassination), whereas Zaoui is more discreet, more secretive. Born in Medea 33 years ago, he was soon coopted by the Salafist trend, which was very well-represented in the Titteri capital. He was still a high-school student when he was approached by the "khouandja" [members of the Muslim Brotherhood] who, having noticed his abilities and predispositions, sent him to Saudi Arabia on Abou Bakr El Djazairi's coattails. The latter passed

on to him the virtues of djihad. Meanwhile, the Algerian brand of Islamism was receiving its baptism of fire with Bouyali's bloody maquis.

Back from Jidda, Zaoui contacted the Djamaate Et-Tabligh and became acquainted with one Kherbane.

The Tabligh consists in occupying the field, and the Djamaa put him in charge of organizing proselytism in the town that his Islamist friends already called Qom—Medea. Thanks to the State's laxness, he was able to establish himself as volunteer "khatib" [preacher] from the "minbar" [pulpit] of the mosque in the working class neighborhood of M'Salla in Medea.

Once the banned FIS had received his approval, he had to get closer to the capital. He then acted as imam at the Ain Benian mosque, where he was a parliamentary candidate in the legislative elections against the FFS [Socialist Forces Front] candidate, with the result that a second ballot was necessary. His last public appearance was at an election meeting between the two rounds.

Tactical Maneuver

His speech was memorable: to a flabbergasted audience he promised that the institution of the Dawla islamiya [the Islamic State] would mean that all proponents of democracy would be hanged.

Two days later, the election process was interrupted and Zaoui went underground. He took an active part in training a terrorist group and was found guilty of many assassinations by the Algiers Special Court, which sentenced him to death in August 1993.

That will serve to introduce the man. However, the news of Haddam's and Zaoui's defection is not troubling because of their very different natures. Viewed in the context of the very intense activity of the banned-FIS executive branch abroad, and especially as it comes after Haddam was entrusted with the difficult mission of pleading the banned-FIS cause with the American Administration, this defection looks like a tactical maneuver rather than a sedition among the higher echelons of the banned party's representation abroad. The terms of the communique are too moderate to be truthful. "Of its 12 members, two chose to work in a framework other than the banned FIS." Yet, the communique, dated from Bonn, indicates further that "any statement made by these two brothers does not reflect the official position." It would seem that the banned-FIS wants to acquire a new image and reassure international public opinion that it has nothing to do with the assassinations of foreigners and intellectuals, for which the GIA continues to claim responsibility. That would explain why Haddam is being sacrificed on the altar that reflects the image of a party eager to rid itself of the armed label following Clinton's small remark concerning the dangers of "militaristic fundamentalism."

All the more so as, apart from Kebir, Kherbane, and Bounoua, Haddam is the only member of the banned-FIS leadership abroad to have openly claimed responsibility for the assassination of intellectuals and foreigners.

Following the communique of last 13 May, it might be acceptable for Haddam to join the GIA, because the nephew of the former HCE [Higher State Council] member is first and foremost the son of the cofounder of the Djaz'ara, a trend that was never particularly fond of Abassi or Benhadj.

What is rather bewildering, on the other hand, is that a veteran salafist like Ahmed Zaoui should do the same, after Ali Benhadj denounced Gousmi's maneuver when he was putting all his men under the GIA's banner, and gave his blessing to the creation of the AIS [Islamic Salvation Army] as the legitimate armed branch of the banned FIS.

The breach caused by the communique of last 13 May is not about to be healed, and bloody repercussions—like Hattab's elimination by Makhloufi—did not prevent political rifts from getting deeper.

FIS Financial Support Discussed

94AF0257C Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR
in French 11-17 Aug 94 p 7

[Article by Rene Backmann and Farid Aichoune: "FIS (Islamic Salvation Front) Finances: the Emirs and 'Trabendo'"—first paragraph is LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR introduction]

[Text] The Gulf monarchies and black-market networks are the Algerian Islamic movement's main financing sources.

The considerable funds available to Algerian Islamists come from two main sources: Saudi Arabia and certain Gulf Emirates on the one hand; "trabendo" (black market) on the other hand. The Saudi monarchy, which was very generous until the Gulf war, seems to have ended its direct subsidies. The princes in Riyadh, like the emir of Kuwait, were appalled by the about-face of the FIS [Islamic Salvation Front] leaders who, after taking a stand in favor of Saudi Arabia, turned round to Baghdad under rank-and-file pressure and sided with Saddam Husayn until the end of the war. Today, the flow of official subsidies from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait has stopped, but it has been replaced by private "generous donors"—princes, businessmen, manufacturers—who multiply the good, and sometimes most generous "deeds" in favor of Islamic fighters.

For instance, in 1990, Yusef Djamil Abdelatif, a fabulously rich Saudi financier and major Sony shareholder, presented a \$1-million check to Ahmed Simozrag, the unofficial treasurer of the FIS abroad. Officially the lawyer of Abassi Madani, now detained in Algeria, Simozrag, who lives in Saint-Ouen, exercises in France the honorable and peaceful trade of a merchant. He is one of the 17 FIS militants who were placed under forced residence at Folembay last week. It was also money from Gulf monarchies and billionaires that made it possible to finance the construction of the Evry great

mosque, the staff of which do not conceal their sympathies for fundamentalist theories. The budget of this prestigious project—30 million francs [Fr]—came practically in its totality from gifts or loans at very favorable terms: the Islamic Development Bank (BID), the head office of which is in Jeddah, opened a credit of \$1.25 million; the Saudi ambassador offered Fr500,000; the Saudi financier Akram Ojeh, Fr3 million; and the Kuwaiti Ministry of Religious Affairs, Fr240,000.

Most of the funds collected in the Middle East are forwarded to the coffers of Algerian (and Tunisian) Islamists through front companies based in Switzerland, France, the Bahamas, and the United States. Some of these fronts are concealed behind oil or industrial engineering companies. In addition, the FIS, as well as Mahfoud Nahnah's Algerian Hamas [Islamic Society Movement] and the Tunisian Islamists own real estate in the United States, in particular in Chicago, which has a large Muslim community.

For obvious reasons, it is impossible to estimate how much money the Islamists derive from "trabendo." What is known, however, is that most of the illegal-trade and counterfeiting networks that supply small merchants with fake Lacoste shirts and Rolex watches made-in-Taiwan, from the alleys of the Kasbah to the sidewalks of boulevard Barbes [in Paris], pay a tax to the "brothers." To this tax are added "voluntary contributions" paid more or less regularly by many legitimate merchants, who thus hope to buy, discreetly, insurance for the future. The efficiency of this "money-pumping" system probably explains why Algerian Islamists did not need, so far, to have recourse to violence or intimidation to finance their activities. This cannot fail to contribute to their popularity.

Background on Leadership of GIA

94AF0263A London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic
20 Aug 94 pp 36-38

[Article by Osman Tezgarte: "Complete Story of Algeria's Armed Islamic Group, With Names, Locations, and Provinces; GIA Has Sponsored Assassination of Intellectuals, Kidnapping of Foreigners, Sabotaging of Economic Installations; Group Encompasses Nine Factions and Its Leaders Are Buried After Their Bodies Are Mutilated"]

[Text] A few weeks ago, a woman in her 40s filed for divorce from her husband at Ksar el Boukhari Court in Medea Governorate, south of the capital of Algeria, on the grounds of his abandonment of the matrimonial home. This case would not have attracted any attention if it had not been for the fact that the woman (maiden name M. Serhoudi) was none other than the wife of Armed Islamic Group [GIA] Leader Sayah Attia. She had been spreading unconfirmed reports about her husband's death.

A few days later, the second wife of Sayah Attia, a 16-year-old woman from a neighboring village called Bouaishoun, filed a lawsuit against the first wife because of a dispute between the two women over some of their husband's property. From this, most observers have concluded that Sayah has actually been killed, otherwise the two wives would not have dared to resort to the courts for fear of his violence. It seems that Algerian security agencies relied on these same assumptions when they declared Sayah Attia officially dead. Reliable sources have said that the security agencies have found a body suspected to be that of Attia's buried near a tree in the semi-desert close to Ksar el Boukhari. But the agencies have not been able to determine his identity because the face had been burned and the thumb prints rubbed out with a chemical before his body was buried. It seems that the bodies of all killed GIA leaders are mutilated in this manner so the authorities will not display them to the public, thus influencing the morale of the group's followers negatively.

Unification of Armed Factions

With Sayah Attia's death, the GIA has lost four of its leaders in a few months, beginning with Mansouri Meliani, its early founder; Abdelhak Layada, (also called Moh Leveille), who was arrested in Morocco and turned over to the Algerian authorities; Sid Ahmed Mourad (called Djaffar el-Afghani); and ending with Sayah Attia.

The GIA has been damaged greatly by these losses. As soon as allegiance is pledged to a leader at its top, this leader is assassinated within months. Such an occurrence is extraordinary among the other armed fundamentalist Algerian factions, whose early founders have continued to stand fast since the March 1992 confrontations. These leaders include Abdelkader Chebouti, the Armed Islamic Movement leader, and Said Mekhloufi, the Islamic State Movement [as published] leader.

In view of these givens, most observers expected GIA activities to decrease, even though a joint statement was issued on 13 May 1994 by the GIA, the Islamic State Movement (led by Said Mekhloufi), and the FIS—the Executive Bureau (led by Abderazzak Redjam) announcing unification of the three aforementioned factions under the banner of the GIA as the "sole legitimate framework for the jihad." They also announced that there would be "no dialogue, no truce, and no reconciliation with the existing regime." The statement also threatened that "suicidal operations aimed at the total destruction of state property and economic installations" would be employed "if the regime doesn't stop thwarting the people's will." The same statement also declared the creation of this unified group's Consultative Council, which includes eight leaders: Said Mekhloufi, Abderazzak Redjam, Mohamed Said, Abdelkader Chebouti, Abdallah Ahmed (Sayah Attia's nom de guerre), Rabihi Qattaf, and Shaykhs Abassi Madani and Ali Belhadj, who are jailed in the military prison in Blida.

Most observers doubted this statement when it was issued for several reasons, most significantly:

1. The GIA is not the organization likely to absorb the other factions if they are united, because it is the newest organization with the smallest following and the narrowest proliferation in the various parts of the country, not to mention the painful blows dealt this group recently.
2. It is difficult for several of the figures included in the announced Consultative Council to meet in a joint organization or even to sit around the same table because of the well-known traditional disputes they have had with each other for long years. The salafists, such as Ali Belhadj and Abdelkader Chebouti, have cast doubt on the credibility of the advocates of Algerianization [al-jaz'arah], such as Mohamed Said and Abderazzak Redjam, and accuse them of being elements inserted by the regime. One need not mention the personal hostilities. Ali Belhadj, for example, has constantly refused to take part in any meeting attended by Said Mekhloufi because the latter was an Algerian intelligence officer who was dispatched to Afghanistan to investigate the "Afghan Algerians" and who then proceeded to join them and became one of their leaders in a matter of years. But Ali Belhadj still insists that Mekhloufi works for the Algerian intelligence.
3. The FIS Executive Bureau abroad, headed by Rabah Kebir, has denied any knowledge of unification of the factions and has cast doubt on the credibility of the statement issued in this regard. Meanwhile, the FIS original Consultative Council (founded in March 1989) met recently for the first time since the start of armed confrontations in Algeria and announced confirmation of the membership of 53 of its surviving original members. It also decided to dismiss Shaykhs Abdelkader Boukhamkham and Ali Jedi who were released from the Blida military prison to act as mediators in negotiations between the government and the so-called "moderate tendency within the FIS." The original Consultative Council's meeting has been considered an indirect denial of creation of the new consultative council, especially since this meeting is the first since the FIS was banned in March 1992.

GIA Networks

Contrary to all these expectations, the development of events in the field promptly compelled most observers to believe that the GIA strategy is actually the predominant strategy. Terrorist operations against economic installations and against foreigners have escalated noticeably, mostly in areas controlled by factions other than the GIA. The most serious of these operations was the assassination of seven Italian sailors (on the eve of the seven industrial countries' conference in Rome) in the area of Jijel, which is controlled by the Islamic State

Movement—a movement that is not known to have attacked foreigners previously. In the wake of this incident, Anouar Haddam, a member of the FIS Executive Bureau abroad, issued a statement in London in which he reaffirmed unification of the factions for the first time. This statement contrasts with Rabah Kebir's initial statements that had cast doubt on the credibility of the "unification statement" when it was issued.

The GIA is considered Algeria's most violent and bloody fundamentalist organization. According to the latest information derived from Algerian security agencies' reports, the GIA includes generally nine local factions, each consisting of 20-30 individuals. These factions are divided over four areas, namely: Algiers, the capital area; the Mitidja area; the western area; and the eastern area.

The Mitidja area (which encompasses the town of Blida and surrounding areas) leads the list of areas in which the GIA is intensively active. We find four factions in this area:

- Sayah Attia (also called Abdallah Ahmed) faction, which is active in the Ksar el-Boukhari District. Attia was (until his death recently) the faction's leader and top commander from the time Djaffar el-Afghani was killed.
- The Khaled Sehili (called the Abou Moustafa) faction, which is active in the Ouled Yaich area.
- The Yakhlef Sidi el Cherif (called Hekmatyar) faction, which is active in Blida.
- The Ali Zouabri faction, which is active in Boufarek District.

The area of Algiers, the capital, ranks second. Three factions are active in this area:

- The Abdelkader Hattab (called Mouloud) faction, which is active in the Bouzareah suburb.
- The Gousmi Cherif faction, which is active in the Bir Khadem suburb, where the Iranian Embassy was located before diplomatic relations between Algeria and Iran were severed. Gousmi previously lived in the Iranian city of Qom for a time and converted to Shi'ism. He also had firm relations with the Iranian Embassy in Algiers. The first operation carried out by his faction was to assassinate Saleh Fellah, the official in charge of relations with Central Asia at the Algerian Foreign Ministry, who was behind the decision to sever relations with Iran and to expel its ambassador from Algeria.
- The Zennati [probably Zitouni] Djamel faction, which is active in coastal Bordj el Kiffane suburb (east of the capital). This faction's members were also close to the Iranian Embassy.

In the western area, there is just one faction, namely the Kada Benchiha faction, which is active between Sidi Bel Abbes and Tiaret.

In the eastern area, there is just one faction also, namely the Basia el Taher faction, which is active in the

Qammar area, where Algeria's first armed confrontation took place in November 1991. Security agencies arrested a number of this faction's members, including faction leader Basia el Taher, on the night of 26 March 1994 while they were planning to blow up the steel industries complex in el Hajjar (near the city of Annaba). It is not known to date who has replaced Basia el Taher.

Iranian Hand

Since Sayah Attia's death, Gousmi Cherif and Khaled Sehili have been vying for the GIA leadership. Algerian information sources have been talking recently about Gousmi Cherif being given the "pledge of allegiance" as the GIA leader. But numerous well-informed sources have cast doubt on these reports, saying that Khaled Sehili's chances are stronger, because it is difficult to get consensus on Gousmi because he is a Shiite. The same sources believe that the quick "media pledge of allegiance" given to Gousmi Cherif falls within the framework of the Algerian authorities' endeavor to give the impression that there is a "foreign hand" moving and financing Algerian terrorist groups.

Dialogue: Nahnah Offers To Serve as Mediator

94AF0255B Algiers EL WATAN in French
28 Jul 94 p 3

[Article signed R.N.: "Islamist Movement: Nahnah Wants To Serve as Mediator; 'The FIS (Islamic Salvation Front) Has a Shadow'"]

[Text] The president of the HAMAS [Islamic Society Movement] movement, Mahfoud Nahnah, offered to act as a mediator between the government and the banned FIS [Islamic Salvation Front]. In an interview with EL KHABAR, yesterday, Nahnah stated that the government had accepted his offer to do something; the HAMAS movement leader, however, is waiting for the endorsement of the main interested parties: Abassi and Benhadj. "Public opinion has to know what the two imprisoned leaders think," Nahnah stated, adding that "spokesmen for the banned-FIS, in Algeria and abroad, have become more numerous and the time has come to appoint the legitimate leadership of the banned FIS."

Referring to the armed groups, Nahnah also estimated that "dialogue with the FIS will not end violence once and for all, but it would help unmask certain parties who hide in the shadow of the banned-FIS and call for bloodshed and the assassination of foreigners."

Nahnah also criticized the National Transition Council [CNT]: "Recently, the CNT has been concerned about salaries, diplomatic passports...but its mission is to deploy all necessary efforts to shorten the transition period," the HAMAS leader stated. Speaking of the government, Nahnah wondered that, "Sifi is presenting his program in all Western capitals before presenting it to the CNT."

Nahnah thus invited the government to give a general idea of its program to the CNT and to the political class." [quotation marks as published]

According to Nahnah, with its continuous trips abroad and within the country, the government has not achieved the goals it seems to have set for itself.

"The government," according to Nahnah, "has not succeeded in reducing the people's discontent, in finding jobs for the unemployed youth.... All it does is submit fully to IMF requirements," the HAMAS leader claimed.

Commando Operation Reported; Chebouti's Whereabouts

94.1F0246A Algiers VSD in French 10 Aug 94 page unknown

[Article by Ammar Belhimer: "Anti-FIS Operation: With the Elite Commandos of the Algerian Army"—first paragraph is VSD introduction]

[Text] The same lost villages deep in the Mitidja. The same twilight struggles as during the Algerian war of the 1950's. But this time it is the Algerian Army, with helicopters and heavy weapons, hunting down the mujahidin of the shadowy Islamic rebellion. Our reporters bring back this report from the front lines of the war...

"If we're shot at, lie down in the cabin!" I'm not about to ignore the warning, but I don't see how, entangled as I am in my bulletproof vest, I can actually do it. At least I was warned the mission was risky. But that much wasn't hard to figure out: Once we left camp, the only distinct sound in the cabin of the truck (apart from the engine itself) was the noise of soldiers releasing the safety catches on their Kalashnikovs. Their faces smeared with carbon black at times betray an anxiety that is palpable—and contagious, which leads me suddenly to ask them:

"Would you be afraid to go out at night?"

The driver responds without a hint of boastfulness:

"We're afraid, sure, but that's no reason to be cowards."

Cowards? Certainly not these men of the helicopter-borne elite commando unit. It is to them the authorities turn when the armed Islamic groups [GIAs] are too much for the police and gendarmes to handle. They are brought in only as a last resort, mostly to exploit specific tactical intelligence. The operation tonight is a bit different: The objective is to rescue a column of soldiers engaged by an armed Islamic group about 20 km from camp. Our convoy of four all-terrain vehicles, reinforced after we get under way by two light-armored vehicles, should suffice to pull their chestnuts out of the fire. I am about to ask how to fix the damned problem with the bulletproof vest when our convoy comes under light-arms fire. A GIA ambush! Everything happens very quickly now: I hardly have time to realize we are under attack before the soldiers begin firing back. The exchange lasts a good

quarter of an hour, which to me is an eternity. The toll: one GIA man, killed. Looking at his angelic visage, one thinks of "Dormeur du val" ["Sleeper of the Valley"], so serene are his features. All at once I find it hard to imagine that it was his comrades-in-arms, the night before, who separated the head from the trunk of the civilian whose corpse we found not far from here. A surgically precise decapitation. And an ignoble spectacle!

From the very first day, we wanted to experience everything. Leaving Algiers to join up with this special unit stationed in the Bouzegza massifs about 20 km from the capital, we knew we were heading straight toward the GIA sanctuary and risked being shot down summarily anywhere on the road. Twenty km is a considerable distance in such circumstances. Especially since nothing in our surroundings was very reassuring: The further we went, the fewer automobiles we encountered on the road; paradoxically, we found more and more gutted shells of vehicles; they were everywhere, on the flanks of adjacent hills and on the shoulders of the road itself. Most were burnt. A godsend—and the only one!—for the inhabitants of this now-desolate region: Picked clean, the vehicle carcasses can be resold for spare parts. Children here do not go to school anymore: They go to "scrap heaps." From one scrap heap to the next they go: In time they will temper steel for a hunting rifle, an automatic pistol. Their vocation is already written in stone. The heroes to whom these kids look up are their older brothers in the armed islamist groups. And one man in particular.

"General" Chebouti is already a legendary figure. No one even knows whether he is still alive. According to the last information received, this chief of the Armed Islamic Movement [MIA] was wounded. But that could be just another deception by this man whose crimes would fill whole volumes. For starters, Chebouti is the man behind almost all the assassinations of gendarmes, policemen, lawyers, and journalists, in short all the many people hated by the FIS [Islamic Salvation Front], whose armed branch is comprised of the diverse GIAs. Chebouti has also been implicated in the terrorist attack on Algiers airport and other major actions. His objective is to strike as quickly and forcefully as possible. He has enormous power and is believed to weigh in personally whenever the FIS is considering important decisions. What is more, he leads a charmed life: Until just recently, he had escaped innumerable traps set for him by the army. Always on his guard, Chebouti lives with a retinue of four lieutenants: They and they alone are responsible for transmitting his orders for the conduct of the jihad. Initially recorded on audio tape cassettes, these orders are then disseminated among the faithful and recruits. The importance of these cassettes cannot be overstated. It is enough to recall the recordings Khomeyni made in France and smuggled into Iran; in truth, it was those recordings that overthrew the shah. For the FIS, the cassettes are far and away the most effective

form of communication. And they are much more discreet than the leaflets posted on the walls of the country's 5,000 mosques.

Major Tarik, leader of the heliborne commandos, is a cultivated French-speaker, dynamic and professional to the tips of his fingers. A warrior, to be sure, but well-educated, too. A sort of Algerian Ernst Junger, lost in the *jebel*. He tells us to open our eyes:

"Don't imagine that all the Islamists wear beards and go around in Afghan 'kamis' (jellabas). No, they are shaven, walk about in Nikes, and wear blue jeans. Their age? Twenty-five to 30. And what amazes me is that these people, so fanatical about their allegiance to Islam, do not really know anything about the Islam they claim to defend. As I see it, these people are frustrated, ignorant, and manipulated."

Major Tarik wants to complete this mission as quickly as possible and get back to his own garrison.

"But for the moment," he says, "I'm reduced to looking for a needle in the haystack...while taking constant pains not to turn the people against us. Sure, we could do just as the French Army did in its day: control the water outlets, put up more and more checkpoints, close the trails and roads. But that would only push civilians into the arms of the Islamists."

Does this mean the GIAs actually control the terrain?

"A journalistic fantasy!" retorts the major. "The men-at-arms of the GIAs number no more than 2,500. Ten thousand others are in prison, including 800 in Ain Guel camp, in the south, where the most intractable are housed."

In a technical sense, he says, "the army has already conquered the terrorists." We have heard this before.

The following day at 1300 we take off in a Soviet MI attack helicopter to act on a new intelligence lead. We are heading for the supposed site of a GIA training camp, about one-half hour from the camp by air. A 10-meter high tower at the site is quickly surrounded, but no GIA—or anyone else—is inside.

How were they warned of this operation? No one will ever know. The unit will capture only a few documents, doubtless useful since they will eventually lead to arrests—but nothing more. At all events, we would have been lucky to find even one body inside the tower: GIAs never leave anyone behind them; either they take their wounded with them, or they finish them off. Later on we had an opportunity to see this for ourselves in the field: The corpse of an Islamist was found abandoned on the scene, his throat slashed. A GIA trademark.

Night has fallen by the time we get to Larbaa, 25 km from Blida. Devoid of life, the city has an eerie feel to it. The handful of half-starved dogs and cats darting furiously about the streets as if they were the target of some

"fatwa" [religious decree] in the wild are scarcely reassuring. At each intersection, army detachments with 12.7 batteries stand guard. One can sense an entire populace is hiding behind shutters, at once watchful and terrified. It is a village of slashed throats, where everyone is suspect and a barrage of gunfire can bring instantaneous death. But Larbaa has a role to play in the Algerian Army's strategy: Intentionally isolating it means cutting off any retreat to areas inhabited by the GIAs.

Returning across the Mitidja plain, the flashing, mist-shrouded lights of Algiers beckon us from afar. The ghostlike countryside behind us may be a harbinger of the fate that soon awaits the capital city. Algiers the White today; tomorrow Algiers the Red.

(Editor's Note: Leader of the Movement of Algerian Journalists, Ammar Belhimer is the founder of the daily LA NATION, which was suspended by the government in August 1993.)

Evolution of Armed Groups To Present Structure

94AF0258B Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR
in French 11-17 Aug 94 pp 22, 24-25

[Article by Rene Backmann and Farid Aichoune: "Survey of the FIS (Islamic Salvation Front): Its Leaders, Its Networks, What It Can Do in France"—first paragraph is LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR introduction]

[Text] They claimed responsibility for one attack against French nationals, threatened retaliation in France: the Islamists suddenly increased the tension. No wonder: the internal balance of that complex cartel, the Islamic Salvation Front [FIS], was just altered. The more violent elements now dominate the organization. Rene Backmann and Farid Aichoune explain how the fundamentalist danger has acquired a different dimension.

Was the attack against the Ain Allah development, during which three gendarmes and two French consular agents were killed one week ago, the result of a misunderstanding? One Islamist source in Algiers, who does not wish to be identified, stated that the commando that opened fire on the guard station of the French Max-Marchand school—four men wearing gendarme uniforms (overalls and ski masks) and driving an olive green Nissan of the security forces—actually had another objective: a neighboring building inhabited by high Algerian officials. According to that source, the passengers of the Nissan opened fire on the gendarmes that ordered them to stop, probably because the car looked suspicious to them. The source of LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR also indicated that, contrary to statements made by the French authorities—which were not confirmed by the Algerian police—the Nissan did not contain any explosives. He indicated that it was also in that vehicle that the commando managed to escape. This version, which obviously is hard to check, adds mystery to an already mysterious case.

The Official Theory Challenged

According to Francois Leotard, who went to Algiers with Alain Juppe a few hours after the attack, the gendarmes were killed during an exchange of fire, when the nine-man commando attempted to force its way inside the residence where 70 French officials and diplomats live, in order to place there another vehicle containing explosives. The French defense minister told the TFI television channel that the car-bomb "was defused just in time" by Algerian bomb disposal experts. The Algerian authorities, for their part, made no official mention of the existence of a car-bomb, which was not shown to journalists. On the other hand, they confirmed that a manhunt mobilizing helicopters was started to find the commando who had driven away in the Nissan. That mobilization was in vain since, one week later, the terrorists have still not been found. Another troubling enigma is that it was impossible to determine whether policemen or (genuine) Algerian gendarmes were present that morning in that residential district, where many objectives required protection: Max-Marchand lycee, Ain Allah development, building housing Algerian high-level officials, villas of the Algerian nomenclature. No one can explain, either, why the existence of a car-bomb, which was not mentioned in the first testimonies gathered on location after the attack, was disclosed, by Francois Leotard, only after his visit to Algiers in company with Alain Juppe.

The GIA [Armed Islamic Group]: Power at Any Cost

These mysteries may be extremely revealing of the state of anarchy that currently prevails in Algeria, of the degree of disintegration of the Algerian State, and also of the French Government's uneasiness as it faces a situation that is increasingly getting out of control. But they do not alter the overwhelming conclusion that we may draw today. Insecurity has never been so great for foreigners in Algeria: 56 expatriate, including 15 French citizens, were killed by Islamist groups since September 1993. The most violent of these groups, the GIA—which claimed responsibility for the assassination of the five Frenchmen 48 hours after the facts, in a fax sent to the London-based Saudi daily EL HAYAT—now seems about to impose its authority on the other armed organizations, perhaps even on the FIS as a whole. Hostile to "any dialogue, any truce, and any reconciliation" with the government, the GIA, which called its supporters to continue their armed action until the regime is overthrown, is no longer content with acquiring more and more supporters among the poor as well as among Islamist intellectuals. During the last four months, it was also strengthened by four members of the FIS interim executive branch, who thus openly shifted from the political to the armed struggle.

The Extremists Are Recruiting

In May, the first two—FIS underground leaders Lounes Belkacem, also known as Mohamed Said, 38, and Abdelrazak Redjem—announced that they were joining the

This report contains information which is or may be copyrighted in a number of countries. Therefore, copying and/or further dissemination of the report is expressly prohibited without obtaining the permission of the copyright owner(s).

GIA. A few days ago, two other leaders from abroad followed suit. The FIS leadership abroad announced in fact that the "brothers" Ahmed Zaoui and Anouar Haddam were no longer authorized to speak on behalf of the FIS, because they had just joined the GIA. Ahmed Zaoui, who resides in Germany, is not a prominent leader. On the other hand, Anouar Haddam, president of the "FIS parliamentary delegation," who has been residing in Washington since 1992, was considered until now as one of the leading FIS spokesmen. This nuclear engineer, elected deputy of Tlemcen in the first round in 1991, started his career during the seventies, as an Islamist militant in the Djaza'ra, an informal group of intellectuals who were supposed to have a modernistic approach to Islam. Shortly before the assassination of the five Frenchmen, he officially announced from the United States his allegiance to the GIA. In an interview with the Arabic newspaper EL WATAN EL ARABI, he confirmed that "the present stage is a stage of jihad (holy war) and armed struggle." A few hours after the Ain Allah attack, Anouar Haddam published a communique—still on behalf of the FIS—in which he made no mention of the five Frenchmen's assassination, but waxed indignant about the French defense minister's trip to Algiers, "a dangerous turn for the Algerian problem." This, he estimated, is "an irresponsible action, (...), the first step toward the internationalization of the Algerian crisis. Bringing back the dreadful French colonial military presence in Algeria is certainly not in the best interest of the French people." A fifth FIS leader, Said Mekhloufi, a former army captain and member of the first Majlis ech choura (the FIS central committee), who was one of the leaders of the Armed Islamic Movement [MIA], the military branch of the FIS, is said to have followed suit. But an FIS official abroad claimed that he had second thoughts after leaving the organization.

The GIA's Conquests

Practically ruling the town and region of Algiers, active in Kabylia, in particular at Boumerdes, Dellys, and Bouira, the GIA also controls large areas in the West, around Sidi Bel Abbès and Maghniyya, near the Moroccan border, and in the Ouarsenis. It is also present in the South, at the gateway to the Sahara, near Guemmar, where it launched its first raid against army barracks even before the 1991 legislative elections. Finally, it controls several towns in the East, in particular the Jijel area where, in two months, it claimed responsibility for the assassination of five Russians, two Ukrainians, and seven Italians. Abdelhak Layada, who succeeded Tayel el-Afghani (the first GIA "emir," a veteran of the Islamic brigades in the Afghanistan war, sentenced and executed in 1992 for the Guemmar attack), was the veritable organizer and historical strategist of the GIA. A self-employed sheetmetal worker of Baraki, an Algiers suburb, Layada proved to be an exceptional guerrilla leader. His charisma enabled him to federate under a single authority the small armed groups that had formed

behind local emirs throughout the Algiers area. It was him who launched the campaign to execute Algerian intellectuals and journalists. Considered by the government as one of the most dangerous terrorist leaders, he tried to escape army raids by taking refuge in Morocco with a group of fighters. Following a trip to Rabat—long kept secret—by General Khaled Nezzar, then Algerian defense minister, Moroccan authorities agreed to extradite Layada—only him—to Algeria. He was sentenced to death on 15 June 1994 by the Algiers Special Court. It was to try and obtain his release that the GIA kidnapped the Yemeni and Omani ambassadors on 15 July. Released unharmed one week later, the two diplomats brought back a message from the new GIA leader, Cherif Gousmi, who offered Algerian authorities to trade Layada's freedom for an end to "the campaign of assassination of foreigners." The Algerian Government never made public its answer to that offer, but two weeks later seven Italian sailors, two Yugoslav businessmen, and seven Russian and Ukrainian military advisers were assassinated.

Toward the Islamic Army

It was probably to counter the GIA's increase in popularity that the three political and military movements that still remained close to the historic FIS leadership—the Movement for an Islamic State (MEA), the Higher Council of Islamic Armed Forces (CSFAI), and the Armed Islamic Movement (MIA)—felt the need, a few months ago, to pool their forces in order to form the Islamic Salvation Army (AIS). Consisting of a multitude of small groups controlled by two "emirs"—Sheik Madani Mirzaq in the West; Sheik Ahmed Ben Aicha in the East—the MEA emerged 18 months ago. Its main activities were limited to a few ambushes against gendarmerie patrols and calls to desertion published through posters on mosque walls. The CSFAI, formed of army deserters, announced its creation by publishing a document calling for the mujahidin to unite, at the time when, on 24 October, the GIA kidnapped three French consular agents, who were released one week later under conditions that were not clear. Long considered as the embryo of the future "Islamic army," the MIA was created long before the FIS, in 1982, when a former officer of the National Liberation Army, Moustapha Bouyali, decided to engage in armed struggle by bringing together several Islamist small groups. One of his lieutenants was a young imam, aged 30 or so, Ali Benhadj, now the FIS vice president, who has been detained at the Blida military prison for three years now. When Bouyali died in an ambush set up by the gendarmes in 1987, the dismantled MIA decided to suspend its military activities in favor of political struggle. It reappeared in the forefront of the stage in the spring of 1992, when it attacked the Admiralty headquarters, on the port of Algiers, and later claimed responsibility for a series of attacks against gendarmes and policemen. It is another veteran of the Algerian war, Abdelkader Chebouti, Bouyali's former lieutenant, who heads the MIA commandos

entrenched around the gorges of Lakhdaria (the former Palestro). His principal feat of arms was the attack of the Bougezhoul barracks on 22 March 1993, during Ramadan, when 33 soldiers were killed and hundreds of weapons recovered by the Islamists.

Afghanistan Veterans

Chebouti's assistants are Azzedine Baa and especially Said Mekhloufi, who was for a long time the editor of *EL MUNQUIND (THE SAVIOR)*, the FIS daily. Having gone to Jordan at the very beginning of the Gulf war, he got the support of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad to receive and train Algerian volunteers who had come to fight on Saddam Hussein's side. It was in Jordan that—together with Qamar Eddine Kerbane, a former MiG pilot then in charge of the FIS crowd-control squad, Al Baqun Alal Ahd (The Faithful of the Oath)—he decided to create a small organization that advocated the institution of an Islamic State, including through military means. Kerbane who, like many GIA and FIS leaders, had joined the Afghanistan maquis, now lives in Germany, under the title of vice president of the FIS abroad. Curiously, it was the AIS squad of the Faithful of the Oath that threatened France with retaliation last Saturday if it did not release the Islamist militants arrested by order of Charles Pasqua after the Ain Allah attack. The AIS, in other words, flew to the rescue of the GIA—its supposed rival—and even engaged in outbidding tactics (verbally for the time being) probably to retain its rank-and-file, as they are attracted by the GIA's audacity and efficiency. Besides, the two imprisoned FIS leaders, Abassi Madani and Ali Benhadj, have sent an appeal from their Blida prison, asking the AIS to avoid armed clashes with GIA commandos.

Thus, it all looks now as if the center of gravity of the Algerian Islamic movement were moving from the politicians to the military, from the advocates of compromise to the proponents of an Islamic State at any cost. This seems to leave very little room to maneuver for those that used to be called the Islamo-technocrats: Abdelkader Hachani (still detained without being charged in Algeria), who persuaded the FIS radicals to take part in the elections; Rabah Kebir, president of the FIS abroad, in voluntary exile in Germany; or Sheik Abdelbaki Sahraoui from Barbès [Paris], traditionally opposed to attacks against foreigners and, like his close associates, not hauled in by Pasqua.

The Hesitations of Paris

In this tangled web of organizations, trends, small groups, and clans, one can understand that the French Government had trouble identifying permanent and reliable negotiation partners. Especially as its policy with respect to the Algerian problem, under Balladur as under his predecessors, seems dangerously vague. With the Islamists, the French Government used in turn the carrot and the stick. Many Islamist leaders were granted asylum, even residence permits in due form. They were

able to deploy their propaganda aimed at the Algerian community, in particular the harki [North African soldier who sided with the French] among whom they met with some success, in Roubaix, Chalons-sur-Marne, and Lyon. For years, they were authorized to publish newspapers that praised violence. They were also hauled in indiscriminately—sometimes without the slightest evidence that they had taken part in a criminal act or belonged to a terrorist organization—whenever the political climate of the moment called for some action, for instance after the kidnapping of the French consular agents in Algiers. We know today that of the 98 individuals arrested in front of television cameras in November 1993, only seven were handed over to the public prosecutor's department. France's attitude toward the Algerian Government has been just as inconsistent. After first attempting, contrary to all wisdom, to support a moribund FLN [National Liberation Front], the successive French governments chose to give their support to the military, which they viewed as the last defense against Maghreb destabilization, while advising them to reach an agreement with the FIS. As if a military-Islamist compromise were the only solution, and the search for a third way, with the democrats, an utopia doomed to failure. Since the new majority came to power in March 1993, and although Charles Pasqua remains in contact with Rabah Kebir, to whom he again sent a representative in April, Paris has granted constant economic support to the Algiers generals. The Balladur government, which deployed a veritable diplomatic offensive to plead—successfully—for the rescheduling of the Algerian debt, just renewed its aid of 6 billion francs to Algeria for 1994.

The American Friend

Although the United States, Great Britain, Germany, Italy, and Spain consider today that the FIS cannot be ignored, and that any other policy will lead only to civil war, Paris, after a long hesitation, thus seems to have decided to give its support to the military, while hoping that they will resume the dialogue with the democratic parties and the Islamists who reject violence. The appeal was heard: the Algerian president, General Liamine Zeroual, just announced that the dialogue with the opposition was resumed on 21 August. Considering the fact that over 3 million Muslims live in France, including 800,000 Algerians, and the passionate ties between France and Algeria, the choice that Paris just made is a dangerous one. With their usual cynicism, the Iranian ayatollahs pointed out to the French that they were letting the United States drive them out of Algeria. The FIS leaders say the same things, in more veiled terms. As for the rector of the Paris mosque, Dr. Dalil Boubakeur, president of the National Committee of the Muslims of France, which denounced the Algiers assassinations, he questioned openly the roundups ordered by Charles Pasqua, as he fears, among other things, "a return to the climate of the Algerian war." There remains to be seen whether the interior minister's attitude is dictated by a

legitimate concern for the security of the French people, or by considerations of mere internal politics.

[Box, p 22]

Threat in France

Is France, which just received a formal demand from the AIS to release the Algerian fundamentalists placed under forced residence, threatened with a wave of Islamic terrorism? Without entirely ruling out that possibility, the policemen in charge of fighting terrorism believe that retaliation, if any, will probably take place in Algeria, where the killers are "in their element," and where the French make easier targets. They also judge that the Algerian fundamentalists are not capable of confronting two States at the same time. Until now, experts point out, Islamist networks have viewed the French territory as a sanctuary: their leaders could reside there; they propaganda department kept offices there. As for the arms that the police found in apartments, cars, or locker-rooms, they were actually intended for the other side of the Mediterranean. Bought in Germany in most cases, they were transiting France. The few networks dismantled by the French police—sometimes thanks to tips provided by the BND [Federal Intelligence Service], the German counterpart of the DST [Directorate of Territorial Security]—were essentially in charge of conveying these arms and, because of safety considerations, were not involved with Islamist circles, which are now familiar with the French police. This, by the way, is the interior minister's real cause for concern: if the AIS demands are not met, could these smugglers become tomorrow's bomb planters?

Folembay: Some Detainees Named; Background

94AF0247D Paris LIBERATION in French
7 Aug 94 p 10

[Article signed M.-L.C.: "Algiers Assassinations: Paris Takes on the FIS (Islamic Salvation Front) Networks"—first paragraph is LIBERATION introduction]

[Text] Whereas yesterday the Armed Islamic Group [GIA] claimed responsibility for the Algiers assassinations, 16 Islamist militants or sympathizers were placed under forced residence at Folembay on Wednesday. Some may be deported as a measure of absolute emergency.

Paris was not long in answering the GIA when it claimed responsibility for the attack that took place in Algiers on Wednesday, a claim that was faxed Thursday evening to the Arabic-language daily published in London, EL HAYAT. In its brief communique, the GIA claimed that it had led the attack against "five French Christians."

As Edouard Balladur was paying his last respects at the coffins of the five French victims, yesterday morning at Le Bourget, unmarked police cars were entering the grounds of the disused Folembay barracks, 25 km from Soissons (see article opposite [not reproduced]). On

board were Islamist militants or sympathizers arrested in the early hours of the morning to be placed under forced residence. Policemen from the Directorate of Territorial Security (DST, counterintelligence) and the General Intelligence Directorate thus took nine individuals to this small village in Aisne. There, they joined six men and one woman who had arrived at the barracks already on Thursday. Those were placed under forced residence several months ago, but in various regions of France. Less than 48 hours after the Algiers attack, the Ministry of Interior, therefore, both took new administrative measures against individuals suspected of belonging to the fundamentalist movement and decided to gather them in a single location.

Of the nine men arrested yesterday morning (actually, the operation targeted 11), six are the subject of an order of deportation in absolute emergency, a measure reserved for terrorists and major traffickers. The other three are barred from residing anywhere on French territory, except the Folembay barracks. One of these men is an imam from Lyon, an Algerian citizen named Abdeslam Oulli. One Mourad Chergui was also arrested in the Rhone-Alpes region. According to the AFP, four other individuals resided in Ile-de-France: Mustapha Boukrid, Rachid Dilmi, Abdelkader Mechour, and Sofiane Naami. Another two resided in Marseille: Mohamed Benkhaled and Mohamed Flifla. The last one, Ahmed Zitouni, is a grocer from Lievin, in Pas-de-Calais.

While this haul is essentially a political answer to the GIA, it is directly in line with operations carried out against circles assumed to be close to fundamentalists in France; these operations resulted in some 120 arrests in about 10 months. The latest operation dates back to the end of July, when Algerians, but also Tunisians close to the En Nahda party, as well as one Moroccan and one Egyptian, were arrested at the French-Spanish border while carrying weapons and ski masks.

The seven individuals who arrived first at the barracks include Djaffar El Houari, president of the Algerian Brotherhood in France, who had been placed under forced residence after the police operation of 9 November 1993. That day, 88 Algerians were arrested. Three individuals—Moussa Kraouche, spokesman for the Algerian Brotherhood in France, Abdelhak Boudjaadar, and Larbi Beddiaf—were made the subject of an investigation for "criminal conspiracy in connection with a terrorist undertaking." And the Turkish imam of Nantua (Ain), Husseyin Konus, was deported to Turkey.

But others are also at the Folembay barracks: Djamel and Boulhassa Ressaif, a pair whose political importance is more questionable. Djamel Ressaif was arrested early in 1993 while in possession of fake identification: the OFPRA [French Agency for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons] had rejected his request for asylum. Algerian authorities are said to have assured the French police that he was involved in the Algiers airport attack. He has been under forced residence since February 1993. His wife filed a request for asylum with the

OFPPA, which was not processed yet. Nevertheless, according to the Ministry of Interior, moving them to the Folembay barracks is part of the "security measures required to face the situation created by the attack of 3 August." Apart from the warning that this constitutes, there remains to be seen what Charles Pasqua intends to do with them. Yesterday, on the France-2 channel, the minister stated that the 16 placed under forced residence were threatened with deportation. He added, however, that "it is out of the question to send them back to Algeria. But if they find another country, we shall not hold them back."

Folembay: Omar Saker Responds to Charges

94AF0258A Algiers EL WATAN in French 8 Aug 94 p 3

[Unattributed article: "AIS (Islamic Salvation Army) Threats: Paris Takes Measures"—first paragraph is EL WATAN introduction]

[Text] An extensive road check operation mobilizing over 500 policemen took place in Paris during the night of Saturday to Sunday, and 40 individuals were taken in for questioning, the AFP learned from the police.

This police operation took place a few hours after the AIS (the armed branch of the Islamic Salvation Front [FIS]) threatened France with retaliation if Paris "did not release immediately" the 17 FIS militants or sympathizers placed under forced residence in Folembay (northeastern France) after the attack in which five Frenchmen were killed in Algiers.

According to the same source, 3,000 individuals were checked during the police operation.

This shows that France certainly does not "fail to heed the threats" of the AIS, which stated that placing Algerian militants or sympathizers of the fundamentalist cause under forced residence amounted to a "declaration of war," people at the Ministry of Interior stated on Sunday. "Security and surveillance measures were taken accordingly. Everything was done to avoid" attacks in France, the same source added.

Additional police forces were called to Paris to flesh out the security network set up in the French capital. The situation of the 17 Islamic militants has remained unchanged since Saturday. They are the subject of a deportation order and are expected to find a host country on their own, according to the Ministry of Interior.

The minister of interior, Mr. Charles Pasqua, indicated that, at any rate, they would not be deported to Algeria, where their lives would be in danger.

No country has offered to take in the Algerian Islamists, and no proposal was made by the interested parties, people at the Ministry of Interior indicated on Sunday.

Finally, we should note that the Algerian imam placed under forced residence at Folembay (northeastern

France) since Saturday afternoon, with 16 other Islamists, denied having called for armed struggle in France.

Speaking on the French public radio station France-Info Saturday evening, Omar Saker (39) stated that the tract found in his vehicle "does not call for an armed uprising in France." "The reason that I was taken in, i.e., a document calling for armed struggle against French authorities, does not exist and has never existed," he added.

Earlier that day, an official source in Privas (Ardeche, Southeast France), stated that Imam Saker was taken in by the police last Monday during a road check. In the trunk of his car, the police found tracts "that were probably of FIS origin," according to the Ardeche prefecture. These tracts, "written in French and in Arabic, called for armed struggle in France and were probably intended for fundamentalist circles," the same source indicated. "There is a tract, but it does not call for an armed uprising in France. It is a tract that relates what is going on in Algeria," Imam Saker indicated. "The French Government is looking for escalation," he added.

Folembay: Student Held for Possession of Weapons

94AF0266B Algiers LE MATIN in French
10 Aug 94 p 2

[Article by Paris correspondent H. Zerrouky: "One Algerian Student Arrested; He Was in Possession of Ammunition; 'Detainees' Well Treated"]

[Text] The FIS [Islamic Salvation Front] threats against France made the headlines in the French press from Saturday to Monday. Except for LE MONDE, the rest of the French press tended to lapse into sensationalism. "The FIS Threatens France," "Islamist Outbidding Tactics," "France Faced With the Fundamentalist Challenge," some of the headlines read, which also shows that the threat is taken seriously. Everyone here remembers the wave of bombings of 1986.

Yesterday, the excitement subsided: Algeria was no longer the main story. AIDS took over. However, the French police raids have given rise to a feeling of anxiety among the Maghreb community. Charles Pasqua, of course, made it a point to reassure, stating that most members of the Muslim community in France live their faith peacefully. Police raids seem to involve mostly well-aimed identity checks, people at the French Ministry of Interior stated. One Algerian student, Abderrahmane Chenine, 24, was arrested and handed over to the Rouen public prosecutor. He was arrested in a supermarket locker room in La Defense (Paris) as he was taking possession of a bag containing 100 cartridges, two silencers and two full cartridge clips. At his domicile in Mantes-la-Jolie (Paris area), the police found tracts from the banned-FIS Executive Commission, cartridges, one silencer, and one submachine-gun ejector. A. Chenine, who was a teacher in Mantes-la-Jolie, was wanted in

connection with an armed robbery perpetrated at the Mont-Saint-Aignan post office in July. In other words, the charges against this FIS militant, who was granted asylum, seem quite serious.

For their part, the 17 FIS militants under forced residence in Folembay were just granted very acceptable conditions. Seven kilos of "halal" meat were delivered to them, three telephone lines placed at their disposal to communicate with the outside, and the Folembay barracks were also cleaned up for the occasion. Meanwhile, the FIS detainees play soccer in short shorts with no shirts on, something they could not do in proper dress in Iran or Sudan, malicious gossip will say.... Many Frenchmen, of course—and not just National Front supporters—find this special treatment shocking and feel that taxpayers money could be put to better use. Of course, the 17 detainees challenge Charles Pasqua's decisions and claim that they are the subject of illegal detention measures.

Imam Larbi Kechat Held in Folembay

94AF0257B Paris LE MONDE in French 15 Aug 94 p 7

[Article signed H.T.: "Held at the Folembay (Aisne) Barracks: Larbi Kechat, an Imam 'Above Suspicion'"]

[Text] Looks into empty space and frozen smiles; on Friday, 12 August, at prayer time at the mosque of rue de Tanger, in Paris (19th arrondissement), the faithful were filled with dismay. Larbi Kechat, the mosque imam for nearly 20 years, a prominent figure of Parisian Islam, was absent, for the first time in many years. Conversations focused on the circumstances of his arrest by the police, two days earlier, and his "arbitrary confinement" at Folembay, among "extremists with whom this man of peace and dialogue has nothing in common."

A native of the Setif area, in Algeria, Larbi Kechat, 49, studied sociology at the Sorbonne. But now this Muslim "above suspicion" devotes his full time to his religious task, to the point of becoming the "soul" of one of the most frequented mosques in the capital, one of the most influential preachers, with an audience of students as well as workers, Algerians as well as Comorans or Senegalese.

Although he always kept aloof from polemics among the Muslim community, avoiding, for instance, taking sides at the time of the Gulf war, Larbi Kechat is famous for his "very moderate" preaches, "his appeals for calm, tolerance, the fight against drugs and delinquency." A regular contributor to the France-2 Sunday morning religious broadcast, "To Know Islam," he gives lectures in the provinces, in Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Spain, and regularly receives Catholic and Protestant personalities on rue de Tanger. In April 1993, he even took part in an Islamic-Christian symposium in Khartoum, Sudan.

During the last Ramadan, which this year fell in the middle of winter, he had 700 meals distributed every day to the

needy, whether Muslim or not. This man, now detained at Folembay, is paradoxically one of the Muslim officials in the capital most concerned with maintaining good relations with the government and local elected officials, whom he invites to his table and who, according to elected officials such as former deputy Jean-Pierre Pierre-Bloch, or 19th arrondissement mayor Michel Bultet, contribute to "peace in the neighborhood."

Arms Smuggling Networks Detailed

94AF0262A Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic
12 Aug 94 pp 26-29

[Article by Nayil Mukhaybir: "Secrets of Fundamentalist Network To Smuggle Arms From Europe to Algeria"]

[Text] The fundamentalist network that French authorities recently arrested on the charge of smuggling arms to Algeria has revealed important new details about the makeup and spread of extremist Islamic cells throughout Europe. Most significant is the existence of a multi-ethnic international Islamic network engaged in supplying Algeria's armed men with money and weapons. In this report, AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI reveals the secrets of fundamentalist weapons-smuggling networks: How do they operate? How do they secure funds? Where do they make deals? Who organizes the numerous cells to transport weapons across a number of European countries? What is the role of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) leaders in Germany in these deals? Who is in charge of coordinating among the Algerian, Tunisian, Moroccan, and Egyptian fundamentalists and other "Afghan Arabs"?

At 1330 on Sunday, 24 July, four Arabic-looking youths were chatting with each other in the railroad station of the French city of Perpignan near the Spanish border when they were accosted by members of the land and air border police who asked for their identity papers. Apparently, according to the official version, security authorities became suspicious of the behavior of the four, and especially their Swedish and Tunisian passports. The authorities subjected them to a thorough search. They turned out to be carrying in their pockets the keys to baggage lockers in the station and the keys to a Volkswagen automobile. The police went immediately to the lockers and found to their surprise that they contained an arsenal of weapons and military equipment: rifles, pistols, ammunition, communications equipment, night scopes, masks, and FIS literature. While the four were led away for questioning, members of the border police went to the Volkswagen Jetta in the station lot. They discovered that it was registered in Germany and had a counterfeit license number. More importantly, they discovered secret caches inside containing more rifles, pistols, masks, military clothing, daggers, and ammunition.

While the four suspects were being questioned in a police station, other French security agents were lying in wait near the lockers in the railroad station. The next day, they arrested an Algerian and Moroccan who got off the

train from Paris and headed immediately toward the suspicious lockers. They were carrying weapons and sums of foreign currency. Within hours, French authorities discovered that they were engaged in breaking up a new network of Islamic fundamentalists involved in smuggling arms to Algeria. The real surprise was what the investigation revealed: that arms were being smuggled to Algeria not only through Algerian supporters of the FIS or the Armed Islamic Group (GIA); instead, there was a multi-ethnic international network reflecting full coordination of efforts at a pan-European level as part of what might be called "the Islamic International." Those arrested at Perpignan were three Tunisians, a Moroccan, an Arab without nationality, and one Algerian. The investigation led to a series of raids in Paris and suburbs on Tuesday, leading to the arrest of an Egyptian and of a Tunisian who owned a clothing store called Retro-Mode in the 20th Arrondissement of Paris. Another arsenal of weapons was uncovered in the store, as large as those found in the automobile and the lockers.

Although investigation revealed that the arrested Algerian was a prominent figure in the overseas FIS leadership operating in Europe, attention turned with new clarity to the role of Tunisia's al-Nahdah in supplying Algeria's Islamists with weapons and helping to smuggle them through Europe. The three arrested Tunisians were known to be affiliated with some North African movements. The three were discovered with counterfeit Swedish and Tunisian passports in their possession, allowing them to use several false names. Furthermore, the owner of the clothing store—considered the collection and dispatching center for the recent smuggling operation—was a Tunisian and a well-known member of al-Nahdah Ennahda. The charge against the Tunisian extremist Islamic movement centers on the role that one of the detainees, named Ahmed Allal, plays in the group's leadership. He, it turns out, formed a humanitarian group called al-Ma'rakah [The Battle] to work in Croatia. He apparently used it as a screen to buy weapons in the former Yugoslavia and smuggle them to Algeria. As for the Tunisian Habib Babour [name as transliterated], whose responsibility it was to drive the Volkswagen Jetta to Algeria, his real identity was discovered by close cooperation between French intelligence and German intelligence, which discovered that it knew his fingerprints and had once detained him in Germany in November 1993 under the name of Ali Nayri [name as transliterated]. He had had in his possession documents and booklets about how to use explosives and about techniques of armed secret activity. Babour turned out to be a known member of Ennahda whose real name is Chehidi Ben-Said. It should be mentioned that one of Ennahda's officials in France, Saleh Karkar, was arrested with 2.7 million francs [Fr] in his possession and placed under house arrest late last year. Security sources indicate that the Tunisian fundamentalists have very close relations with the Iranians. As for the Egyptian factor in the international Islamic network operating in Europe, preliminary investigations have revealed that in the

recent operation it centered on two persons. The first of them was Tal'at Bayuni, an Egyptian fundamentalist living in Stuttgart. It was he who bought the Volkswagen Jetta and sold it last May to another Egyptian fundamentalist, Majdi 'Abdallah, who, while under arrest in Paris, said that he had sold his car a few days earlier to the Tunisian Babour, who had no French residence permit.

"Afghan Arabs"

Besides the role of Tunisia's Ennahda, Egypt's al-Jama'ah, and a Moroccan fundamentalist in the latest network, Afghan involvement emerged clearly for the first time in this structure—"Afghan Arabs," that is. The investigation discovered that at least two of the suspects—the Tunisians Allal and Babour—had visited Afghanistan several times and had received training there. Allal is thought to rely in his work in Croatia on the support of "Afghan Arabs" fighting in Bosnia and on their role in securing arms for the armed men in Algeria. The organization of fundamentalist networks operating in France and Europe is known to rely especially on the expertise of "Afghan Arabs." More than a year ago the French Government expelled the Algerian "Afghans" Kamreddine Kherbane and Mohamed Bounoua Abu Anis [name as transliterated] for their activities in setting up terrorist cells and arms-smuggling networks in France. These two men still continue to move between European capitals, Jalalabad (Afghanistan), Tehran, and Khartoum and are considered to be responsible for mobilization, logistic support, and funding for the armed men in Algeria.

After the Perpignan operation, which was the second of its kind in two months and revealed the fundamentalists' convergence on the city, the number of arrested FIS supporters suspected of belonging to fundamentalist cells in France rose to 117 since Operation Marguerite. This operation, which took place early last November, involved wide-scale raids and arrests in the ranks of extremist fundamentalists, associations, and suspect Islamic centers throughout France. Although, as the police admit, the first operation did not yield "a big catch" and ended with the release of most of those arrested, French intelligence subsequently was able to apprehend and arrest a number of networks involved in smuggling arms to Algeria, counterfeiting documents and papers, and drug trafficking. Most of these operations took place with broad coordination with other European intelligence agencies in Sweden, Germany, Italy, Spain, and even Morocco. Naturally, the French agencies did not publicize all these operations, some of which were at a high level and dangerous.

On 6 May, an Opel Ascona [name as transliterated], license 9572XC77, was at one of the entries to the superhighway that links France and Germany—the entry at the city of Metz in the east of the country—when customs agents approached its driver and asked to inspect the automobile. They were suspicious about its load, which had caused it to ride unusually low to the

ground. After a meticulous search, the French customs agents unexpectedly found secret compartments in the Opel containing an arsenal of weapons sufficient to outfit a full commando unit: 129 dynamite charges, 99 detonators, 500 cartridges, 3 machine guns, an assault rifle, 4 night scopes, 3 scanner sets, and 14 radio transmitter-receivers, in addition to several boxes of painkillers, tranquilizers, and sleeping pills. During the identification and preliminary questioning of the driver, it became clear that he was a French national of Algerian origin married to a French convert to Islam. His name was Abdelhakim Boutrif; he was 35 years old and unemployed. Boutrif quickly confessed that he was engaged in a mission to smuggle an arms consignment coming from Germany and was responsible for driving the car to Spain, where he would turn it over to another person to take it to Morocco and then Algeria for delivery to armed Islamic groups affiliated with the FIS. Boutrif also confessed that it was his third smuggling trip and that he would be paid Fr20,000 (about \$4,000) for carrying out the secret mission. Investigation determined that the dynamite sticks had been stolen from Luxembourg.

On 17 May, the Moroccan police arrested a group of six Moroccans and two Algerians and charged them with setting up a network to smuggle arms from Europe to the armed men in Algeria. In the home of one of the network members, the Moroccan Hasan Ighiri, they had uncovered another weapons arsenal containing 13 machine guns, 350 bullets, 12 night scopes, a revolver in the form of a pen, supplies, military clothing, counterfeit Moroccan passports, and sums of foreign currency.

While the military court in Rabat was hearing the case of the Moroccan-Algerian network and uncovering important details about its European connections, French intelligence on 12 June of this year raided a suspect apartment in Marseilles to arrest Abderrahmane Mesaoui, a 30-year-old Algerian living illegally in France. They charged him with belonging to and working for the FIS as a liaison between extremist fundamentalists in France and other fundamentalist networks throughout Europe. The detention of the Algerian Mesaoui in Marseilles came as a direct consequence of another French intelligence operation in March in the city of Lille in northern France. The arrest of a drug ring there led to the discovery of clues to a terrorist fundamentalist network when a weapons cache was discovered in the home of one of the fundamentalists. The weapons included an Israeli-made Galil machine gun (see AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, issue 895). The arrest of Boutrif and the Moroccan-Algerian network in Morocco had the effect of putting all of Western Europe's intelligence agencies—in Germany, France, Spain, Italy, Belgium, Holland, and Luxembourg—into a state of high alert to uncover the secrets of a broad, many-celled fundamentalist network operating throughout Europe to supply armed Islamists in Algeria with arms and ammunition by various routes and methods and to learn the network's ways of operation, lines of extension, funding methods, and ringleader. In fact, the recent arrests and

weapons seizures have only confirmed information that a number of Western security agencies already possessed that the FIS and extremist fundamentalist elements present in Europe have been able to set up a broad network specializing in smuggling arms to Algeria and supplying Islamists there with false papers to facilitate their movement—passports, identity cards, and certificates of military service. AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI has learned that since Operation Marguerite, the French police have intensified their effort to uncover fundamentalist terrorist cells both on French soil and in other European countries, given the coordination links between these elements.

Germany Stronghold of Fundamentalists

The French admitted at the time that the catch had not been good, but their suspicions continued to exist: hence the measures for observation and monitoring and the coordination with the intelligence of other European countries and Algerian intelligence. AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI has information that the arrest of Boutrif as he was about to pay a toll near the city of Metz was neither an accident nor due only to suspicions about the automobile's load. The operation took place after a silent pursuit operation that followed a tip from German intelligence. The operation, it should be said, was not crowned with complete success because French customs failed to arrest the driver of the BMW that preceded Boutrif at the highway entry. French police believe that the driver of the BMW, who made his escape, was a senior supervisor of the European fundamentalist network to smuggle arms to Algeria, someone known for his many trips between Germany and France and suspected of involvement in many such smuggling operations. His name is Djamel Lounici.

Although French authorities insist on presenting the Perpignan operation as having taken place by accident during a routine inspection patrol, AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI has information that the recent apprehension of the network involved close coordination between German and French intelligence and took place after careful following of the Volkswagen and the movements of network members between Germany, Paris, and Spain, where the arms were to be taken for transport to Algeria. The French police were trying to discover the center where the fundamentalists met and gathered before crossing the Spanish border. They were trying to learn about as many of their hiding places as possible and obtain new details about their ways and methods of operation and their organization and movements.

In fact, French intelligence, which has become well aware that France has recently turned into a rear base for North African fundamentalists, was interested in answering two questions: Are the North African fundamentalists turning France into a base for carrying on terrorist operations in France? or are they using France only as a transit point for arms smuggling and a logistic support base for the armed men in Algeria?

After a months-long operation of intensive surveillance, raids, and seizure of arms and networks through intensive broad coordination with German intelligence and other European agencies, it became possible to uncover all the details of the activity, organization, funding, and mutual contacts of these networks and their routes for smuggling weapons from their source until they reach the strongholds of the Islamists in Algeria.

Police investigations thus far in Europe and confessions by the suspects before the military court in Rabat confirm that Germany is the main center of the Islamic network to smuggle arms to Algeria, the main corridor for arms consignments, and the headquarters of leadership and funding. This has also become apparent from the origin of the weapons seized in France and Morocco and from information about the consignments that have been smuggled.

Trustworthy police sources affirm that the deals, which are concluded mostly between officials in the fundamentalist network and arms merchants, are made in Germany, especially in the city of Hamburg.

Some sources focus on the role played by the German city of Aachen (Aix-la-Chapelle) in these deals. They point out that most FIS members in Germany made this city their center after Rabah Kebir, the FIS's official spokesman overseas and head of its executive organization, settled in it. During questioning, Boutrif confessed that his liaison lived in Aachen. The fundamentalist network suspects before the Rabat court also confessed that most of their contacts took place with Algerians living in Aachen. German and European intelligence therefore is paying special attention to "non-political" activities by Islamists in Aachen. Algerian intelligence is doing the same and recently succeeded in infiltrating their ranks. The recent French operation revealed that two of those arrested were living in Germany and that the automobile used to carry the weapons was registered in Germany. French and German intelligence has for months been following the movements of an Algerian fundamentalist who has lived in Aachen since early 1993. He is thought to be one of the four most important people in the overseas FIS leadership and to be responsible for organizing weapons deals and smuggling operations. He has carried out huge land and sea smuggling operations, including the operation involving the ship Ibn Siradi [name as transliterated], which was seized a few months ago loaded with weapons in the Belgian port of Anvers. The name of this official came up again about two months ago when Algerian authorities in the port of Algiers seized a vessel coming from Hamburg with an arsenal of weapons in one of its cabins. Although FIS leaders in Germany deny that they engage in any non-political activity, many Western agencies have become convinced that orders come from these leaders and that some high FIS officials abroad are engaged in making military deals and arranging arms-smuggling operations. These agencies affirm that FIS leaders are in charge of the arms portfolio and have secret arms-smuggling networks spread through a number of European countries—especially Germany, Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg, France, Spain, and Italy, as well as Eastern Europe.

There is information that Germany was chosen as a main center for arms deals not only because of the presence there of FIS leaders, or because of the Germans' history of officially tolerating the Iranian-supported Islamists, or even because of the presence in Germany of the main center of the leadership of Iranian terrorist activities. The other important reason seems to lie in Germany's location bordering on the countries of Eastern Europe. After the fall of the Berlin wall, these countries turned into an open market for various kinds of weapons and for activities of various mafias that will provide any item—especially the Russian mafia. That is why most of the arms consignments for the Algerian Islamists come from there—especially from Poland, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia. It was no accident that most of the machine guns seized in the possession of these networks were Czech Scorpions or Israeli Uzis. The fundamentalist extremists have for some time been concentrating on the Yugoslav market to obtain weapons. They have been able to establish a broad network of connections and exploit the chaos existing there.

How Do the Cells Work?

It should be mentioned that arms smuggling to Algeria does not take place only by land networks and the route through Eastern Europe, Germany, France, Spain or Italy, and Morocco, where the fundamentalists exploit rough, uninhabited routes to avoid the eyes of the police and their surveillance of the remote borders between the two countries. A few weeks ago, German intelligence received a secret report from its apparatus in Algeria stressing that the fundamentalists' weapons-smuggling plan had begun to rely basically on sea routes and on transporting arms directly from Central Europe to Algeria, where they have strongholds controlling the sea. Nevertheless, it seems that Algeria's armed movements are still concentrating on land smuggling through many cells in small quantities, giving the impression that each consignment is headed for a single commando unit or cell and that each commander gets his weapons directly. These operations have recently increased to an extent that has caused Western security agencies to intensify their surveillance and cooperation so as to get hold of the members of the logistic support networks and secret cells located in most of these countries.

From investigations made to date, it appears that these networks operate according to a cluster system with branching subdivisions and missions. They work through small cells directed by a special committee under the overseas FIS leaders. The cells are not in contact with each other, except within each group, where coordination contacts take place in certain mosques and prayer halls known to be controlled by extremists.

These networks divide among themselves through a number of committees the missions of logistic support. One takes charge of securing the necessary funding; another takes charge of concluding deals; a third insures that the arms will be assembled in caches; and a fourth directs the smuggling networks and transport over many

stages by various means that differ from country to country in order to prevent suspicion. For funding, the fundamentalists rely on many sources in addition to international aid from the "Islamic International" in Khartoum or Tehran. A central source is the imposition of protection payments on North African merchants and emigrants in the name of Islamic alms (*zakat*). Then there is dealing in *halal* meat. It has been observed that the extremists have begun to control the right to grant *halal* meat licenses in return for payments. Finally, there are contributions from believers praying in mosques.

A number of European intelligence agencies for some time have been following with great anxiety the domination of drug smuggling by certain extremists and the sale of drugs as a source of funding. It appears that the main funding comes from associations friendly to the fundamentalists and Iranian fund transfers through banks in Switzerland and the Indian Ocean. French police information is that some FIS officials can collect Fr2 million a month from Paris alone.

As for the composition of the arms-smuggling networks, it was noticed in the most recent operations that Algerian fundamentalists have been using a special complex tactic to elude suspicion. They have been taking advantage of the relations of cooperation and coordination among the extremist Islamic movements throughout the Arab world—"Afghans," non-Algerian fundamentalists, or Algerians who will not arouse suspicions. It has become clear that the Algerian Islamists are engaged in broad recruiting operations among unemployed North Africans, enticing them materially with up to \$5,000 for each operation. The Islamists are eager to recruit Algerians who do not belong to their ranks and who are not known as supporters. Most of them are French Algerians—those born in France and having French passports and identity cards. Enterprising fundamentalists began a while ago to concentrate on recruiting hundreds of Algerians who arrive in France each month not supporting the Islamists, but who find themselves without work, shelter, or residence permits. Extremist Islamic associations secure them shelter, work, and counterfeit permits and train them for special assignments. In addition to these associations, Algerian fundamentalists rely on the services of the smugglers known in Algeria as "trabandistes." These persons come to France, Italy, and Spain periodically to buy consumer goods and smuggle them into Algeria for sale in the black market. They sometimes turn into weapons smugglers for the armed movements, particularly since the Islamists in Europe have for some time been out to dominate the market in fake goods (Lacoste shirts, etc.) and have turned the trade in them into a facade for arms smuggling. In addition, there are the import-export companies that deal more in exporting weapons than any other commodity.

French police sources say that they have become almost completely informed of the methods of operation of the extremist fundamentalist networks that are turning France and some European countries into a rear base for terrorism

and into centers and corridors for smuggling arms into Algeria. However, the same sources admit the difficulty of apprehending these networks, given that their cells branch and spread through more than one neighborhood, city, and country. The recent Perpignan operation had the effect of making the job of European intelligence more difficult: the fact that these cells work within networks that end in the Islamic International and that include fundamentalist elements from many countries makes it necessary to go beyond monitoring Algerian fundamentalists; one must follow the movements and activities of all the nationalities that operate in coordination with them. As an indication of the difficulty of the process one need only point out that French intelligence has counted over 500 Algerians living in France who can be considered supporters of the jihad in Algeria, in addition to over 2,500 active FIS supporters, and about 40 Algerian "Afghans" who have entered France secretly and are living there with counterfeit papers. In addition, there are hundreds of cultural, athletic, and charity organizations, mosques, and prayer halls that could be strongholds for the fundamentalists.

A process of intensified coordination among the other European intelligence agencies has therefore begun in recent months, involving unusual activity by the German intelligence agency (BND), to which credit is due for uncovering most of the networks to date. The BND has spread its agents among Islamists in Aachen and other German cities and has intensified its surveillance of the activities and movements of FIS leaders. It has moved into Central Europe, which is now the scene of intensive Western intelligence to stop arms deals and smuggling. It appears that the Germans have recently decided to move from cooperating with Iranian intelligence to cooperating with their European colleagues.

This is a sensitive period that threatens Europe with widespread terrorist operations. This is what has begun to arouse the anxiety of the fundamentalist movements active in Germany, which until now have felt secure.

Differences Among Armed Groups Discussed

94AF0247C Paris LIBERATION in French
8 Aug 94 pp 2-4

[Article by Jose Garcon: "Frantic Competition Among Islamists"—first paragraph is LIBERATION introduction]

[Text] Faced with the extremism of the GIA [Armed Islamic Group], the FIS [Islamic Salvation Front], which is traditionally more moderate, is trying to outbid it and threatens France. It was forced to become more radical in order to retain its rank and file.

This was the weekend of all radicalizations. The two large armed Islamist structures that exist in Algeria actually took a much tougher stand, one against the Algerian Government, the other against France. "Categorically forbidding" teachers and students to go to school, the very violent GIA (Armed Islamic Group)

threatened last Friday to destroy the schools if they reopened at the end of summer. For its part, the Islamic Salvation Army (AIS), the armed branch of the FIS, threatened retaliation against France which, it claimed, has "declared war on the FIS." This quick succession of events cannot be dissociated from the current race between the FIS and the AIS on the one hand, and the GIA on the other hand, the origins and objectives of which are nevertheless quite different.

Already before the interruption of the electoral process in 1991, many militants of the Islamist movement, who did not believe in the "peaceful way" advocated by the FIS, advocated the armed struggle and even recommended starting it...on the very day of the legislative elections, i.e., on 26 December 1991. They eventually accepted to postpone it only after Abdelkader Hachani, the FIS interim leader, expressly asked them "not to interfere with the elections."

The repression that followed the interruption of the elections obviously played into the hands of the proponents of the armed struggle. Hundreds of FIS militants, eager to escape arrest, rejoined in the maquis those who had never believed in the elections: the famous "Afghans" and the former members of the maquis of Mustapha Bouyali, a sort of local Robin Hood who kept the Algerian Army on tenterhooks for more than a year until he was killed by security forces in 1987. Meanwhile, these new "maquisards" accused the FIS leadership, divided as to what attitude to adopt with respect to the armed struggle, of remaining "idle."

Actually, it was about eight months after the start of the wave of violence in February 1992, that the FIS leadership—faced with the radicalization of its rank and file and...the government's blunt refusal to consider any negotiated solution—accepted the recourse to the armed struggle. These accusations contributed much to the FIS's difficulties in setting up a coordination committee, even a minimal one, and even with the armed groups closest to the FIS, which discreetly started to be formed in the fall of 1992, in particular under the leadership of Said Mekloufi (a former Algerian Army officer) and "General" Chebouti. Yet, starting in mid-1993, the Islamic movement did all it could to accelerate the unification of these groups: "It would be no use to negotiate a truce with the government some day, unless we are in a position to enforce it," an FIS "politician" explained already at the time.

The emergence and rise of the GIA, initially formed by "Afghans" and fringe groups from Algiers, who set up their own "commandos" headed by men such as Moh Leveille, Mansouri Meliani, or Abdelhak Layada, also contributed to accelerate the unification of armed groups with direct or indirect ties to the FIS. Finally, last June, these groups, who until then were gathered around the MIA (Armed Islamic Movement) regrouped under the name of AIS and proclaimed their allegiance to the FIS. Contrary to the GIA, the AIS has the peculiarity that it

favors an intermediate or long-term strategy that does not rule out dialogue, and therefore compromise, with the government. Actually, many AIS leaders are former leaders of the Islamic party, many are academics aware "that neither the army nor the Islamists have the means to win at military level," and that they cannot therefore dispense with a negotiated political solution to the current crisis.

This attitude is far from the GIA hard-line policy, which distributes impassioned pamphlets published in Pakistan. Advocating a general uprising, opposed to "any dialogue, any truce, and any reconciliation" with the "junta in power," this organization, which calls for the pursuit of armed operations until the government is overthrown, has recently seen its rank swell at the expense of the AIS.

In view of the collective retaliation carried out by the army against the population of working-class neighborhoods, the discourse of hatred and revenge developed by the GIA actually proves more convincing than the more "political" discourse of the FIS and its AIS allies. Whereas the AIS may claim that it controls the armed groups of the west and east regions (with the exception of large GIA "pockets" in Bel-Abbes, Tiaret, and Tlemcen in the west, plus part of Constantine and Annaba in the east), the GIA, on the other hand, represents a vast majority in the central region, i.e., the region of Algiers, the main theater of armed operations. Thus, 60 to 65 percent of the GIA troops are concentrated in that region. One thing, at any rate, is certain: in spite of being infiltrated by the police, the GIA is popular enough with the "Islamist rank and file" for FIS leaders Abassi Madani and Ali Benhadj to insist that the AIS should not come into conflict with it.

The attitude to adopt toward foreigners undoubtedly represents one of the main lines of demarcation between the two rival armed groups. Whereas the GIA claimed responsibility for most of the 56 assassinations of foreigners, the AIS recently denounced them. This condemnation obviously was bound to cause problems for the FIS armed branch among the Islamist rank and file at a time when Charles Pasqua "declared war against the Algerian Muslim people." If the AIS wants to follow this course—which it must in order to show that the United States, among others, are right when they say that there are "moderate" Islamists with whom a dialogue is possible—it must show itself uncompromising in defending the "Muslims unjustly arrested" by Charles Pasqua. It must also champion the denunciation of "French interference in Algeria." "Radicalization is a must for the AIS, or it will lose another part of its rank and file," an Arab diplomat commented yesterday. The terrible irony is that Charles Pasqua's essentially spectacular move is causing increasing resentment against France among those Islamists that believed until recently that nothing could be more tragic than possible terrorist attacks on French soil. "For," they said, "it would be suicidal to wage two wars, one in Algeria and the other one in France."

Explanation of Laws for Detaining Islamists

94AF0247B Paris *LIBERATION* in French
8 Aug 94 p 2

[Article signed D.S.: "Forced Residence Close to Administrative Detention"—first paragraph is *LIBERATION* introduction]

[Text] At the Folembay barracks, the 17 Islamists are subject to a status that is more severe than the law. The situation might provide grounds for an appeal.

More coercive than house arrests, less so than administrative detention, the situation of the 17 individuals placed in forced residence in the former barracks of Folembay seems to be something new. Issued by the minister of interior, the order of deportation in absolute emergency must be followed by an order for placement under forced residence in a department to be named whenever deportation to the individual's country of origin is impossible and there are difficulties in finding a host country for the deported individual. As in the present case.

The law then requires the prefect to assign a definite address in his department. Within the boundaries of this department, the individual under forced residence is free to come and go, even though his place of residence is under surveillance and he must regularly report to the police. At Folembay, in spite of walks in the park and free use of the telephone, the individuals concerned will go out only with an escort, and after being authorized to do so. According to lawyer Simon Foreman, "the ministry cannot invent new texts that violate liberty; this placement under forced residence actually amounts to detention, and a magistrate must then monitor it and decide whether that detention-placement, which in my opinion is of questionable legality, constitutes an act of violence." At any rate, this state of things may last indefinitely, because it is the potential deportee's responsibility to take steps in order to find a host country, and it will all depend on how keen they are to look for one. In addition, it is out of the question, it seems, for the ministry to abrogate their placement under forced residence as long as they are not gone. That leaves the assumption, which is officially rejected for the moment, that the French Government might find itself a destination to which the 17 deportees could not object. Thus, in 1991, the Moroccan opposition member Abdelmoumen Diouri was forced to leave France for Gabon following an order of deportation issued in absolute emergency.

But in Folembay, if things drag out, there should be no lack of grounds for appeals to the courts against the arrangements imposed by the Ministry of Interior at the disused barracks.

Escalation of Islamist Violence Examined

94AF0250A Paris *AL-WATAN AL-ARABI* in Arabic
29 Jul 94 pp 16-17

[Article by al-Tahir Hammad: "Secrets of Usamah Bin Ladin's Role in New Phase of Islamic Internationalism;

Coordination Between Algerian and Yemeni 'Afghan Arabs' in Kidnapping Two Ambassadors; Algerian Pilot Destroys 11 Mirage Aircraft and Joins Islamists"]

[Text] Algiers—The kidnapping of the Yemeni and Omani ambassadors and of a socialist Yemeni official by Islamic groups constitutes a major and serious transformation, not just in the ongoing struggle in Algeria, but also at the level of the Islamist movements and of their schemes in the Arab world. The acts to which the two Arab diplomats have been subjected is tied directly to the developments in Yemen; it reflects full coordination among the "Afghan Arabs;" and it poses the threat of a new phase to which the advocates of Islamic internationalism want to move. What combines Yemen and Algeria and what is the new scheme that the Armed Islamic Group [GIA] and the "Afghan Arabs" have begun to implement—a scheme that has led to a split within the ranks of Algerian Islamists and to a coup in which the armed group has come up on top and has embarked on a "bone-crushing" phase with the regime? On the other side, President Liamine Zeroul seems to be isolated within the military command, and there are those who are again talking of a military coup.

Five weeks ago, foreign diplomats working in Algeria received strict instructions from their governments urging them to take, along with their senior officials, maximum precautionary measures in their travels and movements for fear of a new wave of assassinations and kidnappings that is more violent than the previous wave and that is being plotted by armed Islamic groups. In fact, it has been noticed that most foreign embassies, especially those that represent countries concerned directly with Algeria's economic or political conditions, such as France, Russia, Italy, the United States, and Britain, have strengthened their protection and have fortified their sites with dirt barriers and with increased numbers of guards. Most diplomats have resorted to secrecy in their travels and movements, which take place in armored cars and under heavy guard.

The fact is that more than one security report has referred to violent military operations, focusing on the possibility that they will be carried out against Western diplomats and foreign ambassadors. But the surprise is that the operation took place where nobody had expected and that it victimized Omani Ambassador Hilal al-Siyabi and Yemeni Ambassador Qasim Jubran, who were accompanied by YSP [Yemeni Socialist Party] Political Bureau Member Muhammad 'Ali al-Thawr, all of whom were kidnapped in the area of Khemis el Khechna, which is close to the capital and is well known as an Islamist stronghold. But it seems that the two ambassadors passed through that area without any guard or fear, because it had never occurred to anybody that radical Islamists' activities would touch Arabs, and for the first time.

This is why the main and the perplexing question has been: Why have the two Arab ambassadors been kidnapped?

There is no doubt that the kidnapping of the Omani and Yemeni ambassadors constitutes a major transformation in the strategy of radical Algerian fundamentalists, and it falls within the framework of an unprecedented escalation in the acts of violence and war declared by the armed groups against the government.

Despite the conflicting political analyses on the latest operation, the reports of Western intelligence agencies have hastened to consider the kidnapping of the two Arab ambassadors a premeditated act. These Western intelligence agencies have broad knowledge of what is happening on the ground in Algeria, and they have been observing for more than two months the accelerating transformations and developments, whether at the level of the struggle among the regime agencies over dialogue with the Islamists or at the level of a coup that has occurred in the balances of power and in relations between the Armed Islamic Group and supporters of the Salvation Front [FIS]. These Western intelligence agencies assert that the two ambassadors were premeditated targets because of what they represent and not, as it has been rumored, because the operation to kidnap them was easy to carry out when compared with the difficulty of approaching the ambassadors of "major" Western powers who have protection that is difficult to penetrate. Well-informed security sources have told AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI that the kidnapping of the Omani and Yemeni ambassadors and of the YSP Political Bureau member is closely connected with the "Yemen war" and constitutes a very important turning point in the ongoing struggle in Algeria. These sources go beyond just talking about a premeditated operation through which Islamists intend to "Arabize" the war in Algeria to say that the operation is part of the essence of a new fundamentalist strategy connected with the so-called Islamic internationalism, which is led by Shaykh Hasan al-Turabi, the leader of Sudan's National [Islamic] Front. These sources add that the Armed Islamic Group, which carried out the kidnapping, which carries out assassinations and most of the military operations against security and army men, and which is controlled by the Algerian "Afghan Arabs," has sought to reaffirm the bond between the "Afghan Arabs" and all of the Arab world's radical fundamentalist tendencies and has decided, or rather it has received instructions, to "Islamize" the struggle, thus transforming what is happening in Algeria into a part of a comprehensive and unified fundamentalist plan. This group has further sought to assert that what is happening is a comprehensive "Islamic war" from Sudan, to Yemen, to Algeria, and to other countries, and that the battle of the "Afghan Arabs" in Yemen is also their battle in Algeria. These sources note that the fact that the Yemeni ambassador is "from the South," that the Sanaa Government had previously demanded his removal, and that his companion was a socialist and a Southerner, confirms that what happened to the two men is a part of a settlement of accounts in the Yemeni war within the framework of a "fraternal Islamic Afghan solidarity."

In this regard, some sources note the role that may have been played by Usamah Bin Ladin who lives in Sudan and who finances "Afghan Arabs." These sources go so far as to warn of the presence of a new fundamentalist scheme for Islamic internationalism, which is sponsored by Dr. al-Turabi, and that this scheme seeks to take advantage of the momentum gained by radical fundamentalists in Yemen to expand implementation of the fundamentalist strategy so Algeria will become the second country, after Yemen, to fall to the Islamists' control. These sources add that the kidnapping of the two Arab ambassadors is intended to underline this scheme. The kidnapping also confirms that the "Afghan Arabs" have a unified command and that there is a leader who directs radical Islamic movements operating in the Arab world.

Split Among Islamists

The fact is that numerous indicators emerging in the Algerian arena in recent weeks confirm the reports about the presence of a fundamentalist scheme to accelerate the military decision, to establish an Islamic regime with the force of arms, and to block the path finally in the face of any attempt at serious dialogue between President Zeroual and FIS leaders.

Reports indicate that the fact that the Armed Islamic Group and the "Afghan Arabs" fear that FIS leaders may conclude a deal with the regime at their expense has motivated them to move promptly to decide the situation in the "jihad arena" and to attract the overwhelming majority of armed elements to the ranks of the group. The Armed Islamic Group flies the slogan of "no dialogue, no truce, and no negotiations;" insists on establishing an Islamic republic by force; and believes that the opportunity is ripe, that it is within an eyelash from power, and that there is no need for any dialogue. AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI's information does in fact confirm that a real coup took place recently within the armed Islamic movements and that as a result of this coup, Armed Islamic Group radicals have seized total control of the decisionmaking under the leadership of Bouabdallah Ahmed, the group's new leader, who is also known as Cherif Gousmi or Cherif al-Afghani. It has been noticed recently that some FIS leaders have begun to talk about uniting the armed Islamic factions. The truth is that what has happened is a coup, and the least that can be said about it is that it has brought about unification by force and that it has settled the struggle among fundamentalists in Algeria in favor of the Armed Group. The reports add that the struggle that went on within the FIS between leaders of the salafiyah tendency and the Algerianization [al-jaz'arah] tendency has been settled in favor of the salafists who have embraced the Armed Group's line and decided to join the Islamic internationalism plan and to view the goal not just as the establishment of an Islamic republic in Algeria but transformation of the Arab regimes into "Islamic" regimes in a comprehensive war. The reports assert that some FIS leaders have joined the Armed Islamic Group,

most prominent of whom are Mohamed Said, Abderrazzak Rejjam, and Said Mekhloufi. Mekhloufi, along with Abdelkader Chebouti, was known to be the military commander of the Armed Islamic Movement.

Whereas numerous sources cast doubt on the statements made by Rabah Kebir from Germany and Anouar Haddam from the United States in their capacity as FIS leaders and as two parties to the dialogue with the Americans and the Algerian regime, these same sources note the more important role played by the other two members of the "external FIS leadership," namely "Arab Afghan" Kamerateddine Kherban and Abdallah Anas, who have been absent from the "media" arena and who are content with moving between Jalalabad, Khar-touni, and some Western countries to secure military, material, and logistical support for the armed groups. These sources say that these two leaders have chosen the group's line finally and that splits have extended to the FIS leadership abroad, which is eager to wrap these splits in utter secrecy.

The sources further note that even Abassi Madani and Ali Belhaj no longer possess the ability to speak in the name of the armed Islamists. Perhaps this is why they have stiffened their conditions to engage in dialogue for fear of confronting the new real situation, namely that the radicals, while in jail, have pulled the rug from under their feet.

It seems that the Armed Islamic Group, with its new dominant formula, has succeeded in rearranging its conditions and cells since the blow it was dealt last February when its leader, Djaffar El Afghani was killed with nine of his chiefs in an ambush while they were holding a secret meeting in the capital. In addition, some security reports speak of a sudden development in the armed groups' military and human power, noting that these groups now have more than 10,000 armed elements and that they have recently received large quantities of weapons and munitions through immense smuggling operations from Europe and through deals delivered to the groups via Sudan and Libya. Reports say that the weapons include anti-armor weapons, large numbers of grenades and detonators, and equipment which is used to booby-trap vehicles and on which "Afghan Arabs" have trained in Sudan, where their training includes commando operations and street warfare.

For weeks, reports have been asserting that the Armed Islamic Group is preparing to move to a decisive phase in the conflict with the government and that it has drafted a plan for a gradual intensification of the situation that will make Algeria's summer a very hot one. This plan seeks to launch a ferocious confrontation against the Algerian authorities so as to try to decide the conflict through several approaches: control entire provinces and declare them liberated; escalate ambushes against security barriers and centers; attack military barracks and jails; increase assassinations, including prominent regime leaders as targets; reveal the Islamists' infiltration of the military establishment by urging supporters in the army to desert and join them or to carry

out operations inside barracks; and carry out qualitative operations that lead to the departure of all foreigners from Algeria so as to isolate the regime finally and then pounce on it. Perhaps what has motivated the armed groups to launch this confrontation is their feeling that the regime is no longer able to confront them and that the time for the final battle to assume power has arrived. In fact, it seems that the broad-combing operations and raids that have been carried out by the security forces against the armed elements' strongholds, using war-planes at times, and that have claimed hundreds of casualties among radicals in recent weeks and resulted in dozens of arrests—it seems these operations have not alleviated the severity of terrorism and of armed activities. Moreover, fundamentalists have succeeded in regaining control over a number of Algerian villages and areas from which the security forces had expelled them four months ago. More than one town and area, such as Blida, Tiaret and the "triangle of terror," have now been restored to the control of the Islamists who levy protection money on their inhabitants and prevent them from selling tobacco and newspapers and who, at times, marry inhabitants' daughters by force. In the total absence of the security agencies, these Islamists slaughter whoever refuses to hand over his weapon to them.

Armed fundamentalists have exploited these conditions to increase their terrorist operations on a large scale, including continued destruction of the state's infrastructure, burning economic establishments, attacking companies, and destroying through the "scorched earth" policy whatever is likely to contribute to Algeria's economy. Along a parallel line, the Islamists have focused their psychological and physical warfare on innocent citizens. Assassinations have gone beyond security men and government employees to include absolutely guiltless ordinary Algerians with a brutality that resorts to the method of "slaughter" so as to spread fear in the hearts of all and to create a climate of instability and of anger at the government.

In July, operations have escalated to such a degree that it seems Algeria has entered the bloodiest phase since the start of acts of violence in early 1992. In addition to the resumed economic war, the assassinations, and the increased ambushes, this month has seen resumption of the war against foreigners, embodied in the murder of seven Italian sailors and the assassination of four Russians, a Romanian, and a Yugoslav in a clear message to leaders of the seven industrial nations who met in Naples and condemned terrorism, and who, more significantly, decided to aid Algeria economically. What the Algerian authorities have not revealed to date is that this new phase has been characterized by an unprecedented escalation of terrorist operations against security forces. A few days before the operation against the Italian sailors, fundamentalists in the eastern governorate of Jijel, which has become a fundamentalist stronghold, laid an armed ambush for security forces. As a result, more than 100 security elements were claimed as victims in a single operation. But what distinguishes recent operations is

that armed fundamentalists have begun to implement a premeditated plan to march on the capital and to turn it into a battlefield. Recent days have actually seen a concentration of terrorist operations against the capital and its suburbs, which are considered fundamentalist strongholds, in the biggest challenge to prove that the government is unable to impose security, not even on the city of Algiers. The operations of radical fundamentalists have not been confined to the capital's suburbs that are well known as fundamentalist strongholds and where a Russian and a Romanian were murdered near a fake military roadblock. These operations have been extended to areas that are famous for being safe and that are heavily guarded, such as the embassies quarter where armed elements attacked the Italian Embassy and entered the high-class al-Qaysariyah Restaurant, which is frequented by foreign diplomats and high-ranking Algerian officials, and killed two Yugoslavs and two Algerians, leaving behind a booby-trapped vehicle in front of the building so it would blow up in the face of rescue men.

Reports assert that more than 3,000 armed Islamists have moved to the capital in recent weeks in preparation for a violent wave of escalation that will precede the bone-crushing phase between the two sides. These elements have deployed in hideouts prepared especially and equipped with weapons to execute a wave of car bombings and assassinations against prominent regime officials. This wave has included an abortive attempt on the life of Interior Minister Meziane-Cherif. Meanwhile, it has been learned that the armed groups have begun to stir their "sleeping" elements in the military establishments to help them occupy barracks, smuggle weapons, and plant explosives. Within this framework, Western security observers have paused before the operation carried out by an air force officer during the independence anniversary celebration at Setif el Araba Base. This officer destroyed several helicopters, burned five Mirage warplanes, and damaged six more before he fled in a helicopter and took refuge in a fundamentalist stronghold in the mountains.

In this climate, it seems that Algeria's struggle has turned into a struggle between two radical exterminatory tendencies and that it is proceeding toward open confrontation, thus placing President Liamine Zeroual in a critical position. Zeroual is subjected to foreign pressures, especially French and U.S. pressures, to carry on with his political dialogue. But the formula altered in recent weeks when it became evident to the regime that the FIS has not embarked on any positive initiative to respond to the regime's initiatives to release two FIS leaders and hundreds of FIS detainees and to dismiss Redha Malek's cabinet. The FIS has not even renounced violence, but rather has persisted in its conditions and has stiffened them. Some circles point out that the FIS backed down when it discovered that it has lost the initiative and the control over armed elements on the ground, most of whom have been attracted by the Armed Islamic Group. The FIS no longer dares to carry on with

the dialogue so it will not experience the estrangement that has developed between politicians and armed elements. But the regime has discovered this new situation, as well as Abassi Madani's and Ali Belhaj's weak position in the dialogue, and has decided to sever the dialogue.

Moreover, it seems obvious that all of President Zeroual's endeavors to impose his line and policy of dialogue on the military command have failed. At a meeting held a few days ago by the higher military command, Zeroual was surprised to find that his supporters and supporters of dialogue among high-ranking officers have decreased in number and have distanced themselves from him. Zeroual was subjected to new criticism, led by Chief of Staff General Mohamed Lammari, who is known for his leadership of the exterminatory [isti'sali] tendency. Reports assert that Zeroual departed from that meeting isolated. Meanwhile, the military command's stronger tendency, which seeks to settle the situation, gained prominence. Consequently, conflicts within the regime have begun to surface in the open.

So, there has been a split within the ranks of the armed groups, with control evidently gained by the radical group, and a split within the military establishment, with those who favor eradication returning to the forefront.

In this situation, observers wonder what Zeroual can do other than to embark on a comprehensive military confrontation, especially since his interlocutors among the Islamists have lost their cards and since they no longer constitute a strong legitimate representative of the armed Islamic movements!

This means that the situation in Algeria is moving toward a crushing war and that it will soon enter the "bone-crushing" phase—all amidst reports that say that a major Western power has requested from its security agencies a confidential report on the possibilities of a military coup in Algeria.

Kabylia Said Under Increased 'Terrorist' Attacks

94AF0252A Algiers EL WATAN in French 1 Aug 94 p 3

[Article by Ali Yacine: "Kabylia: Small Villages Swept Up in Nightmare"]

[Text] Often described as a haven of peace spared the ravages of terrorism, Kabylia since early this year has seen its full share of instability (assassinations, arson, attacks on homes, etc.).

Like the regions of Medea, Chlef, and Blida, Tizi-Ouzou and its environs are living in fear, and while not subject to the curfew in effect in other wilayas, the whole region braces for trouble as soon as night falls.

Two areas are hardest hit: In the west, Draa Ben-Khedda and Sidi-Naamane are caught up in a nightmare, with terrorist attacks day after day reducing the populace to a state of dread and agony. Add to that the badlands of

Sidi Ali Bounab, which are infested by groups that are a law unto themselves in many neighboring villages. Conditions at night, and sometimes even in the daytime, are unbearable in the communes of Naciria, Draa El-Mizan, Ait-Yahia Moussa, and Sidi-Naamane, with whole populations at the mercy of terrorist groups and forced to suffer in silence.

But even worse and more pernicious is the fate of villages situated in the forested massifs of Yakouren, Akfadou, and Tamgout.

The terrorist groups deployed there several months ago after high-level deliberations have invested the environs, sure of the impunity conferred on their stronghold by the region's geography.

Dozens of villages "hidden" deep in the forest receive nightly visitations from gunmen who subject them to the worst humiliations.

The rectangle formed by the communes of M'Haga in the south, Adekar on the east, Tagma, and Yakouren on the west is the terrain of choice for terrorists, who are determined to subjugate this isolated, remote region far from large cities, devoid of police stations or gendarm-erie squads.

Numbed by so many horrors, citizens of these villages cannot get over what has happened to them. In Tifrit, people recount the arrival of a terrorist group escorting a truckload of cans of oil stolen from a regional commercial center. After all the people were assembled, they were ordered at gunpoint to exchange the cans for olive oil.

In Zekri, farther north, a truck loaded with semolina similarly diverted was distributed to several inhabitants after speeches were made in the village square on "the aims of the jihad."

But some inhabitants remarked on the fact that half the cargo found its way to the guerrillas. That provoked the wrath of the terrorists, who went so far as to threaten the citizens with reprisals unless they cooperated. The villagers are expected, for example, to report movements of army or gendarme units, discreetly resupply the guerrillas, and distribute their propaganda to people living in the environs. The same is happening for tens of kilometers in all directions, in the so-called "42d" sector that marks the boundary between the wilayas of Tizi-Ouzou and Bejaia.

In this region, clandestine bursts of gunfire are almost constant by day and by night, and travelers on the now perilous roads in the two wilayas are subjected to vile outrages. Further south, between Yakouren and Tagma, the village of Assif El-Hammam, site of a thermal generating station, is a mere shadow of its former self, having long since been deserted by aficionados of the region's purifying waters. Since the only fellah market

was burned down, inhabitants no longer dare venture to nearby communes to provision themselves, for that has become too dangerous.

Practically the whole eastern part of the wilaya of Tizi-Ouzou is under the diktat of terrorist groups that perpetrate spectacular exploits (car thefts, nocturnal attacks on very isolated villages) to perpetuate their reign of terror. Already, since early July, enormous fires have destroyed more than 1,500 hectares of forest, in addition to which the ANP [People's National Army] carried out a large operation supported by a huge force. The latter did not, however, yield the expected results, and the slow, insidious drift of an entire region into the hands of the terrorists has outraged the inhabitants of many villages. The principle of self-defense groups, as they are called in many villages, has been revived in an effort to defend them. There is only one problem: The arms needed for their defense were turned over to the state, and the state is virtually absent. Villages like Ait Aissi, Tifrit, Alma, Tignatine, Boumansour, and Oulkhoul (birthplace of the late Tahar Djaout) are today reeling under a terrorist offensive that began in mid-June. For some months now, a rumor too horrifying to joke about had been circulating in the region: that the "finale" would be played out in Kabylia. The actors are in place. Only the date is still to be determined.

Struggle To Resist Terrorism in Chlef Described

94AF0244 Algiers EL WATAN in French
25 Jul 94 pp 1, 3

[Article by special correspondent in Chlef, Ghania Oukazi: "Former Mujahidin Organize in Self-Defense Groups; Chlef Resists Terrorism"—first paragraph is EL WATAN introduction]

[Text] In Chlef, terrorism is raging in the oppressive heat of summer. But the people are not about to give up. Actually, they are increasingly organizing their own defense. Former mujahidin were the first to do something. Even though insecurity is total and the risk of being the target of assassins is huge.

"We organize interventions and ambushes to thwart acts of terrorism, and we intend to keep fighting until these criminals are wiped out," we were told by a member of one of these groups of fighters who seem determined to protect property and individuals with their "last drop of blood." In fact, they are determined to hold out against the destroyers of Algeria. "Many operations were carried out, and we estimate that this is just the beginning of a struggle that we took to heart long ago," they insist.

In Chlef, "E'rai ma yetlef oua el-oued ma yincheff." [meaning: things will return to normal eventually] A saying that current events contradict every day. Actually, caught between the unbearable heat and daily acts of terrorism, the people are slowly dying.

Terrorists have every opportunity to spread psychosis and fear. This is not surprising since they are armed and act as a group...

"It is actually a case of 'governments of the night,' the same as in Tiaret and elsewhere," we were told by citizens, who remain practically powerless to face the unequal struggle. "We even shut ourselves up at home as soon as the sun goes down," the employees of a company acknowledged.

It is just terrorist groups, using barbaric and criminal means to intimidate the people. "They claim that they will improve the town's morals by killing men who get drunk and women accused of being loose," a young man, whose house adjoins that of a woman who was lynched, told us.

However, they do not leave it at that. "They even forbade us to give parties and celebrate weddings the way we used to," a group of women complained.

In fact, quite by chance, we attended a wedding where the women's traditional shrill cries of joy were forbidden. As for music, there was absolutely no hope of hearing the slightest sound. This being so, people in other neighborhoods assured us that parties were in full swing, even to celebrate high-school graduation. These paradoxes are hard to understand.

Apart from exceptions of this type, which are almost like miracles, "the government of the night" favors criminal acts under the cover of "jihad." Spread by word of mouth, rumors swell, and people thus end up talking about veritable maquis created by terrorist groups in the mountains surrounding the town. "To get food supplies, they hijack trucks carrying all sorts of goods," people say. "During the day, they probably work out their plans. At night they terrorize the people and perform their macabre tasks."

Although the people are experiencing a particularly torrid summer, they must barricade themselves at nightfall. The slightest noise is more than enough to put them in a cold sweat.

The town of Chlef is stifling under the pressures exerted on it from all sides. Neighboring villages, by the way, do not fare better. Oued-Fodda, some 10 km from the governorate seat, imposed a curfew that starts at 1600. Just go there around 1800 and you can see for yourself. There is not a living soul to be seen, the streets are empty, and the store shutters closed. Yet, not so long ago, in "normal times," Oued-Fodda was the delight of kebab lovers, and there were many of them. But things are different now.

The people of Chlef thus vegetate in the oppressive heat of one of the hottest months of the year. Heading west on the road out of town, the feeling of uneasiness becomes still more apparent. We shall never talk enough about the Oued-Sly cement factory, which is still operating without filters. "It's truly death city," an inhabitant told us, speaking of the adjoining neighborhoods. Like all cement factories in the country, the Oued-Sly factory is no exception to the rule. The thick clouds it releases,

which the local people have come to know all too well since the factory started operating in the late seventies, are completely destroying the environment. The people, especially older people and children, suffer from serious respiratory troubles. As for the orange groves, they were burned to a cinder. Gone are the juicy oranges that were the pride of the town and gave it an opportunity to celebrate "the orange festival." That was at a time when El-Asnam could thumb its nose at the prettiest towns.

Today, only desolation remains. But also the rage not to give up, to fight for one's dignity. "We, too, are men," a member of a self-defense group told us. "Truth always wins in the end," he added.

We should say that terrorism found here an ideal recruiting ground: among "fringe groups" first, and also among the victims of social injustice.

The living conditions of the population are a disaster. All the facts mentioned here are definitely not legends or stories from former eras. They make up the daily fabric of life in Chlef, formerly El-Asnam, a medium-size town located hardly 200 km from the capital, halfway between the two large megapoles.

To get there, coming from Algiers, you should expect to find "standing room only" in an overcrowded slow-speed train with no air conditioning, where the buffet is either closed or sells you mineral water at outrageous prices. Not to mention the toilets, clogged and overflowing, the foul smell of which reaches even the train driver's nose. It's hard to go to Chlef, unless you have your own vehicle, and even then.... Insecurity on the road deters those who are better informed.

In spite of all the efforts made by citizens to give back to their town a more or less "normal" image, you get the impression that you are driving through a huge shantytown that will not admit to being one.

After the famous earthquake of 1980, nothing was left of the town that used to be called "El-Ouasta," a town that knew the rules of hospitality, even toward mere travelers from Algiers or Oran passing through. The construction of prefabricated cottages and houses, a few months after the earthquake, contributed to the breakup of the town into several urban sites deprived of all conveniences, except for the hospital or the neighborhood clinics which are always short of medicines.

The town also lost its name. The day after the painful disaster, El-Asnam became Chlef. A name that means nothing to those who live here. Old people, especially those born here, feel truly disoriented. One of them acknowledged that: "this change put an end to our childhood dreams and completely cut us off from our past." Some say that the name of El-Asnam brought misfortune to the people: "Does that make sense?" those who knew it during its years of prosperity ask.

The downtown section was "patched up" with concrete, but there is no indication that parasismic rules were

respected. Very few individual houses and low-cost apartment buildings are being built, and very few assigned. Corruption and illegal practices are widespread.

A lot of things in town are not as they should be. Just look at the people standing in line at a water tank...to buy water. One water tank costs nearly 1,000 Algerian dinars [DA]. The 200 liters of water will sell for DA50. The precious liquid is rationed haphazardly and is available only every two or three days, and for only a small half-hour. "Does that mean that water is given its true economic value?" the inhabitants of a rather well-off neighborhood (one of a kind) ask as they struggle against all odds to preserve their lifestyle.

In addition, obtaining any administrative document means going through a veritable obstacle course lasting several days, if not months. Several citizens testified to the slowness, not to say the absence of the administrative departments. "No authority has the courage to sign anything," we were told. "The government," as local authorities are called here, gives the impression of being nonexistent for a large part of the population.

It is because of all these problems that a delegation of Chlef citizens decided to go see the ministry of interior, Abderahmane Meziane-Cherif. By receiving them and mentioning the responsibility of the highest town authorities, the minister thus justified the latest reshuffling of governors, designed to remedy the incompetence of their predecessors.

But the Chlef delegation certainly did not come just to explain this type of problem to a high-level official. "There is worse than the petty annoyances of the civil service," a group of elders told us.

Increased Violence, Sabotage in Tizi Ouzou Detailed
94AF0243B Algiers EL WATAN in French 23 Jul 94 p 3

[Article by Ali Yacine: "Draa-Ben-Khedda: New Upsurge in Sabotage"]

[Text] A year after the series of holdups perpetrated in the wilaya of Tizi-Ouzou, especially in its western and southern parts, this summer has seen an exponential upsurge, in the last few weeks, of assassinations, sabotage, and diverse acts of theft, plunging the populace into a state of intense anxiety.

The corridor extending from Sidi-Ali-Bounab (large wilderness area south of Tadmait) to Draa-Ben-Khedda and Sidi Naamane has been subjected to incessant pressure from terrorist groups, leaving blood and ashes in their wake.

Last week, a concerted strike was mounted against economic units in Draa-Ben-Khedda (10 km west of Tizi-Ouzou), where vehicle fleets were completely destroyed by fire. Other raids carried out the same night left an enormous amount of damage. According to

reports from people on the scene, the terrorist groups all used the same technique: At about 2000, one or two individuals came up to the gates of these economic units, jerry can in hand, asking the security guard for water. As soon as the trusting guard let the supplicant enter, the latter pulled his weapon and neutralized the guard. At about 2300 hours, accomplices arrived and set fire to the equipment.

The Sonatro base several hundred meters away was also put to the torch. Five semitrailer trucks and a control panel at the production unit (which makes coated gravel for road resurfacing) were destroyed. The other enterprise attacked was Cotitex. Since this cloth production complex was guarded by elements of the ANP [People's National Army], the terrorists quickly found another way to reduce its production capacity, by attacking the refurbished trucks used to transport workers. At Sidi-Naamane, 6 km away, a terrorist group intercepted four trucks transporting the night crew to the locality and its environs, as well as other trucks enroute to Tizirt. Forcing the occupants out of their vehicles, the terrorists set fire to the trucks, leaving the Cotitex workers stranded in the middle of the night. Near Baghlia (Boumerdes wilaya), about 15 km from the hellish corridor, terrorists torched numerous trucks, buses, and machinery parked several dozen meters from an ANP cantonment, while the service station at Tagdempt (7 km west of Dellys) fell victim to arson in broad daylight.

In addition to these acts of sabotage, assassinations and vehicle thefts have occurred at temporary roadblocks. The most serious incident took place at Draa-Ben-Khedda, where in the space of 11 months three brothers were assassinated, the last one being decapitated and his head left near a bus-stop.

At the same time, thefts and nocturnal visits have become an increasingly common occurrence. The latest "technique" used: forcing inhabitants of a house to remove the furniture, household appliances, and other gear from their own domicile. One helpless family complied because their two-month-old baby was taken hostage, a knife at its throat. Others escaped with broken legs after jumping out their windows.

This upsurge of terrorist operations, particularly along this corridor, can be partly explained by the growing presence of fugitives fleeing from elsewhere in the country, but also by the proximity of the Sidi-Ali-Bounab wilderness and the Makoda mountains, not to mention the number of fugitives being given refuge in town by sympathetic collaborators.

At the ORAC (Center Region Poultry Farming Office), several trucks and administrative offices were completely burned, with damages estimated in the tens of millions of dinars, plus an enormous loss of jobs. At almost the same hour, shortly after midnight, the headquarters of Cosider (formerly SNS [Algerian Steel Company]), where steelworking products are commercialized, met the same fate, with offices lost to fire and a

crane destroyed. At the headquarters of OAIC (Algerian Interoccupational Grains Office), trucks for pulling trailers were destroyed by arsonists. Fortunately, the enormous silos full of wheat miraculously escaped destruction. Several meters from the site, the offices of OGZA (Office of Activity Zone Management) were reduced to ashes. These acts of sabotage were all perpetrated within a few dozen meters from the Cotitex complex at Draa-Ben-Khedda.

EL HAQ Editor on Risk of Civil War

94AF0246C Paris *LIBERATION* in French 2 Aug 94 p 2

[Interview with Ali Rachedi, editor of Algerian weekly EL HAQ, by J.G.; in Algiers, by telephone, date not given: "Risk of Civil War"]

[Text] A proponent of dialogue, the editor of the weekly EL HAQ believes creation of an Islamic state on the Iranian model would plunge Algeria into civil war.

[J.G.] One has the impression Algeria is slowly sinking into chaos. Does the state still have the capacity to stop the violence?

[Rachedi] The question is rather whether the regime as a whole has the will to regain control. In Algeria, the state is deeply entangled with clans that are in perpetual conflict. The regime is divided: At present it includes men who seem to want to move toward a political settlement via a "dialogue" that would include all interested parties that reject violence. But others seem not to want such a solution, and I fear they don't care about the violence—indeed, they may even support it, directly or indirectly.

That being said, the armed groups are scoring points, they have implanted themselves almost everywhere and are carrying out increasingly spectacular operations, while the government's authority, by contrast, seems to be melting away.

[J.G.] Couldn't the present situation exacerbate regional identity problems, for example, in Kabylia?

[Rachedi] Definitely, though the danger is not immediate. So long as what we have is a confrontation between armed groups and the regime, so long as the overwhelming majority of people do not get drawn into the violence, there is no real danger of that. But if the armed groups get the upper hand and by violence impose an Islamic state—which therefore would be some sort of revolutionary regime in the Iranian mold—it is almost certain this would trigger civil war.

[J.G.] Couldn't this lead to the country breaking apart?

[Rachedi] I think people are letting their imaginations run wild on that question. The regime has always tried to brand Kabylia as "regionalist," but in fact since independence all the country's leaders have come from one small triangle in the eastern part of the country. Besides, how could you ever draw Kabylia's borders, when Berber-speaking populations are found everywhere in

Algeria, not just in the towns of Kabylia itself? That said, a Kabylia identity does actually exist: It is a mountainous region with hundreds of villages; but its inhabitants have always been committed to national unity.

[J.G.] Can the armed groups take power by force of arms?

[Rachedi] In purely military terms, it would be difficult, scarcely imaginable. But the "military" do not operate in a vacuum. They operate within a political system, within economic constraints, in a social environment. In the aftermath of the IMF accord—which, contrary to what people are saying, was not particularly generous to Algeria—there exists a serious risk of increased social unrest. The danger lies in the combination of a popular uprising—which still could happen, if living conditions deteriorate too far—and the activism of the armed groups, which could exploit the situation by intensifying their pressure...

The latest attack against the Frenchmen shows that the armed groups can strike when and where they want, not just in the capital but even in reputedly "hyperprotected" zones. It is precisely as if certain clans in the regime, opposed to "dialogue," were trying once more to get the security forces to step back—a move we saw several months ago, too, by the way—as a way of telling proponents of dialogue: "If you try to talk with those people, this is what happens to you."

[J.G.] So you think there is a greater risk of civil war than Algeria breaking apart?

[Rachedi] Yes, because Algerians are extremely jealous of their freedom and won't let anyone dictate by force the way they live their lives. I think they are ready to admit, most of them, that many Islamist movement demands are well-founded, so to speak, but they won't let themselves be forced into a mold that is alien to them. It is true also that the danger is somewhat geographically focused, because the hard core of the democratic movement is found, for historical reasons, in the center region—which does not mean the other regions are not interested in democracy or modernity.

In the last analysis, I do not believe our country will become either another Lebanon or another Afghanistan, because we do not have regions or communities with irreconcilable differences. And we do not have tribes sworn to uphold inexpiable ancestral hatreds.

Journalist Questioned; Organizations Protest

94AF0257A Paris *LE MONDE* in French 15 Aug 94 p 7

[Unattributed article: "Identity Checks Following Islamist Threats Against France: An Algerian Journalist Under Investigation in Paris"—first paragraph is LE MONDE introduction]

[Text] On Friday 12 August, in Paris and in the provinces, the police continued the vast operation started on

Saturday, 6 August, in response to some Algerian Islamists' threats against France. Four individuals suspected of taking part in traffic on behalf of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS)—including an Algerian journalist, Sayah Taleb—were placed under investigation.

In Paris, for the sixth consecutive night, more than 3,000 identity checks were made in the streets and subway corridors of the capital during the night of Friday, 12 August. Thirty-two individuals found in violation of immigration laws were handed over to the security branch of the police force, compared with about 60 the day before. A total of more than 20,000 individuals were checked in one week.

In Toulouse, two foreigners in irregular situation were taken in for questioning during similar operations. In Lyon, the continued identity checks are arousing resentment among the Maghreb community. "The fishing season for people from the Maghreb has started," the Association of Young Arabs of Lyon and its Suburbs (JALB) protested.

As a legal consequence of these operations, on Friday, 12 August, in Paris, four alleged FIS sympathizers were placed under investigation and sent to prison by the examining judge, Roger Le Loire, acting on behalf of his colleague Jean-Louis Bruguiere. Mohamed Belarbi, 30, and Lahcene Baroudi, 27, arrested in Paris, were charged, among other things, with aiding and abetting an arms law violation, and criminal conspiracy in connection with a terrorist undertaking. The two men, respectively the manager and employee of the Sira bookshop in Paris, are suspected of having financed the purchase of the arms and ammunitions found last 9 May in the car of Abdel Hakim Boutrif, when he was arrested near Metz.

The examining judge also placed under investigation Mohamed Sedjerari, 46, and journalist Sayah Taleb, 51, for criminal conspiracy in connection with a terrorist undertaking. Arrested in the Lille area, the two men were put in prison in connection with the Ahmed Seba case, which involves a traffic of fake Algerian identity papers destined for the Islamist maquis.

Solidarity Associations Are Concerned

Sayah Taleb's lawyers maintain that any contacts he may have had with FIS members were part of his activities as a journalist and a writer. According to Maitre Dupont-Moretti, Mr. Taleb is in jail "because he is a journalist, a writer, an intellectual, an Algerian and a Muslim." The lawyer sees his incarceration as "a threat for all Algerian intellectuals." He said that the only documents found at his client's (who has written five books on Algeria, including one cosigned by Herve Bourges) were "working documents." Mr. Taleb, a former leader of the Movement for Democracy in Algeria, has lived in France for 25 years.

For their part, on Friday, 12 August, the lawyers of 13 of the individuals under forced residence in Folembay

(Aisne) filed three appeals with the Amiens (Somme) administrative tribunal in order to stay the implementation of the ministerial order to deport their clients, and have it nullified. They also asked for an emergency report on their clients' conditions of forced residence.

In a communique, five organizations denounced this placement under forced residence which, they said, "amounts to a veritable arbitrary detention." The communique was signed by the Federation of Associations of Solidarity with Immigrant Workers (FASTI), the Group of Information and Support of Immigrant Workers (GISTI), the French Lawyers Union (SAF), the Magistrates Union (SM), and SOS-Racism. They recalled that a democratic State "is characterized by compliance with legal procedures and the safeguards that go with them."

For its part, the Human Rights League (LDH) denounced "the French government's unfailing support of the Algerian military regime, which actually encourages it to persevere on a road that is leading to disaster."

Scientists Return Home To Participate in Forum

94AF0258C Algiers EL WATAN in French
8 Aug 94 pp 1, 3

[Article by Tahar Hani: "Research: Exiled Researchers Come Back"—first paragraph is EL WATAN introduction]

[Text] The Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research will organize a scientific forum in Algiers, on 10-15 August. Some 100 Algerian researchers residing abroad (America, Europe, and Asia) are expected to participate in this meeting, the first of its kind in the annals of our country's higher education.

According to a ministry official, the intent of the forum is to put in touch Algerian researchers from various disciplines working both in Algeria and in some developed countries, in scientific and technological fields. So far, 60 researchers working abroad have agreed to participate. "That is already a good thing," the same official commented, estimating "that, in the summertime and when security conditions are unfavorable, it is difficult to mobilize the mass of Algerian researchers who have settled elsewhere and whose work benefits Western or Asiatic countries."

The forum will also make it possible to start a debate on the contribution of our scientific and technological potential in exile, adapting it of course to current economic and social requirements. These contributions will be many. They will deal with teaching, the training of postgraduate students, educating educators, information and scientific and technical documentation, and finally research projects in several fields.

To this end, a rich and differentiated program was prepared. The participants will tackle the preparation of a debate concerning how to organize the contribution of Algerians residing abroad; they will consider technology

and knowhow transfer problems in North America, and especially the ways and means to redeploy the higher education system.

In sum, the major objective of such a meeting is first to provide bases for active and permanent solidarity among our researchers, as the expected synergism cannot fail to support and strengthen the dynamic revival of the higher-education sector and that of scientific research.

Note that, prior to that forum, two major seminars on scientific research were organized in Algiers by the same ministry. The goal was to somehow shake up researchers and define a program or a concrete working orientation that would revive the debate on research and the country's overall scientific development.

Officials from national institutes and universities will also take part in this event, which will also give the Algerian researchers who have remained at home an opportunity to absorb the working methods and educational views of their colleagues in exile.

The latter, in turn, should take the "pulse" of the Algerian university, its new orientations, reorganizations, and above all its various needs. All scientific branches will be considered. The mosaic of researchers who are expected to attend could certainly answer the concerns of those who remained here in spite of many pressures and threats.

We should note the well-considered gesture of the supervising ministry, which does not try to impose an agenda. "They are researchers and we are the administrative personnel. It is among themselves that they should organize debates," another official maintained.

In Algeria, scientific research was always confined within a bureaucratic system that left out prominent professors and forced others to leave their native country, although it had educated them. The new dynamic system set up by ministry officials may at last release initiatives from all sides and recognize the true value of researchers, the men who show us the way.

EGYPT

Survey of Independent Press Presented

94LD0071A London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic
27 May 94 p 13

[Article by 'Abdallah Kamal in Cairo: "The Late Al-Sadat Was the First To Usher In the Era of Sensational Press in Egypt"]

[Text] A quarter million copies of sensationalist newspapers and provocative headlines are circulated in Cairo. They deal with political, artistic, and athletic subjects. Sometimes they boost their circulation, and sometimes the editors are summoned to the district attorney's office for questioning on charges of calumny, slander, and defamation.

The story of sensational journalism in Egypt goes back to the 1970s. Without intending any change in the press sector, late President Anwar al-Sadat ushered in the era of sensational papers when he announced the establishment of the democratic pulpits in the mid-1970s. He appointed a pulpit to each of the political right, left, and center. Then these pulpits broke away from the single political organization prevailing at that time, the Socialist Union; each became a political party, and thus the National Progressive Unionist Grouping Party [NPUG], the Liberal Party, and the Egypt Party were formed.

At that point, the era of the partisan press began, and that was the first step on the road to a politically sensational press.

The partisan papers were required to help the political organizations that published them obtain popularity—to form political capital for the parties. Because, while these newspapers were published, the government owned dozens of national publications, long established in their markets, the partisan newspapers had to scream with all their lung power to proclaim their new existence.

Press Competition

The NPUG issued a weekly paper, AL-AHALI [People], whose name was chosen by the late journalist Salah Hafiz, one of the most important teachers of the RUZ AL-YUSUF school. Thus it appeared that there was a rivalry not only between two parties but between two schools of journalism, first AKHBAR AL-YAWM [News of the Day], represented by AL-AHRAR [The Liberals], and secondly RUZ AL-YUSUF, represented, to a certain extent, by AL-AHALI. While AL-AHRAR used sensational journalism with a light political purpose, AL-AHALI committed itself to a politically sensationalist line that emphasized social distinctions. So it published articles with headlines like "The People at the Top and People at the Bottom" and "Crooks!" especially by journalist Salah 'Isa in his weekly satires about articles, the news, and the government newspapers.

In the meantime, the newspaper AL-SHA'B [The People] was published as the organ of the Socialist Labor Party, in tabloid form, and it was decided to publish it weekly, on Tuesdays. While this format generally demands that the content be sensationalistic and provocative, this was not the case. The party at that time held to a largely balanced political line, neither extremely right nor left; nor was it, at the same time, fiercely opposed to the Egypt Party government, or, subsequently, the National Party government.

Despite the fact that the tabloid format gives prominence to photographs and big headlines, especially on the front page, the editorial department of AL-SHA'B insisted on handling their tabloid as if it were a dignified daily standard.

Thus, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, Egypt had not so much a sensationalist press as a sometimes combative

one, and there was no competition apart from the Events page in the official AL-MASA' [The Evening] newspaper, which tended to blow up ordinary events into heated issues, to the point where readers began to mock news like that of "the woman who ate her husband's arm" and "the thief who repented in the apartment he was burglarizing."

In spite of this, the newspaper was sold and hawked in the middle of the day, when workers were heading home from their jobs.

Far from events, the partisan newspapers' first leap forward collapsed, and they began to retreat gradually, either because the formula was limited and did not have the dimensions of continuity as is the case with AL-AHRAR, or because bombs were exploding intermittently inside the newspaper and the party. The newspaper wounded itself, as was the case with AL-AHALI, whose rhetorical line began a steep decline in the second half of the 1980s.

For its part, AL-SHA'B changed and became a "standard" newspaper. Hamid Zaydan, then 'Adil Husayn edited the newspaper in this form, and then Majdi Ahmad Husayn, but it remained until recently a colorless, undistinguished party paper.

Before getting into the next stage of the story of the sensationalistic press in Egypt, we will pause to consider two points, the first relating to AL-I'TISAM [Preservation], the magazine of the Muslim Brotherhood [MB], which kept publishing until it was closed down in the early 1980s. It was an ideal example of a magazine that blazed in its opposition to the rule of President al-Sadat; it could hardly be described as sensationalist, especially as it was made up of a group of opposition articles with an Islamic slant.

Later on, we will discover that the MB was behind a number of sensationalistic periodicals, but now we will move on to the second point, dealing with the brief varied pattern that occurred with AL-AHRAR in 1986, for a period of just three months.

AL-AHRAR's circulation had fallen to 30,000 copies per week. When Mustafa Kamil Murad, the chief of the Liberal Party, found that there was no alternative to raising the price of the paper in order to raise with it his party's voice. For that reason, in an unprecedented step, he sought help from a journalist capable of saving the newspaper, using the logic that journalism comes before politics. So he appointed Mahmud 'Awad—the deputy editor of AKHBAR AL-YAWM—editor-in-chief of AL-AHRAR.

'Awad started out as if he had detached the newspaper from the party, as the latter was allowed only two columns, with two more columns for the party's news, of which one was on the first page and the other on page two.

AL-AHRAR was at that time, one might say, the model of "refined sensationalism" in journalism, providing information without a biased view, relying upon well-known writers to attract the greatest possible number of readers. In this way the newspaper began to have a major news story with a huge headline just two or three words long with a second story on the left of the front page, something like "Most Famous AIDS Patient Visits Egypt" or "Muhammad 'Abd-al-Wahab Writes to AL-AHRAR."

In those days AL-AHRAR took full advantage of two events: its excellent coverage of Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal's return to writing, when it published "Decision Making in Egypt at AKHBAR AL-YAWM," and the second, its coverage of the Central Security events [police riots] of February and March, 1986.

As soon as Mahmud 'Awad left the editor's desk, under pressure from the late Salah Abu-Isma'il, Muhammad 'Amir was appointed editor-in-chief, and the rhetoric resumed its downhill course.

On another front, AL-SHA'B had begun to make its way towards taking advantage of controversial political events, but it never was wholly sensationalistic, and started a new era with a different layout prepared by artist Muhy-al-Din al-Labad, and given over, for some time, to reports, led by writer 'Adil Hammudah, which purposed to highlight the case of Sulayman Khatir, the Egyptian soldier who opened fire on Israeli border guards, of whom it was said that he committed suicide in prison.

On a third front, AL-AHALI insisted upon a leftist political format without first-rate journalistic standards.

In fact, party journalism was experiencing very tough competition, after the publication of the most important political sensationalist paper in Egypt in 1984: AL-WAFD, the organ of the right-wing Wafd party. It came back into being as the result of a legal struggle between the government and the Wafd Party.

The late journalist Mustafa Shardi plotted a new journalistic course, going beyond the careful boundaries set out by AKHBAR AL-YAWM, and offered a journalism different to a large degree. While many people disagreed with it, from the beginning he prepared a distinctive layout that made use of one large photograph, a scattering of items on the pages, and slanted and round headlines always helped by a high editorial tone.

AL-WAFD was published on Thursday mornings, and Mustafa Shardi's influence on it was clear, for while the newspaper went beyond all recognized boundaries at the time in the news it printed, Shardi supported the newspaper with a heated leading article, apparently daring at that time, though now they seem ordinary, read years after his passing.

Besides Shardi's article, there was an important news lead, considered one of the most important sensationalist elements AL-WAFD offered. This article was called

"The Little Bird" and published, every Thursday morning, a huge number of items of secret news about the Wafd's political enemies in the National Party government, relying on an Egyptian popular formula that tended not to reveal who had told the secret; one told whoever asked that a "little bird" had told him.

Press Battles

In the same context, Shardi supported his newspaper in more than one battle, moving journalistic work forward; it appeared that he believed that sensationalism alone was not enough to boost the paper's circulation figures, and by extension the party's increased popularity on the political scene. So it set off—at the same time—a battle with the Nasirites over the late President Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir, in the same newspaper that had printed frank studies by the late Wafd leader Sa'd Zaghlul, and at one time feuded with the NPUG, and all the officials of the National Party government.

Shardi exploited every political clash with the government by auctioning it in the field of sensationalistic journalism. He printed news about chases he saw driving his car. He made room in the news for the group of bullies who beat an editor, treating it as a political matter. He considered the accusations of bribery against his journalists—in the famous "Little Bird" case—part of the political battle. The accusation was never proved in court later.

When AL-WAFD went from being a weekly paper to a daily, it brought the same format to the daily edition, but it was compelled to print a number of state news items as a journalistic service to the reader, and as part of its competition with the other three daily newspapers, AL-AHRAM, AL-AKHBAR, and AL-JUMHURIYAH, which Egyptians had been buying for years out of habit, and on which they relied.

Mustafa Shardi died, and with him the characteristics of the paper he had formed. Its general exterior appearance remained; for by chance the date of his death was the same date of the apparent deal between the government and the party. On one hand AL-WAFD was a paper in need of more essential official information that would have enabled it to withstand the daily competition battle. On the other hand, the government was not able to absorb a daily attack on it, after they had been only weekly.

Thus the new editor-in-chief of AL-WAFD, Jamal Badawi, who had helped Shardi found the newspaper, became the first editor-in-chief of a party newspaper to travel on official trips on the president's plane. He was also the first party writer to be given a weekly television program to retell many stories from Egyptian history, in addition to 30 episodes in the month of Ramadan of another historical program, called *Qata'if* (Pancakes).

But AL-WAFD did not abandon sensationalism. It went from printing political scandals to printing news of

events, human interest, and crime stories. It held to a certain balance in printing news allowed to be included in the program "From the Papers" broadcast every day at midnight. Thus page one could include, at the same time, news like "Startling Confessions of Bank Explosion Suspects," "A Visit to Sa'd Zaghlul's Tomb on the Anniversary of the 1919 Revolution," "Minister of Awqaf Chief of Egyptian Haj Mission," and "Emergency in Tax Agency Preparatory to Declaration Season."

What imposed this format on AL-WAFD was the fact that the party had found itself having to attack terrorism, terrorists, and extremists. This was a policy parallel to the National Party's, and it made Jamal Badawi write things similar to what the official papers were writing, saying: "It appears that random murder will continue, so we must live with this reality and get used to it, until this affliction goes away and security is restored to this land."

At the same time, the Wafd was keen to hold on to its special readership by printing more human interest stories; it followed rape stories, details of what went on in the hospitals for the insane, robberies, pickpocketing, and murder while attacking price-gouging and the government's economic policy.

In recent years, AL-SHA'B has pulled the rug out from under AL-WAFD.

AL-SHA'B's transformation into a more sensationalist paper was linked to the Labor Party's turning to a different political line, after making an alliance with the Muslim Brotherhood. Its former editor-in-chief 'Adil Husayn adopted the paper's current format and made his weekly article the paper's most important editorial material, generally occupying the banner headline page it was printed on.

Majdi Ahmad Husayn, AL-SHA'B's current editor-in-chief, said that the popular response to the party is what gave the newspaper its high circulation, and that AL-SHA'B now sells more than any other weekly newspaper.

AL-SHA'B decided, in its new format, to pay close attention to women's stories, to stories of the torture of suspects. These were the topics AL-AHRAR and AL-WAFD had started with, and AL-SHA'B followed them even more closely.

The Labor Party newspaper tended to print any information at all, even if it were not clearly documented. For example, the Friday edition of the paper, which is now published biweekly, said, "Israel is putting nuclear warheads in the holy places," and "the new law betrays the rights of workers." It accused al-Nabawi Isma'il, Fayidah Kamil, and their son Mahmud of fraud in selling cars, in addition to 'Adil Husayn's article: "We Will Not Submit to the Enemies of God, Nor Will We Be Silent On Their Plot for the Secession of Southern Sudan."

This newspaper clashed many times with the National Party government. At one point it was accused of

encouraging the strikes at tourism, when anti-tourist operations were precipitated by an article condemning tourist activities in Egypt. Thus the newspaper became a primary focus of legal investigations conducted every now and then on editors and the editor-in-chief.

A few weeks ago, the chairman of the board and the editor-in-chief were brought to criminal court on the charge of publishing unsubstantiated material, and party Vice President Hilmi Murad, Secretary General 'Adil Husayn, Editor-in-Chief Majdi Husayn, and journalist Mustafa Bakri are now being investigated because of articles dealing with the massacre in Hebron.

Majdi Husayn told AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT, "It is clear that we are seeing political pressure being put on opposition newspapers, and the margin of freedom that this supposedly nationalist government allows the press. This is worrying in terms of press freedom. We cannot deal with newspapers with laws and the judiciary and courts."

But, "we are not against the law," he added. "However, what is going on reflects great distress in press freedom, and is a cause for great fears. The Supreme Press Council is now studying what they call the right to respond and to correct. I think the Council is meeting to protect information security, which is nothing but the first step toward an official ban on already-rare information. Then they'll accuse journalists of writing without anything to substantiate it."

AL-SHA'B is now facing five lawsuits in court, filed by senior officials. Most prominent is the case of the accusation on Prime Minister 'Atif Sidqi's debts, the case against the governor of Cairo, and the suits of the minister of petroleum and Member of Parliament Thuraya Lubnah.

But Majdi Ahmad Husayn does not deny this will influence the paper's editorial policy, saying, "It is not our fault. It is they who are trying to cripple press freedom. We will not retreat. This has been our steady position for years. We trust the judiciary and our own message."

He added, "AL-SHA'B is a sensationalist newspaper, that is true, particularly as it has become the sole opposition paper that refuses to abide by the rules of the game. We want to change the rules of the game, in the framework of law and the Constitution."

For its part, AL-SHA'B says, "The charges leveled against them are incitement to riot, printing articles that endanger national security, social peace, and national unity. The punishment for these charges exceeds 10 years imprisonment."

Previously he was questioned, with some of the same people, about unsubstantiated items printed about the involvement of the President's chief of staff in the scandal of Madinat Nasr contractor Fawzi al-Sayyid; and there were similar charges against Member of Parliament Thuraya Lubnah.

Thus the greatest political and journalistic problem of AL-SHA'B is that it does not understand the dividing line between documented information and information unsupported by any substantiation, which reduces it to rumor.

Perhaps because this has entangled it in numerous legal problems, AL-SHA'B has taken to printing selections from articles and books by non-Party writers, explaining this by saying, "There are an incredible and unacceptable number of lawsuits filed against AL-SHA'B, because ours is a serious voice, and we expose without fear, not caring of the corrupt persons' social status. There are many lawsuits against us. Because the paper enjoys no immunity, we must be careful."

In general, AL-SHA'B was one of the papers that took advantage of the case of Lucy Artin, which was the downfall of a number of Interior Ministry officers. It printed every story and rumor on the subject, as did the Liberal Party's AL-HAQIAH, boosting its circulation to 40,000 at the time, up from just 15,000 before.

But Lucy Artin was also the most important issue exploited by every newspaper in Egypt, without exception, though it happened by slow degrees. There were also newspapers that printed every rumor, like some of the party newspapers, some that printed documented information, and some that printed only the recent official decisions in the case.

Thanks to this, with the reoccurrence of stories like Lucy Artin, Fawzi al-Sayyid, and others, a number of party newspapers have achieved great affluence, but does this mean that there is a sensationalist press in Egypt?

Journalist Professor Dr. Khalil Sabat of the College of Media says, "There is not a genuinely sensationalist press. In the West, that expression means newspapers that cover scandals and chase after celebrities, that dig through their secrets, and pay money for them. In Egypt, though, there is only political sensationalism, unsupported by facts. I do not think Egyptian society could handle the existence of sensationalist papers, in the Western sense, which print erotic photos, private recordings, and secret telephone conversations. Not only is it foreign to the society in terms of its values, but also because the newspapers cannot, legally, dare to try it, and would not be able to withstand the power of the people they would be writing about."

He added: "We do not need sensationalistic newspapers so much as we need newspapers that uncover the truth, to inform their readers, not to stir up his instincts and feelings, or to play with the readers' emotions, but to address their minds and offer true information."

But this does not mean that Egypt has experienced, in the last two years, the publication of numerous newspapers that have come very close to the Western sensationalist ones, if not entirely. That formula has added three new papers, published by Dar Akhbar al-Yawm in rapid succession.

The first was AKHBAR AL-HAWADITH [News of Events], a tabloid published on Thursday mornings, with every page featuring crime news from all over. At first the format chosen for the paper seemed unfamiliar, meaning that society suffered from all these crimes, and so it tried to begin publication with the slogan it adopted in its advertising campaign: "Crime does not pay."

In spite of that, AKHBAR AL-HAWADITH published stories about people who came back after death, children discovered by their families, catastrophes caused by the earthquake, the scandals of European stars, and much more of the same.

"In spite of that," says AKHBAR AL-HAWADITH Editor-in-Chief Samir Tawfiq, "and in spite of the fact that we sell 500,000 copies every week, we are not a sensationalist paper. We insist on defending the motto for which we publish: 'Crime does not pay.' That is why we do not print rumors, but facts. We do not turn criminals into heroes, and we do not publish verdicts that are not final."

For his part, Tawfiq describes his newspaper as the first to enter Imbabah, and the first to help the fruit-seller who arrested the Metro station terrorist. Readers gave him an apartment and sums of money. He said, "We are almost two years old, and we believe that requires us to try even harder and stay farther away from sensationalism."

On another front, AKHBAR AL-YAWM has continued to promote more sensationalist newspapers, with the publication of AKHBAR AL-NUJUM [News of the Stars], which contains all the details of artistic life, and photos of the stars and their society news. For its circulation it depends on various star photos, printed weekly on the cover; in the final analysis it is one of the less steamy papers, though it is generally classified as a "popular" paper.

ISRAEL

Strength of Religious Zionism Expected To Grow

94AA0099C Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR in Hebrew
22 Jul 94 p 17

[Article by Y. Bar: "They, Too, Are Among the Cursers"]

[Text] The latest terrorist act in the territories—the abduction and murder of a soldier from Gezmo and the murder of a young girl from Qiryat Arba—supplied all sectors of the Israeli public with support for its long-time positions. The pacifists sounded their anticipated "nevertheless and despite everything" (luckily, this time we did not hear the cliché, "We will fight terrorism as if there were no peace, and we will progress in peace as if there were no terrorism"); those opposed to peace viewed the two murder cases as proof of the falseness of the peace process and the dangers hidden in it; and the religious surprised no one when they found, in the wake of these incidents, a chance to claim how erroneous are the

various Zionist ways, and, subsequently, how straightforward is their separatist way.

According to them, the current secular government has proved, by their lack of preventing the latest incidents, "the helplessness in the face of increasing terrorism"; while the religious Zionism, thus YETED NE'EMAN, is in a "severe values crisis, following the government's policy toward settlement in the territories." It follows that only followers of Rabbi Shakh and those like him, opponents of the Zionism under which they are flourishing, are correct in their opposition.

Even the curses, which Major General of Central Command Ilan Biran had hurled at him by the settlers in Qiryat Arba—"traitor" and "murderer"—just like the words sprouted by the settlers to Israel Defense Forces (IDF) soldiers—"Nazis," "Kapo," and "Gestapo"—were quoted with great relish in YETED NE'EMAN, as if the quoters came to say: You see? Not only do we know how to curse the Israeli police in our demonstrations, the Zionists, too, are among the cursers. Behold, we have bequeathed some of our ways to those who err.

A Hasty Conclusion

The orthodox Jews of YETED NE'EMAN enjoyed something unique when they were informed that the mouthpiece of the National Religious Party, HATZAPA, published an announcement to not yet say a prayer for the country's well-being in the way that had been accepted to date. The orthodox had never said this prayer, and this matter was one of the distinguishing revelations that separated the orthodox from the religious Zionists. The addition of prayers in honor of the state, which the national religious did, was, in the eyes of the orthodox, sacrilege.

Now that HATZAPA has reported that "the time has come to cancel the prayer for the well-being of this government's 'officers and advisers,'" because "they are not worthy of our prayers for their well-being," the orthodox really celebrated. Now, the disgrace of many of the knitted yarmulkes, who tried to live in peace with both the state and the religion, was revealed. Now, they withdrew them. Indeed, their motive was that they were giving prayers for the "correct" political stands, but the result is what is important: The knitted yarmulkes withdrew them. And the orthodox do not doubt that this is the start of the disintegration of religious Zionism. The innermost thoughts dictate the orthodox analyses, therefore, they have a clear conclusion regarding the significance of the turnaround: "This turnaround in the national religious position is deserving of a much deeper and wider treatment beyond this little corner, which deals with issues of the hour. It teaches about the breakdown of ideology and losing one's way."

A hasty conclusion. The national religious ideology did not become broken in the hearts of its subjects. The breakdown in the national religious Zionism is a result of

the fact that the reality of the past two years is slapping them in the face, very frustratingly and painfully. In the two previous decades, their nationalist ideology strengthened: The years of the Likud government improved its strength, its settlements filled the territories anywhere they found room for a [?mobile home?]; their youth movement, Beney 'Aqiva, was home to almost all of the sons and daughters of religious Zionism, and thus became the largest youth movement in the country. They were proud, indeed, of this homogeneity of their youth, but it reminded us of the reality of totalitarian societies, the Comsomol, for example. And, in general, in a society in which there is no room for multiple opinions, there is cause for concern.

In the years of participation by the National Religious Party in the coalition, institutions close to them were beefed up, and members of religious Zionism sometimes sensed that the "beginning of redemption" was, indeed, at the door, and they kicked hard, and how they kicked.

A Coalition in the Name of God

And then, the government changed, the Likud went out to the opposition desert, and a government arose with the participation of the political "Devil" in the eyes of the National Religious Party, Meretz. Those at the head of the new government turned Satan, himself, into a legitimate mediator, to their alarm. Their entire world, until then, had been built upon colonization in the name of God, and which was carried out under the aegis of the previous government; its justification for this was that the enemy standing before them was not human, was murderous, not worthy of positive treatment, and eternal war was decreed upon them. Suddenly, this Satan received a new standing with the Israeli Government. Not really sympathetic, but—What a disgrace!—almost human. The Messiah's times, which hovered in the air during all the years of the Likud government, made room, during the current government, for signs heralding evil, days in which real danger hovers concerning the continuation of Israel's sovereignty over all of the Holy Land and the 2 million foreigners living in it. It is not easy to adapt and resign oneself to such a change, in the course of which, the settlers, the pioneer corps of religious Zionism, changed from the beloved sons of the government to a thorn in their side.

At the time when political developments started to crystallize a reverse and opposing political path to that of the knitted yarmulkes, the national religious continued to dream of the rise of the kingdom of Israel and the establishment of the Third Temple. Some of them dreamed of the return of the kingdom in actuality (and if it were only possible to locate them, we would see the descendants of King David returning to service), and of the physical establishment of the Third Temple on the Temple Mount, instead of the Muslim mosques that are hoisted on the most holy site on earth.

Such people could not contend with the new reality without being deeply, spiritually damaged. Only a few

have begun to understand that a different way is also possible, a way which, despite the fact that it is not under the patronage of God and the law of Rabbi Cook, is legitimate. Only a few came to conclusions from this and changed their way of thinking.

The reaction of most of them was to fortify their positions and treat the current regime as not legitimate, a traitor to the nation's values, which, had it not been for their recoiling from a civil war, would have already taken care of it. There were those among the settlers who already said no to any sort of civil war, but, in the same breath, did not remove from consideration the possibility of taking over the government by force. Democratic values do not appear in the Halakha, therefore, there is no obligation to preserve them; and if the regime that was democratically elected but that "depends on Arab votes" does not consolidate the path that God wants, not only is it valid, it is, perhaps, a religious duty to forcefully drive it out.

There Is No Third Way

And the orthodox see the voices and they dissolve. [sentence as published] For them, the idealistic breakdown of religious Zionism has only one meaning: If they are mistaken, that means that we are right, for it could not be that there would be a third way. The crisis in religious Zionism is, for the orthodox, a crisis for all of Zionism and do not confuse them with contradicting facts. Therefore, the conclusion of the author of the YETED NE'EMAN article, P. Hovev, is unavoidable and so expected: "Now, after dozens of years of bowing to the Zionist idol, the time has come for the national religious to understand that this is not 'the beginning of the growth of our redemption.' Perhaps it would be possible to be glad for the fact that more Jews are discovering the truth. But, when the situation is so bad that they are already discovering its severity, it is already very sad." Now, not only the settlers have visions, we have another religious group that sustains itself with delusions.

Dear orthodox: The national religious have not found any truth about the error in the Zionist perception, they are not repenting. Just the opposite, they have turned their Zionist version into part of their religious perception and have become an extremist, messianic group whose disappointment with the Zionist government is not because of the Zionism in it, but, because, according to their perception, the secular Zionists of the Labor movement and its partners are not religious enough, not belligerent enough, not colonizing enough, and do not hate Arabs enough. Religious Zionism will not become anti-Zionist in the wake of the crisis visited upon it; the extra-Zionist religious Zionists will, perhaps, become ultra-Zionists, some of them deluded, some disappointed, and a few dangerous to the rule of law. Residents of Beney Baraq and North Jerusalem, it is too early to rejoice. The time has not yet arrived to exchange the teddy bears for [?playthings].

TUNISIA

Efforts To Eradicate Environmental Pollution

Environmental Minister Discusses Programs

94WN0375Y Tunis REALITES in French 30 Jun 94 pp 8-9

[Interview with Mehdi Mlika, minister of environmental affairs and land planning, by Ridha Lahmar; date and place not given: "Citizens Entitled to Healthy Environment and Sustainable Development"]

[Text] On the occasion of National Environmental Protection Day, and mindful of all our country's pollution problems, we asked Mr. Mehdi Mlika to discuss the broad lines of his environmental protection policy, with its implications for land planning and the imperatives of sustainable development.

[Lahmar] Mr. Minister, can you tell our readers where we stand in the fight against pollution, and where are our worst problems?

[Mlika] The services under this ministry began by performing a veritable scientific and technical "diagnostic" of pollution in our country. Our approach has been pragmatic: We've examined the state of the sea, the land, and the atmosphere. We've investigated environmental conditions on agricultural land and in forests, the pollution in industrial and urban regions, analyzed water quality, and studied the public health environment. We've taken a particularly close look at conditions in low-income neighborhoods on the outskirts of our cities, with a view to rehabilitating them. Our worst pollution problems are highly concentrated geographically around our industrial hubs: Sfax, Gabes, Bizerte, Kasserine, and Ben Arous. Finally, we've prepared a comprehensive and coherent strategy for environmental protection. Our national action plan, "Agenda 21 National," will enable our country to enter the 21st century with the environment preserved, ready for sustainable development.

[Lahmar] Can you tell us what principles underlie your approach?

[Mlika] Our actions derive basically from our concept of human rights. We started from the principle that Tunisians have the right to a healthy environment, to health and well being, plus the right to sustainable development, thanks to protection of natural resources and the environment from degradation. Actually, the two are closely related, since preservation of our natural resources should allow our children to benefit from sustainable development.

[Lahmar] What are the top priorities in your action plan?

[Mlika] Starting from the diagnostic and the action plan, the services under the ministry, ANPE [National Environmental Protection Agency], and ONAS [National Public Sanitation Office] have targeted action priorities on the

basis of their environmental impact: urban sanitation, solid waste management, and disposal of industrial and hospital waste.

We have tried to match our words with action: For example, over the last two years we've improved sanitation in 80 out of the 300 low-income neighborhoods surveyed, at a cost of 13 million Tunisian dinars [D], by installing a network for collection, removal, and treatment of waste water. The second stage of the 10-year plan has now been launched; it involves 130 neighborhoods over the life of the Eighth Plan, and will cost D25 million.

President Ben Ali has made courageous decisions, such as closing the NPK factory, to protect the health of citizens from toxic emissions. Industrial activities have been moved to La Skhira to protect jobs. It's the same with the Nefza tannery, which was polluting the water table with toxic waste water. Another plant in Mahdia that was processing olive cake and polluting was shut down to protect the environment. Also, rehabilitation measures have been adopted to prevent environmental pollution. In Kasserine, for example, the pulp factory that was emitting mercury was forced to modify its practices, at the cost of a D20-million investment. In Gabes, a two-stage absorption process (better profitability) ended emissions of toxic gases into the atmosphere, at a cost of D80 million.

[Lahmar] Don't you think, Mr. Minister, that these investments are a luxury in a country such as ours, where the leading concerns are to create jobs and promote production and exports?

[Mlika] Not at all. Studies we have made of the impact on public health have shown that the nation spends four times as much on health infrastructure, medical care, and medications. In reality, pollution generated by atmospheric, toxic, and industrial waste affects the health of the citizen, causing maladies and suffering and productivity losses from illness. This is why we talk so much about the utility and importance of [environmental] impact studies; industrial polluters must be located outside urban areas, far from the coast, and they must treat their wastes.

[Lahmar] Can you tell us, Mr. Minister, how much relative emphasis you put on prevention versus remedial action?

[Mlika] Preventive measures are included in the national planning scheme, which makes impact studies mandatory at two levels: For example, for the building of a tannery, we study both the impact on of the tannery on the environment and the impact of the industrial zone on the entire region, to avoid pollution, for there are sensitive zones such as coastal areas and beaches, major cities, that must be protected at all costs. We are working to reconcile the national master plans for transport, energy, and water with the imperatives of pollution prevention. For that, we depend on very modern techniques such as aerial photography and remote sensing.

ANPE and the Directorate General of Land Planning play the key role in preventing public nuisances, while ONAS works on rehabilitation.

We can say that important actions have gotten under way to reduce pollution at the worst sites: At Gabes, we have invested 80 million of the D150 million needed to reduce the harm from phosphoric acid, though the problem of phospho-gypsum remains to be resolved. At Sfax, over a three-year period, we've invested 35 million of the 70 million needed. In Ben Arous, 40 percent of the industrial nuisances have been resolved. In Gafsa, at the phosphate complex, the water pollution has been stopped. The air pollution problem remains to be resolved. In Bizerte, the problems of STIR [Tunisian Refining Company] and El Fouladh are still with us, for lack of funds. You must remember, this is a 10-year plan and we are only in the third year. We hope to complete it before the 10 years is up. In the coastal areas, we have set up five permanent laboratories that are now operational to analyze water quality where people swim and the sand on the beaches; three others are under construction, while four Japanese-built laboratories on wheels patrol the beaches to ensure against contamination. We can say that our beaches are healthy; that is important, both for our own countrymen and for tourists.

[Lahmar] And what measures are being taken to stop pollution by the PME's [small and medium-sized industries]?

[Mlika] With regard to PME polluters, we have taken three series of measures to "rehabilitate" offenders in this domain. First, sensitization through cost-free studies; second, advocacy of technical assistance solutions, again on a cost-free basis; finally, incentives for installation of waste treatment equipment with aid from the pollution control fund. This aid subsidizes 20 percent of the investment, and provides assistance in finding bank financing for 50 percent, leaving 30 percent for the enterprise itself to contribute. All this is in compliance with the two basic principles adopted by the legislature: The polluter must be the payer, and the producer must take responsibility for reclamation. The Integrated Investment Code has provided tax incentives for enterprises that preserve the environment. We have prepared studies, at no charge, for building a purification station for 15 industrial units that will cost Ben Arous some D6 million, to be financed by the parties in question. We have found new waste pretreatment solutions for individual enterprises, and ONAS will then connect the factories to the public [sewage disposal] network.

[Lahmar] Mr. Minister, have we found the necessary sources of financing? What about possibilities of recycling the debt?

[Mlika] Four years ago President Ben Ali launched the idea, which has been getting more and more support, of recycling debt reimbursement payments into environmental protection projects, starting from the idea that the phenomenon is worldwide in scope. Some foreign

partners have accepted the principle. For example, with Sweden we have three large projects, including the Kalaat El Andalous sewage purification station, which was totally built by Tunisia, the three national parks of Nahli (Ariana, D350,000), Bou Kornine (D500,000), and Sidi Yahia at Sousse, which is an urban green zone, and finally solid waste triage centers at three towns in the Sahel.

In partnership with the Netherlands, over the last two years, we have completed two suburban sanitation projects. In cooperation with Germany, with the help of grant money, we are implementing several antidesertification projects.

[Lahmar] Can you talk to us a little about Agenda 21 and redevelopment projects?

[Mlika] Agenda 21 National is an integrated set of programs and actions that includes seven distinct programs. First we have the "three hands," blue, green, and yellow. The "blue hand" refers to protection of the seas, beaches, and coasts against pollution. The "green hand" covers expansion of green zones, reforestation, and wilderness parks. The "yellow hand" symbolizes the struggle against desertification in all its forms. PRON-AGDES [expansion not given] deals with management of solid waste: collection, handling, regulation of dumping, composting, etc. In addition, we have industrial pollution abatement and environmental monitoring as well as the sensitization and education program. ONAS has done a great deal to improve urban waste water treatment: The big cities now all have public sewage systems to capture waste water. Thirty mid-size cities have been equipped, with the help of an IBRD [International Bank for Reconstruction and Development] loan. For small towns, the process has begun: Nationally, 75 percent of residences are connected to sewage systems, a percentage considered very high for a developing country. Our country currently has 42 purification stations, 5,500 km of culvert, and 230 pumping stations, thanks to the energetic and able work of our cadres. For the Eighth Plan, D600 million of direct investment has been earmarked. If you count indirect investments paid for by other departments, the figure would amount to 1,400 million. This gives some idea of the high priority we place on the environment.

[Lahmar] Can you tell us where technology transfer comes into the picture, and how much is earmarked for training of cadres?

[Mlika] Drawing on foreign techniques, Tunisian technicians are now building purification stations whose physical plant is 65 percent Tunisian, and which thus cost 50 percent less than if imported, thanks to the know-how of Tunisian enterprises. We have joint research projects under way with ENIT and ENIS [expansions not given] to find pollution abatement solutions. Our training center for advanced station maintenance is training 35 people per year to the associate degree [two years postsecondary] level. In short, the

sector is becoming more and more integrated. We have in the planning stage a national center for environmental technology, in collaboration with friendly countries, to develop specific techniques adapted to our needs: the struggle against desertification, abatement of industrial pollution, etc. The center could be international in terms of its mission and its influence.

[Lahmar] It would seem that a great deal of hope rests on sensitization and education of young people about environmental protection. How, and why?

[Mlika] We have an ambitious national program in this domain, to popularize the principles of environmental education, because education of adolescents and children is expected to change the attitudes of adults and engender the kind of civically responsible behavior that augurs well for the future. We have a project to form "environmental clubs" in the schools with their active participation. "Labib," the mascot, is the "hero" of this project.

Industrial Pollution Sources Identified

94WN0375Z Tunis REALITES in French
30 Jun 94 pp 10-11

[Article by Ridha Lahmar: "Environmental Pollution and Degradation: Zones at Risk"]

[Text] Over the last 30 years, the expansion of human activities—extensive livestock raising, intensified agriculture, construction of irrigation systems, as well as the process of industrialization and urbanization—has by its scope and rapidity led to degradation of the natural environment, and in some zones to deterioration in the quality of life.

The manifestations of this phenomena are many: desertification of some regions in central and southern Tunisia, toxic waste released into the environment by chemical plants located in the beds of wadis [normally dry river channels], declining numbers of fish in the Gulf of Gabes because of phosphoric acid, waste water produced by the inhabitants of lower-income neighborhoods, dumping of domestic waste on the outskirts of big cities, underground water sources polluted by overexploitation of irrigation wells, etc.

High-Risk Zones

Then too there is flooding, and degradation of the littoral as a result of waste from boats that damages our beaches and coasts. What we propose to present is a survey of the status of areas subject to various kinds of pollution problems, a sort of map of Tunisia's high-risk zones, both to illustrate the extent of the phenomenon and to examine measures and plans aimed at remedying the situation through concrete action. At the same time, the state has adopted a comprehensive prevention policy to prevent similar problems from arising in the future.

Among other things, the policy calls for sensitization of adolescents and schoolchildren, civic education, and citizen participation.

Water and Soil

The growth of large-scale sheep raising in central and southern Tunisia has led in many cases to overexploitation of ground cover and pasturage, resulting in impoverishment of the soil and movement of topsoil by the action of wind and running water (erosion). The most spectacular consequence has been increasing desertification and the advance of dunes that threaten oases, crops, and villages: 3 million hectares are threatened, and 18,000 hectares are lost each year. Also, the growth of irrigated farming—fruit plantations and vegetable crops—has encouraged overexploitation of underground water sources: Between 1960 and 1990, the volume of exploitable water resources doubled, from 667 to 1,170 million cubic meters [m³].

Some 85 percent of this water is provided by 100,000 wells, half of them equipped with motor-driven pumps. The consequence of all this uncontrolled drilling is that the water for Chott El Djerid—the Nefzaoua water table—is at risk of being poisoned by salinity.

This phenomenon has become a reality in some parts of Cape Bon, where overexploitation of ground water has made the water unusable, owing to the danger it poses for fruit trees. The citrus trees of Cape Bon were only saved thanks to extra water provided by the Medjerda/Cape Bon Canal. Now the quality of water and soils is an irreplaceable natural boon for agriculture and livestock raising, not to mention for feeding people in the countryside, meeting domestic needs, etc. The use of chemical fertilizers and pesticides in agriculture puts the future of our ground water at risk of pollution.

Large underground water reserves remain in the region of Kairouan and Sfax, Gabes and Medenine, Tozeur and the extreme south; there are somewhat smaller reserves in the zones of Kebili and Tataouine, the Kef, Sidi Bouzid, Kasserine, Gafsa, Jendouba, Ariana, and Cape Bon. Elsewhere (Beja, Siliana, etc.) underground water is very limited.

Coastal Threat

The Mediterranean is an almost-inland sea with a great deal of boat traffic. Undersea currents and the direction of prevailing winds expose our coasts to marine pollution from hydrocarbons and ships dumping ballast on the high seas. Moreover, not all our ports have purification stations. Degradation of the marine environment is obvious at Sfax and Gabes: The natural wealth of the sea is being impaired, as is evident from the decline in fish production. Underwater plant life is deteriorating in a [fish] reproduction zone, while fishermen in coastal waters are overexploiting stocks, as is evidenced by the proliferation of fishing boats and trawlers at Sousse, Mahdia, Sfax, and Gabes.

This report contains information which is or may be copyrighted in a number of countries. Therefore, copying and/or further dissemination of the report is expressly prohibited without obtaining the permission of the copyright owner(s).

The chemical industries situated near the coast, with the toxicity of their untreated wastes, contribute a great deal to pollution of the marine environment.

Flooding Threat

An unusual natural phenomenon, flooding triggers unpredictable calamities for the population and for infrastructure. Their periodicity cannot be established with precision, since it is affected by irregular autumn and spring rains and by the network of wadis, whose valleys are poorly trenched. The most vulnerable regions are Jendouba, Bou Salem, Mateur, Sidi Bouzid, Sfax, the Skhira and Kairouan, and the southern outskirts of Tunis.

The floods of September 1969, March 1973 and 1979, and October 1992 will long be remembered. Discharges from the wadis rose to 1,000 times normal—even 2,000 times normal for several hours—which led to flooding impossible to control without dams or ground cover. Construction of several dams such as those at Sidi Saad on the Zeroud wadi, Houreb on the Marguellil wadi, and Sidi Salem on the Medjerda has helped attenuate the effects of these inundations. But much flood engineering remains to be done: correction of wadi beds, improvement of catchment basins, construction of protective dikes, etc.

Urban Risks

It is in the urban and industrial zones—and by reason of their relatively small size, the concentration of housing and population, the proliferation of factories—that we find pollution at its most spectacular, and at its most distressing, from a quality-of-life standpoint. First, there are problems of collecting and storing solid waste, removing residential waste water, and dealing with more or less toxic industrial waste, not to mention rainwater. These pose the most serious sanitation and public health problems.

The biggest industries are also the heaviest polluters: The cement plants (Bizerte, Tunis, Gabes, etc.) and metalworks (Menzel Bourguiba) pollute the atmosphere with their dust: The El Fouladh steel plant discharges nine tons per day of iron oxide-base dust and carbon monoxide, not to mention the noise pollution and propagation of vibrations at the cementworks. As for the chemical industries (tanneries, for example) and agrofood factories, they pollute the water: Discharges from the 20 tanneries dump 2,500 m³ per day of waste water "rich" in chrome and cyanide, among other things.

The problem consists first of all in getting waste treatment equipment for the industrial facilities, then connecting them to a public drainage system, so waste is not returned untreated to the environment. An example: In the governorate of Ben Arous, which has 615 industrial units, only 13 percent of them have been connected to a public drainage system, while 30 units ought to have pretreatment equipment; 40,000 m³ per day is discharged into Tunis's South Lake by a network of canals.

Bizerte lake, too, finds itself a natural receptacle for waste from the big industrial plants: the Bizerte refinery, STIR, El Fouladh, and the Cementworks. And Bizerte doesn't even have a purification station yet!

At Kasserine, the Sotupalfa pulp factory dumps four tons per year of mercury, by-product of the caustic chlorine, and there is a high risk of contamination of ground water. The waste water contains 375 times as much mercury as allowable under European standards.

At Sfax, where pollution reached such record levels that the Siap-B plant had to be closed down, many steps are being taken to abate pollution from the industrial zones and the port, including waste treatment stations and connection to public drainage systems. Project Taparura, now under way, is an effort to stop much of this pollution, but it is very costly.

In large and even medium-sized cities, the two biggest problems are construction of public waste water drainage systems with accompanying purification stations, on the one hand, and solid waste management—controlled collection and disposal—on the other. Treatment of hospital waste is a special case, which must be considered separately.

To estimate accurately the dimensions of the residential waste problem, you must realize that the average Tunisian "generates" 150 kg per year, or 1.2 million tons, of which 70 percent is organic and 11 percent consists of cardboard and paper. Industrial wastes total 217,000 tons per year, and the volume of special wastes is divided as follows: 2,000 tons per year from hospitals and clinics, 300,000 batteries and dry cells, 75,000 tons from slaughterhouses and hen-houses. A gigantic task. To improve urban sanitation, we have had two major projects—for greater Tunis and greater Sfax—that involved laying 300 km of culvert and building four purification stations. Plus a 17-town project with 240 km of culvert and 26 pumping stations with two purification stations. Finally, a 15-town project to rehabilitate existing drainage systems. And much remains to be done.

INDIA

Papers Assess Outcome of O'Leary Visit

'New Thrust' to Relations

94AS0431A Madras THE HINDU in English 21 Jul 94 p 12

[Article by Sushma Ramachandran: "Indo-U.S. Ties on Even Keel"]

[Text] The hype surrounding the U.S. Energy Secretary, Ms. Hazel O'Leary's recent visit to India has obscured much of the concrete as well as intangible results of what appeared, at times, to be a high-power "tamasha." The Union Power Minister, Mr. N. K. P. Salve's surfeit of flattery and old-world chivalry, coupled with Ms. O'Leary's presentation on Indo-U.S. cooperation, lent a dramatic tone for the visit. The culmination was a concluding ceremony-cum-press conference in a hot, overcrowded room filled with Ministers and officials of both sides where Indian and U.S. officials compered, in turns, while MOUs [Memoranda of Understanding] were signed. As lights shone, TV cameras rolled and photographers clicked away furiously, even Mr. Salve was constrained to wonder whether the right papers had been signed in the midst of all the chaos.

Setting all the publicity paraphernalia aside, Ms. O'Leary's visit has been a tour de force in more than one sense. One of the most significant and yet more indefinable aspects of the trip has been the attempt to erase the memory of Ms. Robin Raphael's tough posturing. The very fact that a Cabinet rank official like the U.S. Energy Secretary has been sent to this country within weeks of the Prime Minister, Mr. P. V. Narasimha Rao's meeting with Mr. Bill Clinton in Washington speaks volumes for the U.S. administration's anxiety to place bilateral ties on a higher plane. The signal apparently is that the days of sending junior administration officials is over. The new approach is reinforced by plans for visits by the U.S. Secretaries of Commerce, Defence and the Treasury the next year followed by a repeat trip by Ms. O'Leary in 1995.

The Energy Secretary did her utmost to defer to Indian sensibilities and focussed on the common concerns and feelings of both the countries. She touched a chord by referring to the inspiration drawn by the American black movement from Mahatma Gandhi in her keynote presentation at the meeting organised by industry associations.

Ms. O'Leary's strategy was a study in contrast to that of Ms. Raphael's. Ms. O'Leary also highlighted the positive aspects of her talks with the Indian Government, even to the extent of declining to mention any area of disagreement on energy policies. "There is no problem that cannot be overcome," was her line.

But she must undoubtedly have been disappointed that the first counter-guarantee agreement for a U.S. investor in an Indian power project could not be announced during her stay. Despite hectic activity in the Power and

Finance Ministries days before her arrival, the legalities involved in drafting an agreement held up a formal decision on granting a counter-guarantee to the Enron Corporation of the U.S. for the controversial Dabhol power project. This would have been the icing on the cake for Ms. O'Leary whose theme right from the airport arrival statement was on "doing deals running into billions of dollars."

This brings us to the most substantive outcome of the visit—the U.S. administration shifting to a relationship on economic ties based on mutual interests. The push to place Indo-U.S. relations on an even keel has clearly come from a hardheaded realisation of the enormous benefits accruing to the American business community from closer political cooperation. To go by Ms. O'Leary's account, calls from leading corporate entities started pouring in as soon as the decision to send a business delegation was announced in Washington during Mr. Rao's visit. This account may be treated with some scepticism by cynics in view of the reported poor publicity given to Mr. Rao's visit in the American media.

But there is no doubt that the business team accompanying the Energy Secretary was a high-power one with representatives from 42 leading companies in the energy and environment sectors. This was in addition to a large team of officials from the departments handling power, oil and gas, environment, coal and renewable energy. Nuclear power agencies were not represented as this area may be taken up for discussion during her next visit in 1995.

The agenda mainly centred on meetings with representatives of the Indian industry. The so-called Indo-U.S. summit meeting organised by the CII [Confederation of Indian Industries], FICCI [Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry] and ASSOCHAM [Associated Chamber of Commerce] became an occasion where official speeches were followed by more constructive informal workshops in each sector where Indian officials and corporate executives could interact with the delegation. While many of the agreements ultimately signed were hammered out earlier, the mood was upbeat on both sides with investment opportunities in India being detailed by the officials concerned.

Even so, few observers could have envisaged that so many MOUs would be concluded in the private sector as well as between government agencies. Agreements on as many as 11 joint ventures in the private sector were finalised and five more official MOUs with an umbrella agreement for bilateral energy consultation were signed by the two countries.

Critics have pointed out that declarations of intent in energy efficiency, coal cleaning technology and fossil energy may be mere publicity hype till agreement is reached in the contentious area of intellectual property rights. It is not widely known, however, that both sides were well aware even before Ms. O'Leary's arrival that a formal agreement could not be concluded in renewable

energy as it comes under a wider protocol on science and technology which has been stalled on the IPR issue. Despite the lack of a formal document, there appears to be no bar on going ahead with collaboration in this area especially as controversial issues are not involved.

What could become a matter of concern, on the other hand, is the view that the solar technology being passed on to Indian companies is obsolete and outdated. According to some accounts, the technology for manufacture of photovoltaics has not been successfully applied in the United States. An even more sensitive issue is the finalisation of counter-guarantees for power projects being promoted by American companies in this country. Ms. O'Leary referred to the importance of financing U.S. investments at the very outset of the official schedule during the roundtable meeting with five Ministers. The need for counter-guarantees by American companies like Enron was also mentioned subsequently based on the argument that the projects would otherwise face financing difficulties from banks abroad.

Clearly aware of the mounting opposition here to the grant of unduly liberal incentives to foreign investors in power projects, the American experience was cited to buttress the case in favour of counter-guarantees. According to Ms. O'Leary, similar guarantees had to be given even by the U.S. authorities when independent power producers initially entered the scene. But these were no longer necessary, as subsequent entrants became aware that the earlier projects were viable and self-sustaining.

These arguments were largely meant to blunt the attack on the proposed counter-guarantees by the domestic industry and media experts rather than to convince the Indian authorities. This was not required since Mr. Salve made it amply clear at various fora that incentives being offered to foreign investors were "irreversible". The counter-guarantees have been accepted as a matter of course though it was clarified at the joint press conference that they would be given on a case by case basis.

This may not be much consolation for domestic industry which was strenuously opposed to the bountiful incentives being given to foreign promoters. But the U.S. Energy Secretary's visit should not be viewed as the spur to policymaking on this score as a decision in principle was taken much earlier to allow guarantees for the first seven projects set up with foreign investment.

Notwithstanding the uproar over counter-guarantees, the O'Leary visit has given a new thrust to Indo-U.S. relations. It has put them on a solid footing. Differences may persist in areas like the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) where Ms. O'Leary is likely to concentrate during her visit next year, but the tone of affability pervading the proceedings this time round augurs well for the future.

Greater Firmness Needed

94AS0431B Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA
in English 15 Jul 94 p 10

[Editorial: "One-Sided Liberalization"]

[Text] Business is a two-way street. So amidst all the hype about the visit of the U.S. energy secretary, Ms Hazel O'Leary, one should not forget that it takes two to tango in business and driving a hard bargain is part of the game. Ms O'Leary was in India to do business and not dole out charity, for she did return home with several deals firmed up even though there was no assurance offered on the easing of the U.S. government's restrictions on the transfer of technology. The four statements of intent signed during her visit, it seems, will acquire meaning only if India signs a wider science and technology co-operation agreement. The Indian government may have difficulties in doing so since wide-ranging commitments on intellectual property rights protection are required. In short, the flow of technology from the U.S. to India will remain restricted even as India generously offers its market to American business. This one-sided liberalisation cannot go on for long. India must liberalise its trade and investment regime and be more open to the world, but it must also strike a hard bargain with those who eye India's market and its skilled manpower. It would have been more useful if the Union minister for power, Mr N. K. P. Salve, had opted for hard-headed business with Ms O'Leary rather than offer her all manner of incentives. After agreeing to give counter-guarantees, a guaranteed rate of return, protection from exchange rate risk and so on, India ought to be expecting a "thank you" rather than saying it.

The myth that foreign investment in power is an act of benevolence on the part of friendly investors who require our protection and gratitude deserves to be exploded. The fact is that India offers an attractive market, given the government's liberal policy regime and the high rates of return assured to the investors. Indeed, India ought to expect more investment, but, irrespective of whether it comes in or not, it must clean up its infrastructure sector so that all investment, public or private, domestic or foreign, is productive. Without such an institutional reform it is not at all clear how fixed returns on high cost foreign investment can be assured. Indeed, if such institutional reform is put through, such high cost foreign investment may not be needed at all. Mr Salve has not revealed how he hopes to ensure better compliance in user charges collection from farmers and businessmen who steal with impunity and from households which are subsidised. Aware of such complexity on the institutional side, foreign investors have demanded and extracted government guarantees. If the government and the state electricity boards do not, however, improve technical efficiency in distribution and the collection of user charges, the government faces the prospect of forking out huge sums of money in a few years from now. All these issues must be convincingly addressed before more guarantees are offered.

Further Details on PRC Foreign Minister's Visit**Qian 18 Jul Press Conference***94AS0424A Madras THE HINDU in English 19 Jul 94 p 1*

[Text] New Delhi, July 18—The Chinese Vice-Premier and Foreign Minister, Mr. Qian Qichen, hopes the ongoing talks between the two countries on force reduction "will soon yield concrete results".

At a press conference here today, Mr. Qian said he hoped the present "close confrontation" or "close proximity" of the two countries forces—which meant the same thing, according to him—would end soon, and that peace and stability would prevail on the border. It was already tranquil, he said.

Asked how many more rounds of talks would be needed to sort out the border issue, Mr. Qian said results should not be expected overnight. He said the Prime Minister, Mr. P. V. Narasimha Rao, concurred with this view.

"Whichever side made advances first, should withdraw first," Mr. Qian said.

It was apparent from some of the observations made at his press conference, and others in the course of his day-long interaction with the Indian leadership, that Mr. Qian's visit was being used by both countries to project an image of rapidly improving relations. On the eve of Mr. Qian's arrival here, the Foreign Secretary, Mr. K. Srinivasan, had spoken to the media in a similar vein.

A Rashtrapati Bhavan release said that during his meeting with the President, Dr. Shankar Dayal Sharma, Mr. Qian noted that the ties between the two countries "had now entered a new stage".

At the press conference, Mr. Qian said that not only were friendly ties between India and China of "fundamental" importance in the bilateral context, but also a necessary factor for peace in the region and the world, given the "new international situation". The leaders of both countries had adopted a "forward-looking approach" in this regard, he said. These observations came in response to a question from a correspondent of Xinhua, official Chinese news agency, on the prospects for future Sino-Indian relations.

In a statement issued on arrival last night, Mr. Qian said China and India were "friendly neighbours" who enjoyed "more than 2,000 years of amicable exchanges". It also said "The Chinese people have always admired the industrious and talented Indian people for their contributions to human progress and development and treasured their traditional friendship with the Indian people."

The statement said that so long as the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence were observed "China and India will achieve their goal of developing long-term, stable, friendly and good-neighbourly relations and mutually beneficial cooperation."

At his press conference, Mr. Qian had to face a volley of questions on the border question and on Kashmir. Asked for his views on the Kashmir dispute by the correspondent of the Pakistan Broadcasting Corporation, Mr. Qian said it was a legacy of history which had not been resolved though there were U.N. resolutions and the Shimla Agreement. Indeed, the dispute had "sharpened". Nevertheless, India and Pakistan should have bilateral discussions to resolve the matter peacefully and should "ease the situation", even if the problem could not be resolved straightaway.

Stand on Sikkim

Asked why China had not recognised Sikkim's accession to India, Mr. Qian said his country had not issued statements on this subject since the Seventies (when it had not recognised the accession). He said that was Beijing's view "in the Seventies", and since then talks were going on which, he hoped, would lead to resolving of the question "gradually".

Asked if China still stuck to its old position, he answered in the affirmative, but said "We are not saying anything specific now. The two sides are discussing the issue now."

Mr. Qian, who had a crowded schedule today, is scheduled to leave tomorrow. Besides the President and the Prime Minister, Mr. Qian had meetings with the Commerce Minister, Mr. Pranab Mukherjee, the Finance Minister, Dr. Manmohan Singh, and the Minister of State for External Affairs, Mr. R. L. Bhatia. An External Affairs Ministry release said the meeting between Mr. Rao and Mr. Qian took place "in an extremely cordial and friendly atmosphere".

Missile Scheme Discussed*94AS0424B Madras THE HINDU in English 19 Jul 94 p 13*

[Article by P. S. Suryanarayana: "Pak, China Discuss Indian Missile Scheme"]

[Text] Islamabad, July 18—India's latest missile development programme seems to have figured in the talks that the visiting Chinese Defence Minister, Gen. Chi Haotian, has had with the Pakistan Prime Minister, Ms. Benazir Bhutto. But there is no indication of China's response to Pakistan's oft-repeated concern over India's so-called "Pakistan-specific" Prithvi missile.

While, according to sources, the Chinese Defence Minister's current visit is basically a "friendship gesture," the Pakistani side is trying to get some political mileage out of this visit which coincides with the Chinese Foreign Minister, Mr. Qian Qichen's visit to India at this time.

Gen. Chi is also leading a defence delegation and issues relating to Sino-Pakistan cooperation in this sensitive sphere are also being discussed at different levels. The two countries have extensive ties in the defence sector

and Pakistan's sense of urgency to beef up its security structures, given its dilemmas over the U.S. stand on the F-16 issue and the Pressler Amendment, makes Gen. Chi's visit important.

Consistent Denial

However, both Beijing and Islamabad, which have consistently denied any transfer of Chinese M-11 missiles to Pakistan, are not inclined to comment on this subject in light of India's Prithvi programme. According to some diplomatic observers here, the question of Pakistan's possible responses to India's Prithvi programme need not necessarily be viewed in the Sino-Pakistan context. On the political dimension of Sino-Pakistan ties, one of Ms. Bhutto's early foreign policy priorities during her second tenure was to checkmate India which, according to her, had made "diplomatic inroads" at the expense of Pakistan in respect of countries such as China and Iran during the previous Nawaz Sharif regime in Islamabad.

However, in February-March this year, Ms. Bhutto had failed to anticipate China's response to Pakistan's efforts to arraign India on the human rights issue on the changing international stage.

It now remains to be seen whether the Benazir Bhutto administration can anticipate China's realpolitik response to Pakistan's concerns regarding the Indian Prithvi programme.

Analyst's Assessment

94AS0424C Madras THE HINDU in English 20 Jul 94 p 1

[Article by K. K. Katyal: "Qian Breaks No New Ground"]

[Text] New Delhi, July 19—The visit of the Chinese Vice-Premier and Foreign Minister, Mr. Qian Qichen, was significant for the reiteration, at the political level, of the resolve to strengthen bilateral ties and to sort out existing problems, with greater expedition, if possible. There was neither an advance on the subjects that had figured in the on-going talks between the two sides nor breaking of any new ground.

Mr. Qian's discussions with the Indian leaders confirmed, as was expected, the validity of the compartmentalised approach by the two sides—to concentrate on areas of commonalities, like economic relations, approach to issues concerning new world order and international relations, human rights, etc. and reserve the cases of disagreement, notably the boundary-related matters, for separate treatment. These nuances were reflected in Mr. Qian's observations at his press conference on Monday in response to specific, at times sharp, queries. The varying interpretations of his remarks—his hope for an early concrete result of the talks on troops reduction in the border areas, on the one side, and his ambiguity on Sikkim on the other—prove the point.

An expert group, comprising diplomats and military officials, had been engaged in working out the nitty gritty of the agreement on peace and tranquility on the border, signed during the Beijing visit of the Prime Minister, Mr. P. V. Narasimha Rao, in September last year, but had not made much headway. Obviously, differences on the depth, extent, timing and nature of withdrawal of the troops from positions of "close confrontation" (China's description) or "close proximity" (India's characterisation) and the alignment of the Line of Actual Control (LAC), had persisted. An inkling of what possibly was holding it up was available from Mr. Qian's observation that "Whichever side made advances first should withdraw first". The expert group, it appears, was stuck on Samdurong Chu area, because of the differences on "who advanced first" there.

Nonetheless, the present Chinese postures mark an advance over what was the case, say, four years ago. Beijing then was averse to the very idea of delineating the LAC, what to say of the pull-back of forces. The agreement of September last year, though confined to principles, was a landmark. But implementation of the conceptual arrangements was also important.

Positive Ambiguity

On Sikkim, Mr. Qian chose to be ambiguous, but it was a positive ambiguity from India's standpoint. Beijing, he said, had stopped issuing statements since the seventies (when it said it did not recognise Sikkim's accession to India). He made two other points—one, China's position had since not changed; and two, both sides were holding discussion on the subject. Some time ago, the Chinese Ambassador to India, Mr. Cheng Ruisheng, hinted of Chinese acknowledgement of Sikkim being part of India.

It is a pity that China continued to be equivocal on Sikkim—and on Arunachal Pradesh—though India, on its part, had given no cause for complaint to Beijing on issues related to China's territorial integrity. New Delhi recognised China's stand on Tibet and Taiwan. To cite a recent example, it took care to ensure that the trade office, proposed to be set up in Taiwan, would be a non-official outfit. The purpose is to realise the potential of economic relationship with Taiwan in the same way as China had gone about it.

On Kashmir, Mr. Qian reiterated the present Chinese stand, favouring a peaceful solution to the problem through discussion between India and Pakistan. Though he did mention the U.N. resolutions as also the Shimla Agreement—in response to a query by a Pakistani journalist—the dominant impression, conveyed by him, was of support to bilateralism. China, it implied, was opposed to internationalisation of Kashmir. As a matter of fact, Beijing provided clearer indication of its position on the subject recently. It follows, therefore, that any Pakistani move to take the Kashmir issue to the U.N. General Assembly would not have China's support.

If Mr. Qian's visit helps to impart a new urgency to the job undertaken by the expert group and the two sides are

able to disentangle their troops at the border, move on to the delineation of the LAC and to put in operation additional confidence-building measures, it would serve a useful purpose. Otherwise the credibility of the entire negotiation process would be affected.

Further Reportage on Relations With PRC

Border Trade Resumed

94AS0425A Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA in English 20 Jul 94 p 15

[Text] United News of India, Shimla, July 19—After a gap of 32 years, India and China resumed border trade through the Shipkila Pass in Kinnaur district of Himachal Pradesh last Saturday.

Trade has been resumed following an agreement signed between the two countries on September 7 last during the Prime Minister's visit to Beijing.

A trade mart has been set up at Namgia village in Kinnaur district and another in Tibet.

The Himachal Pradesh chief minister, Mr Virbhadra Singh, while welcoming the starting of trade markets, said the opening up of this traditional route and setting up of the trade marts, will go a long way in promoting the development of friendly relations between the two countries and their people, besides helping boost the trade and commercial activities in the remote areas.

The Himachal Pradesh government has designated the Kinnaur deputy commissioner as trade authority and the state industries director as coordinator at state level for the Sino-India trade.

The industries director, Mr S. Negi, said trade in all commodities, including traditional items, would be undertaken. Trading activity will, however, be restricted to trade marts set up on both the sides.

On the Indian side, the market is located at Chhupan in Namgia village of Pooh tehsil in Kinnaur district. Namgia is connected by motorable road.

The market on the other side of the border will be at Jiuba, about five km north of Shikipki. Travel passes have been issued to 63 traders by the trade officer at Namgia and by the Kinnaur deputy commissioner, Mr Desh Deepak.

Mr Negi said the trade markets would be open from June to October every year depending upon weather conditions. Transactions will be carried out both through the barter system as well as in fully convertible currency.

Mr Negi said the Himachal government had taken steps to create infrastructures like tented and other accommodation facilities for traders, seasonal accommodation facilities for the staff of the customs, police, banks and other related establishments to facilitate trade.

Mr Desh Deepak said on telephone that Indian traders could go to Tibet for carrying out trade. However, no trader from China could come to the Indian side as certain bridges on way from Tibet to Namgia along the Sutlej river had been washed away.

About six km of motorable road linking Namgia with Chhupan is under construction. The state government has liaised with the border roads organisation to maintain the existing mule track to Chhupan till a permanent road was completed.

Mr Desh Deepak said several items, including wool, goat cashmere (pashom), goat and sheepskins, yak hair and tails, salt, borax, China clay, butter and silk, will be imported from China.

However, import of goat and sheepskins, yak tails, and yak hair will be subject to the provisions of the convention on international trade in endangered species.

Items to be exported include agricultural implements, blankets, copper products, textiles, cycles, coffee, tea, barley, rice, flour, dry fruits, dry and fresh vegetables, vegetable oils, gur, tobacco, snuff, cigarettes, agro-chemicals, local herbs, dyes, spices, watches, shoes and kerosene oil.

Trade and commerce relationship between India and Tibet have existed since centuries. In northern India, the famous Hindustan-Tibet Road was the main trade route touching Shimla, Rampur Bushahar, Chini in Kinnaur district and entering Tibet at Shipkila, near Namgia village in Kinnaur district.

Today, the road with marginal realignment, is known as national highway 22 and extends up to Kaurik on the India-China border beyond Namgia along the Spiti river.

Various high mountain passes leading to different centres in China, were also used as trade routes. Various travellers during British times have given vivid accounts of Indo-Tibetan trade conducted through various trade routes in Kinnaur.

Economic Ties Stressed

94AS0425B Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA in English 23 Jul 94 p 7

[Article by Anita Katyay: "India, China To Stress on Economic Ties"]

[Text] The Times of India News Service, New Delhi, July 22—Long standing adversaries, India and China, are now attempting to shake off their old suspicions by shifting the focus away from the pending territorial dispute and concentrating instead on building bridges through improved economic ties.

Mr. Rajiv Gandhi's visit to China in 1988 followed by the Prime Minister, Mr. P. V. Narasimha Rao's trip last year, provided the necessary impetus for the upgradation

of Sino-Indian economic relations as the political leadership on both sides accepted that if closer political ties are to be forged, it would be most appropriate in the changed international scenario to focus on bilateral trade and joint business ventures.

"When heavy investments are made in each other's country, the two are more likely to behave with each other," explained a senior official of the external affairs ministry. The idea, he said, is to build stakes on both sides. Moreover, increased trade and business leads to increased interaction among the people with the result that old disputes tend to become secondary, he added.

With the political leaders giving out the right signals, the message has percolated down as the volume of trade between China and India has registered a substantial growth, having increased from \$390.33 million in 1992 to \$675.73 million in 1993, while the visits of business and ministerial delegations have been stepped up. The Chinese commerce minister was here last June while their metallurgy minister is presently here to negotiate a huge investment for iron ore mining.

Even the latest visit of the Chinese foreign minister, Mr. Qian Qichen, although essentially a political interaction, had a strong economic component to it. The fact that he held lengthy meetings with the finance and commerce ministers here is being viewed as a positive indication of China's inclination to step up economic relations. This was further reflected by the Chinese request asking that the agreement on avoidance on double taxation be signed during their foreign minister's visit.

Mr. Qian's remarks that there is immense scope for developing economic and trade linkages and that India and China should work towards making their border into "areas of friendship" by opening of new border trade posts, is also being viewed in the same positive light.

The Lipulekh pass in U.P. [Uttar Pradesh] and the Shipkila pass in Himachal Pradesh have already opened but negotiations are on for opening more such posts in the Eastern sector, including Nathu La. The Chinese have some reservations about Nathu La for that would imply the recognition of Sikkim as part of India but South Block officials are confident of resolving this contentious issue soon.

While the mood on both sides is upbeat, officials and industry circles also acknowledge that the pace of improvement on the economic front has been rather slow. Officials said though trade between the two countries nearly doubled from 1992 to 1993, it is nothing compared to China's total foreign trade last year which was as high as \$195 billion.

Similarly, officials pointed out, that though China has attracted foreign investments to the tune of \$25 billion, India's share is woefully small with only 25 Indo-Chinese joint ventures having been planned so far. Exports to China had so been concentrated primarily on steel, iron

and chrome ores, in view of the construction boom there but India has also identified a wide range of new products which it can supply to China and the areas in which the two can collaborate. These include pharmaceuticals, automobile components, chemicals, textile machinery, open caste mining machinery, software services, agro products, earth movers and aerospace.

Ranbaxy, it was stated, is the first Indian joint venture in China while Lupin, Tata's and Bajaj are also negotiating similar projects. A team of National Aeronautics Limited (NAL) had visited China last month and the Chinese are now sending a team of experts next month.

South Block officials complained that though they were moving full steam ahead to provide the necessary information and remove all the institutional bottlenecks, the industry has been slow to respond. Trade delegations visiting India, they feel, have been dwelling on generalities and have failed to address themselves to specifics. It is also their view that Indians are hesitating to venture into China as they continue to be inhibited by their past relations.

Dr. Chanjrajit Chanana, the former industries minister and chairman of the Institute of Industrial Economics, agreed that though things are looking up, the "world of China remains unexplored as far as India is concerned." Indians, according to him, are constrained by lack of sufficient information from the Chinese side. In addition, he said, absence of banking relations, shipping and air links, poor transportation network between the two countries and patchy communication facilities act as a hindrance to the development of trade.

The Confederation of Indian Industries (CII), which recently sent a fact-finding mission to China, has also noted that there is a lot of potential for trade and joint business ventures with the two joining hands for third country exports as well. The CII report has said that though the Chinese are interested in doing business with India, they too are not well informed about the demands of the market here.

Pakistan, India Expel Diplomats for Spying

94AS0443A Bombay *THE TIMES OF INDIA* in English
13 Jul 94 pp 1, 15

[Article: "Pak, India Expel Diplomats"]

[Text] Islamabad, July 12.—Pakistan today expelled an Indian diplomat, Mr V.S. Chauhan for "espionage" and gave him a week's time to leave the country. In a similar action, India also expelled a Pakistani diplomat and a staff member of its high commission in New Delhi on the same charges today.

Mr Chauhan, was earlier today picked up by Pakistani security agencies while allegedly receiving sensitive documents from a Pakistani agent.

According to the official news agency APP (Associated Press of Pakistan), Mr Chauhan was an undercover agent of the Indian intelligence agency, RAW (Research and Analysis Wing (Intelligence Agency)).

As per the interrogation carried out by the Pak security agencies, Mr Chauhan allegedly disclosed that RAW was behind many of the alleged sabotage activities in Pakistan and he was also aware of the deployment of the Pak army in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir.

Mr Chauhan's arrest follows the apprehension of Mr Mohammad Afzal Bajwa, a non-diplomatic staff of the Pakistan high commission while he was allegedly receiving sensitive Indian documents from an agent in New Delhi. The Pak foreign office here alleged that Mr Bajwa had been manhandled by Indian security agencies.

The Indian government's decision to seek the expulsion of Mr Naseerudin Ahmed, the first secretary, and Mr M.A. Bajwa, who was apprehended by police here yesterday, was conveyed to the Pakistan high commissioner, Mr Riaz Khokkar, by the foreign secretary, Mr K. Srinivasan.

An external affairs ministry spokesman told news persons Mr Khokkar was summoned to the foreign office where Mr Srinivasan conveyed India's strong protest at the "unlawful detention and brutal torturing" of Mr V.S. Chauhan last night in Islamabad by the Pakistani agencies.

Mr Khokkar was told by Mr Srinivasan that according to information with the Indian authorities Mr Bajwa had been indulging since long in espionage along with Mr Naseerudin Ahmed.

The conduct of Mr Ahmed has come to the notice of Indian authorities as incompatible with his status as an accredited diplomat in India, the Pakistani envoy was informed.

Mr Bajwa, an upper division clerk, was caught yesterday "red-handed" by the police here while allegedly receiving a 107-page document relating to defence from an Indian contact in exchange for Rs 3,000 and a carton of cigarettes. The contact man managed to escape and Mr Bajwa was handed over to the Pakistani high commission after questioning.

Meanwhile, the Indian high commission in Islamabad has lodged a strong protest with the Pakistan foreign office for the "forcible abduction and subjection to sustained third degree interrogation" for over six hours of Mr Chauhan late last night by agencies of the Pakistani government.

A high commission spokesman said that the action was in obvious retaliation for the "red-handed" apprehensions, a few hours earlier by authorities in New Delhi, of a Pakistan high commission official, Mr Mohammad Afzal Bajwa, while receiving sensitive documents from an Indian contact.

The high commission sent the protest note to the foreign office noting that the incident was a "blatant violation of

the code of conduct for treatment of each other, diplomatic personnel, signed between the two countries in August 1992" the spokesman said.

Similarly, the Pakistan foreign secretary, Mr Najmuddin Shaikh summoned the Indian high commissioner, Mr S.K. Lambha, to convey a "strong protest" against the alleged "involvement of Mr Chauhan in activities prejudicial to the interest of Pakistan and incompatible with his diplomatic status."

Mr Chauhan was handed over to the Indian high commission officials at 3 a.m. today at a police station in Islamabad.

The Indian high commission in a press release said that Mr Chauhan was abducted by Pakistan intelligence operatives at 8.35 p.m. yesterday outside his residence after he had left the house of Indian high commissioner, Mr Lambha.

"He (Mr Chauhan) was handcuffed, blindfolded and bundled into a car and taken to an interrogation centre where he was chained and beaten up and forced to sign a document whose contents he does not know.

"From there he was taken to a deserted hilltop where he was again beaten up by more than 20 people and forcibly photographed accepting documents while seated in his car. The car had been separately driven from his house to the deserted place," the release said while denying the Pakistani allegations.

Following repeated intervention by the Indian high commission, Mr Chauhan was released only at 3 a.m. today after having been tortured for over six hours, it said.

"A medical examination at the police station revealed that Mr Chauhan had suffered severe injuries including subconjunctival haemorrhage in the right eye, bruises on the face, wrist and ankle and haematoma in gluteal region and back and thigh," the release said. Mr Chauhan was later admitted to a local hospital for further check-up.

According to the high commission, the violence to which Mr Chauhan was subjected was "extreme in nature."

The release said that the high commission was concerned at the increasing frequency of wanton violation by the Pakistan government of the bilateral code of conduct for treatment of each others' diplomats.

The high commission maintained that the incident involving Mr Chauhan was the 118th violation of the code of conduct against Indian diplomatic personnel which had been conveyed to the Pakistan foreign office since January 1993.

These included incidents of intimidation and harassment of high commission officials and their family members and vandalism of their property.

The press release said that a proposal of New Delhi in April this year for a meeting to review the implementation of the code of conduct was rejected by Islamabad.

Spokesman Reports No Progress in Talks With Pakistan

94AS0428A Bombay *THE TIMES OF INDIA* in English
23 Jul 94 pp 1, 13

[Names as published]

[Text] The Times of India News Service, New Delhi, July 22—The first round of official-level talks between Indian and Pakistani officials to review the implementation of the code of conduct for treatment of diplomats and consular personnel ended inconclusively today with both sides accusing the other of breach of the code.

The Indian side was led by the joint secretary, Pakistan, Mr Bhadrakumar, while Pakistan was represented by the deputy high commissioner, Mr Shahid Malik. The discussions lasted about 90 minutes.

The outcome was a foregone conclusion as Pakistan has persistently refused to hold structured discussions on the implementation of the code, formulated in August 1992 after the Mittal incident in Islamabad. Since then the number of incidents of harassment of diplomats and consular staff on the two sides have multiplied and the diplomatic missions of the countries are more involved in mud slinging rather than constructive dialogue.

An official spokesman said India had conveyed regret and disappointment over Pakistan's persistent violation of the code of conduct in total disregard of accepted norms of behaviour. The Indian side emphasised that the entire range of issues relating to the functioning of its diplomatic establishments in Pakistan needed serious discussion. New Delhi has expressed its readiness to do so.

The only hopeful sign to emerge from this morning's discussions is that both sides agreed to continue the dialogue when "mutually convenient, both in New Delhi and Islamabad."

Last week, New Delhi had proposed discussions at the joint secretary's level between the two countries after both had expelled two officials each for "behaviour incompatible with the status of an accredited diplomat". A Pakistani junior functionary, Mohammed Afzal Bajwa, had been nabbed redhanded in Connaught Place while accepting top-secret defence documents. He and a first secretary had been expelled.

The same evening, Islamabad had reacted by expelling two Indian officials on similar charges. Mr V. S. Chauhan, an official posted at the Islamabad mission, had been mercilessly beaten by the Pakistani security agencies before being released.

The official spokesman described as "totally false" the reports carried by the Pakistani media about Bajwa

having been beaten up after being apprehended. The Pakistani media had splashed photographs of Bajwa being brought out in a wheel chair, with a collar band and a fractured arm while deplaning at Lahore airport after his expulsion.

The spokesman showed a video film made of Bajwa in police custody at the Connaught Place police station. He is shown to be perfectly normal with not a scratch on any part of his body. He was also examined by an Indian and later by a Pakistani doctor.

In the last part of the film, Bajwa is shown walking normally to a car accompanied by Mr Asif Durrani, head of chancery, in whose custody he was released by officials of the ministry of external affairs.

The spokesman said in April this year, New Delhi had proposed a review of the Code of Conduct. But Pakistan had rejected this proposal outright within a week of receiving it. The code has a clause which calls for a periodic review.

Citing instances of Islamabad intransigence in implementing the code, the spokesman cited, among other instances, the vandalism perpetrated at the residence of the Consul General in Karachi and the ransacking of the Indian Airlines office in that city in early December 1992.

In early 1993 New Delhi has sent in a claim for compensation of Rs 63 lakhs for the damage caused to the consul general's house and Rs 10 lakhs for the damage to the IA [Indian Airlines] office.

To this, Islamabad had responded by demanding more details. Since then no compensation had been paid though the code enjoined that diplomatic and other property damage had to be paid for by the host country.

Other violations of the code by Pakistan relate to the issuance of visas to consular staff on assignment. Though the code prescribes 30 days for the issuance of such visas Islamabad always procrastinated on the issue. Even at the moment about 17 requests for assignment visas are pending with Islamabad.

The spokesman described as a "ploy and completely stage-managed" the Pakistani allegation that their naval attache had been attacked on Tuesday in the Sarojini Nagar area. He said he would give further details on the alleged attack.

Militant Incursions Said Beginning in Ram Nagar

94AS0420B Jalandhar *PUNJAB KESARI* in Hindi
3 Aug 94 p 4

[Article by Rajiv Jandiyal: "Militants have Started Incursions in the Ram Nagar Area of Jammu Due to Government Neglect"]

[Text] We warned the Jammu-Kashmir administration last year that if strong steps were not taken to curb

terrorism in Ram Nagar tehsil (county) in the Jammu area, its condition would soon parallel Doda district's predicament. But the administration did not adhere to the warning seriously and the condition there continuously deteriorated for the worse. The terrorists are taking full advantage of this official neglect of the area. In the beginning they started to loot the residents and now frequent murders are routine.

As soon as the governor of Jammu-Kashmir declared an improvement in the situation, the terrorist incursions in the area jumped unproportionally. Many had to leave their homes for secure places. It is sad that in spite of all these terrorist excesses the administration did not heed the warnings. As a consequence a heart breaking incident occurred on July 20 that compelled 250 residents of Ram Nagar to leave their homes. Incidents like this prove the falseness of the governor's statement that the terrorists are loosing ground.

The frequency of the terrorist assaults in this region amply demonstrate the extent of the alertness of the Jammu-Kashmir administration in this area. Encouraged by Pakistan, these terrorists have continuously engaged in strengthening their position here.

The terrorists had indicated their presence in the Ram Nagar area long ago by exploding a weak device. The local leaders repeatedly requested the administration to take immediate decisive steps to curb the terrorism before it took root in the peaceful Ram Nagar area but to no avail. This silence on the part of the administration encouraged the terrorists and they attacked the Basantpur police station resulting in the death of a head constable. In fact, in the history of Ram Nagar that was the day of initiation of the black days to come. After this day it was not possible for the inhabitants to sleep peacefully, and surprisingly even the gravity of this incident did not see any response from the administration. This inactivity on the part of the administration worked as a green signal for the terrorists. Their aspirations broadened and the public had to pay the price. The loss incurred by the tehsil (county) due to the indifference shown by the administration is irreparable. After this occurrence the residents of the most peaceful county in Jammu-Kashmir are compelled to live under the shadow of terrorism. The terrorists succeeded in every undertaking and the hardships for the residents continue to pile up.

After the July 20 incidence in the Ram Nagar region, during my travel to Basantgarh village, the residents told me that initially the terrorist's demands were limited to 500-700 rupees or a few cows but now their demand has gone to 20-30 thousand rupees or they insist on payments of two thousand rupees a month. Hundreds of cows and goats etc are seized at gun point.

The frightened residents were suspicious that certain local people were assisting the terrorists. Their conviction is based upon the fact that during every attack the terrorists always enter the master bedroom with the prior knowledge of its location. This is possible only if they have connections with the local people. Expressing their grave concern they said that so far the honor of their daughters and wives is safe but if they are attacked we will be forced to leave our homes like other families have done. It does not appear, however, that the situation will return to normal. The working ethics of the local police confirms this assumption. The incidence of July 16 amply confirms this feeling. On June 25 the terrorists had warned the inhabitants of Panget village to keep a monetary ransom ready in the absence of which they were lose their lives. Police had full knowledge of this warning. But on July 16 once again, terrorist activity killed one person. If police had shown some awareness, this incidence could have been avoided and terrorism restrained. Due to the police apathy the terrorists were able to augment fear in the village. Under these circumstances when the administration and police both have proved to be ineffective in protecting the life and property of the residents, they are left with no option but to flee.

During my travels, I noticed that the local population was destitute and had no means even to flee and was, therefore, destined to bear the burden of the terrorists' excesses.

In one incidence, it is said, that the villagers while endangering their lives were able to chase away the terrorists, but the police was unsuccessful in locating those terrorists.

According to some sources, about 500 terrorists most of whom are Pakistanis and Afghans are actively running a training camp in Dhar Sipoz. They ceaselessly try to recruit innocent local people. The local residents are very distressed with the terrorist activities and expect the government to provide them relief from these terrorist attacks and to chase the terrorists out of their region.

On one hand the governor says that the condition has remarkably improved while on the other hand the remaining tehsils (counties) in Jammu are falling prey to terrorist activities. Under these conditions the governor's statement appears to be a joke. Recently, Pakistani Prime Minister Mrs. Benazir Bhutto had said that after claiming victory in Kashmir and Doda, the terrorists are proceeding toward other areas of Jammu region. At that time nobody took Mrs. Bhutto seriously. But it now appears that the terrorists are bent upon justifying what Mrs. Bhutto had said earlier. On July 22 a [Pakistan Military Intelligence [ISI] trained Pakistani terrorist was killed proving that the terrorists are now firmly rooted in Ram Nagar area, but eminent police officers are still not

ready to accept that the Ram Nagar area is infested by the terrorists. Many area residents, fearful of the terrorists, are spending their nights in the woods. It appears that the government is not at all concerned with the difficulties locals are faced with.

Terrorist activities that started last year now poses a serious threat. First Kashmir then Doda and now peaceful places like Ram Nagar are falling prey to the terrorists, and the administration with its ears sealed is sitting unaware of the approaching danger. It is because of the wrong policies of the government that the terrorists are successful in expanding their area of influence. The point to ponder is why, at a time when the sources indicated that a terrorists training camp in Dhar Sipoz is operative, the police officials still maintain that the issue of chasing the terrorist away from the camp is under consideration.

The inaction by the Jammu government in not ending terrorism in this county is in reality very surprising. But it can be decisively said that the failure of the government to stop terrorism here will have dangerous repercussions. It is noteworthy that the Ram Nagar area has long been known for its communal goodwill and has never harbored any communal tensions.

There is still time to correct the situation by enforcing strong measures. If the government chooses the right and clear remedial policies, the situation can still be brought under control. But if the administration misses this chance, it will be extremely difficult to correct the situation.

The geography of this region is very difficult and the security forces cannot secure every inch, therefore, it is essential that weapons be issued to those who can resist and protect themselves and others from the terrorists. This will develop a sense of security in the people of this region and they will not be forced to flee their homes like the people of Doda district had to.

Congress-I Said Worried About Effects of Scandal

94AS0420C New Delhi JANSATTA in Hindi 2 Aug 94 p 1

[Text] New Delhi, August 1. A section of Congress parliamentarians are worried about opposition anger over the securities scandal. They also steam during their conversation in the central hall. Some have even passed on their opinions to the officials of the parliamentary group. These people say that to save two or three party members, the entire party should not be put on the stand. But this apprehension is devoid of leadership and also lacks a united voice.

The Minister of State for Home Affairs, Rajesh Pilot, tried to obtain resignations of the ministers concerned with the intention of passing them on to the Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao, so that in the name of reorganizing the council of ministers, Mr. Rao might get rid of the accused ministers. This effort was viewed as if Mr. Pilot was engaged in glorifying his leadership. His effort also indicated that business within the Congress is not as usual. Because of this undertaking, the prime minister has rebuked and silenced Mr. Pilot. This information is attributed to the highly placed sources.

The anxiety of the party in power, with the resignation of the opposition from the parliamentary committees tomorrow, will intensify. Some maintain that the people close to the prime minister did not develop a proper offensive on this issue. Also, after the presentation of the joint parliamentary committee's report on the surety scandal, and during the debate the government was under tremendous pressure. According to the sources, at that time also the parliamentary congress leadership was not able to sustain an effective position. The All-Indian Congress' Committee [AICC] had developed its offensive strategy in consultation with the parliamentary membership from respective states. But at this time nothing of much magnitude was conceived. Even after the Chairman of the Joint Parliamentary Committee, Mr. Ramnivas Mirdha had expressed his displeasure at the action report, Minister of Parliamentary Affairs Mr. Vidya Charan Shukla tried to pacify him in a prolonged conversation in his parliament office. [passage omitted on opposition boycott of parliament]

This is a U.S. Government publication. Its contents in no way represent the policies, views, or attitudes of the U.S. Government. Users of this publication may cite FBIS or JPRS provided they do so in a manner clearly identifying them as the secondary source.

Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) and Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS) publications contain political, military, economic, environmental, and sociological news, commentary, and other information, as well as scientific and technical data and reports. All information has been obtained from foreign radio and television broadcasts, news agency transmissions, newspapers, books, and periodicals. Items generally are processed from the first or best available sources. It should not be inferred that they have been disseminated only in the medium, in the language, or to the area indicated. Items from foreign language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed. Except for excluding certain diacritics, FBIS renders personal names and place-names in accordance with the romanization systems approved for U.S. Government publications by the U.S. Board of Geographic Names.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by FBIS/JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpts] in the first line of each item indicate how the information was processed from the original. Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear from the original source but have been supplied as appropriate to the context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by the source. Passages in boldface or italics are as published.

SUBSCRIPTION/PROCUREMENT INFORMATION

The FBIS DAILY REPORT contains current news and information and is published Monday through Friday in eight volumes: China, East Europe, Central Eurasia, East Asia, Near East & South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and West Europe. Supplements to the DAILY REPORTs may also be available periodically and will be distributed to regular DAILY REPORT subscribers. JPRS publications, which include approximately 50 regional, worldwide, and topical reports, generally contain less time-sensitive information and are published periodically.

Current DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications are listed in *Government Reports Announcements* issued semimonthly by the National Technical Information Service (NTIS), 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, Virginia 22161 and the *Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications* issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

The public may subscribe to either hardcover or microfiche versions of the DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications through NTIS at the above address or by calling (703) 487-4630. Subscription rates will be

provided by NTIS upon request. Subscriptions are available outside the United States from NTIS or appointed foreign dealers. New subscribers should expect a 30-day delay in receipt of the first issue.

U.S. Government offices may obtain subscriptions to the DAILY REPORTs or JPRS publications (hardcover or microfiche) at no charge through their sponsoring organizations. For additional information or assistance, call FBIS, (202) 338-6735, or write to P.O. Box 2604, Washington, D.C. 20013. Department of Defense consumers are required to submit requests through appropriate command validation channels to DIA, RTS-2C, Washington, D.C. 20301. (Telephone: (202) 373-3771, Autovon: 243-3771.)

Back issues or single copies of the DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications are not available. Both the DAILY REPORTs and the JPRS publications are on file for public reference at the Library of Congress and at many Federal Depository Libraries. Reference copies may also be seen at many public and university libraries throughout the United States.

END OF

FICHE

DATE FILMED

27 Sep 94